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Abstract: 
 
The label Salafee-Jihaadee has been used to categorize Islamic groups that 
espouse violence against the West and Muslim regimes. The typology of Salafee-
Jihaadee is met with vehement disapproval and criticism from adherents to 
Salafism. For this reason, the portrayal of Salafees as violent extremists requires 
scrutiny.  
 
This study aims to make a unique contribution to knowledge of Salafism by 
surveying an extensive literature review, supplemented by interviews of known 
Salafee clerics based upon the premise that Salafism is an antidote to Islamic 
extremism rather than a cause of violent jihaad and terror.   
 
Furthermore, this research aims to offer new insight into existing literature and 
theory regarding Salafism. By re-examining current theory this research attempts to 
show that Salafism is an antidote to violent extremism. Therefore, there is a clear 
need to explore the relationship between Salafism, violent extremism, and 
takfeerism. 
 
In chapter one Salafism is defined and its key features as a movement are 
characterized and evaluated. Chapter two analyzes Salafees’ view and role in 
denouncing violence and extremism. Chapter three introduces alternative 
assessments of Salafism as a movement and evaluates the arguments put forth by 
its critics. Chapter four investigates Salafist perceptions of pluralism particularly in 
Western non-Muslim societies. Chapter five details the role of Salafees and their 
counter arguments to extremism. The final chapter details the conclusions of the 
research, which indicate that Salafism is not a precursor to violence, but rather the 
efforts of Salafee scholars offer effective counter-narratives to the jihaadee-
takfeeree paradigm.   
 
Commonly Used Terms 
 
Ahl al-Sunna 
Counter-narrative 
Extremist 
Jihaadee 
Manhaj 
Salafee 
Salafism 
Shaikh 
Takfeer 
Terrorism 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
 
Ahl al-Hadeeth: Reference to scholars of the hadeeth sciences who primarily 
adhere to a more literal approach in understanding Islamic texts. 
 
Al-Ra’yy: A methodology of textual analysis that gives preference to analogy, 
intended purpose, and logic to deduce sharee’a rulings.   
 
Al-wala’a wa al-bara’a: The concept of loving what Allah loves according to the 
Qur’an and - and disavowal of polytheism and non-Muslims. 
 
Bid’a: Heresy, which is of two types: one that causes a Muslim to be 
excommunicated from the faith, and the other type, which is considered 
blameworthy and sinful. 
 
Fatwa: Religious ruling issued by Muslim cleric.  
 
Fiqh: Jurisprudence 
 
Hizbeeya: Blind partisanship based upon un-Islamic principles.  
 
Hizbee: Practitioner of partisanship. 
 
Ijtihaad: Jurisprudent reasoning. 
 
Mathhab: Jurisprudential school of thought. 
 
Manhaj: Methodology of understanding Islam and its textual evidences. Also, the 
term is a reference for the methodology of propagation. 
 
Modernists: Those Muslim thinkers and academics who generally take a more 
secular approach towards understanding Islam. They tend to shun literalism and 
tend to be more socially liberal regarding sharee’a maxims such as hijaab, 
polygamy, and the role of sharee’a in contemporary settings. 
 
Salafee: A Muslim who adheres in creed and methodology to the understanding of 
the first three generations of Muslims.2 
 
Salafism: A contemporary descriptor for the creed and methodology of the first 
generation of Muslims. 
 
Shi’a: Non-Sunni community of Muslims that claim that ‘Alee should have been the 
rightful leader of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet (saw). The 																																																								
2 Commonly Anglicized words like words like Allah, Islam, Qur’an will retain those spellings and differ 
with the transliteration system used in this research.  
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Shi’a are comprised of a vast sectarian tradition and generally considered 
unorthodox by Sunni jurists.  
 
Shirk: Polytheism or polytheistic belief as considered by Islamic texts.  
 
Sunna: Statements, actions, habitual practices of the Prophet (saw) recorded in 
authenticated hadeeth literature.  
 
Sunni: One who practices Islam according to Sunna traditions. Salafees use this 
term to denote those who practice the Salafee methodology and at other times to 
denote those within the broad Sunni tradition which excludes Shi’a. 
 
Taabi’een: The scholars who met and acquired knowledge from a Companion of 
the Prophet (saw). 
 
Takfeer: The creed of declaring a Muslim to be an apostate. 
 
Tawheed: Islamic monotheism 
 
Taqleed: Blind following a school of thought or individual without regard to the 
soundness of the individual’s opinion and accepting it as sharee’a evidence. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CVE: Centre for Violent Extremism 
 
ISIS/ISIL: Islamic State group headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, known for its 
brutality and uncompromising application of, what they believe, to be Islamic law. 
 
Saw: Abbreviation meaning may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, which is 
written after the name of the Prophets.  Example: the Prophet (saw). 
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Introduction 
 
The time in which we live, is one of great political turmoil, economic uncertainty and 
rising political violence.  The common narrative held by the media and intelligence 
agencies, both Western and Eastern, is that the root cause behind ‘Islamic’ 
extremism and political violence is Salafism. However, this research project will 
argue that this does not offer an adequate explanation, nor seem accurate when 
scrutinizing empirical data, Salafee literature and religious doctrine, thus requiring 
further analysis into the phenomenon of ‘Islamic radicalism’ and Salafism.  
 
Personal Insight on the Topic 
 
My personal interest in the topic is due primarily to three reasons. Firstly, having 
studied under several leading Salafee scholars has given me a personal 
connection and insight into the topic. Secondly, my association with Salafee 
principles and creed makes me feel an urgency to investigate further the many 
claims against the movement.  Thirdly, I have personally known several persons 
who were affected by radical ideologies, resulting in their imprisonment, and in 
some cases their becoming informants for Western intelligence agencies. 
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Literature Review 
 
Although there is literature outlining Salafee theology with analysis of contemporary 
extremist ideology of groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Shabaab, there does not 
appear to be extensive research into contemporary Salafism and its role in 
denouncing political violence. This proposed project aims to fill the gap in literature 
through interviews, and analysis of pre-existing English resources with an emphasis 
on Arabic literature. 
 
An analysis of these precepts can be useful in determining whether Salafism is as 
accommodating of political and social contexts, and pluralism as its adherents claim, 
or if instead, it is the foundation of violent extremism, as most media and policy 
makers tend to assume.  
 
Building on the work of Baker (2011), Lambert (2011) and the applicant's own 
master’s dissertation (2009) this PhD research project will explore the Islamic basis 
on which Salafees act as antidotes to al-Qaeda and related terrorist propaganda. 
Whereas Baker and Lambert focus primarily on the UK, this research will have an 
international and transnational remit, centered on Saudi Arabia. Interviews will be 
conducted with significant Salafee scholars with a view to establishing the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of interventions by Salafee scholars against al-Qaeda 
propagandists and related extremists such as Anwar al-Awlaki. In doing so, the 
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research will engage closely with the ground-breaking work of Michot (2006).3 
Interviews will be supplemented and supported by an analysis of literature 
produced by both Salafee scholars, al-Qaeda, and related extremists. Much of 
the literature being reviewed has not previously been translated into English and 
many of the interviewees have not previously been interviewed in a research 
context. This is the basis on which the research thesis will aim to fill a vacuum in 
current scholarship and add an Islamic perspective to complement and develop 
important work by al-Qaeda and Saudi specialists such as Hegghammer (2006), 
Wictorowicz (2006) and Lia (2007). 
 
Labeling and categorizing a social movement like Salafism can be difficult due to 
the various definitions and understandings of who is a legitimate Salafee and what 
makes a Muslim Salafee. However, as authors like Haykel suggest, “It is 
nonetheless well-established that the Salafis [sic] claim to be engaged in a process 
of purifying Muslim society in accordance with their teachings, and that the 
designation Salafi [sic] is prestigious among Muslims because it denotes the 
earliest and therefore authentic version of Islam…” (2013). As Haykel suggests 
association with the Salaf carries a certain degree of prestige and legitimacy with it 
and the term is derived from hadeeth literature.  Haykel also raises important 
research issues, which this research will attempt to answer. He states, 
 
          “But beyond these facts it would be useful to know why the term Salafi [sic],     
          which in the late nineteenth century referred to modernizing and reason- 
          minded Muslim reformist scholars, has come to be identified with the  																																																								
3 Michot’s analysis of Ibn Taimeeya’s verdicts show how extremists often misappropriate his ideas to 
justify violence. 
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          Wahhabis for whom reason-based (‘aql) arguments are anathema. What is  
          the difference, if any, between a Salafi [sic] and a Wahhabi? [sic] How old  
          is the term Salafi [sic] as a designation for a particular group or movement  
          among Muslims?” (2013).  
 
The primary sources of this research project will be Salafee texts, speeches, and 
interviews, which will then be translated into English. Primary sources will be 
scrutinized to understand and contextualize the origins of modern day Salafism as a 
movement. Also, these sources can provide insight into the creed and methodology 
as propounded by Salafee clerics who head the movement.  
 
Additionally, critical analysis of the politico’s texts and speeches will be analyzed to 
make the case that their ideology and movement have important fundamental 
differences which must be considered when scrutinizing Salafism and referencing 
Salafee scholarship. 
 
Secondary sources used in this research will consist of academic articles and texts 
written about Salafism, extremism, and counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Shaikh al-Albanee’s collection of religious verdicts (2010) is a critical source with a 
collection of over 600 transcribed audio cassettes and religious verdicts. This 
compilation offers critical insight into modern Salafism because al-Albanee is 
considered one of the revivers of Salafee thought in the 20th century. He is also 
known as one of the greatest contemporary scholars in the science of hadeeth 
study. This collection details the creed and methodology for understanding Islam 
according to contemporary Salafees. Further, it illustrates a proactive response to 
jihaadee-takfeeree ideology. In contemporary times, al-Albanee’s fatwa regarding 
the use of the term Salafee as a descriptor is often cited by Salafees as evidence 
for the obligation to use that term to distinguish oneself from heterodoxy and 
heretical practices. This compilation will be referenced throughout the research due 
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to its extensive detail of the Salafee creed from one of the leading contemporary 
scholars of Salafism.  
 
Bin Baz, the former muftee of Saudi Arabia, also referred to as the Imaam of Ahl al-
Sunna in contemporary times by Salafees, details Salafee thought through his 
compilation of religious verdicts (2000). In addition, his verdicts criticize takfeeree-
jihaadee principles illustrating how Salafism rejects the use of suicide bombers and 
shuns violence in general as a means of reform. This collection of verdicts, like al-
Albanee’s, comprises of both creed and methodology for understanding Salafee 
propagation. 
 
Another important collection of religious verdicts detailing both creed and 
methodology is that of Shaikh Muhammad al-‘Uthaimeen’s (2013). This work forms 
many of the common assumptions of this research: extremism and terrorism are 
alien to Islamic thought and that Salafee methodology is a means of reform.  
 
An additional critical compilation of religious verdicts that will be relied upon in this 
study is that of Shaikh Rabee'a al-Madhkhalee (2013). Al-Madkhalee’s verdicts 
detail how Salafees interact with other groups, as well as the parameters for 
determining whether someone is Salafee. The author is often accused by his critics 
of being harsh and excessive in declaring others to be unorthodox in approach. The 
Shaikh’s books are some of the most extensive and detailed works regarding 
Salafee creed, methodology, and refutations of extremist ideologies.  
  
Shaikh Ahmed al-Najmee‘s fatwa collection (2009) is also of great benefit and very 
influential in grasping what is meant by manhaj or methodology in contemporary 
Salafee literature. Al-Najmee’s work concentrates on many conceptual theories 
pertaining to methodology.  
 
Shaikh Muqbil al-Waadi’ee’s fatwa collection (2013), although he is a Yemeni 
scholar, is also immensely influential in detailing Salafee creed and methodology for 
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understanding and propagating Islam. The Shaikh’s former institute Daar al-
Hadeeth in Damaaj, Yemen, has graduated thousands of students from all over the 
world, and any study of contemporary global Salafism and methodology would be 
incomplete without analyzing the Shaikh’s contribution. 
 
Secondary Sources  
 
Critical to understanding many of the contemporary assumptions and the 
categorization by academics of Salafees is Wiktorowicz’s work (2006). Most 
contemporary studies of Salafism rely upon Wiktorowicz’s classification system with 
few challenging his basic supposition that Salafees and Jihaadees can be linked 
together. These assumptions of Wiktorowicz will be explored and critiqued during 
this research. Some of the main claims posited by Wictorictz are: 
 
1. Salafees represent a diverse community with a common creed 
2. Salafees reject Islamic pluralism  
3. Salafees share a common approach to religious jurisprudence but often 
interpret contemporary politics and conditions differently 
4. Salafees share common creed but differ over explanations of contemporary 
world problems which in turn leads to different solutions;  
5. Salafees believe that the application of human intellect and logic to original 
sources are dangerous and there is no room for interpretive differences; 
6. the various Salafee factions are all tied to the same educational network.  
 
The doctrine of loyalty and disloyalty, a very controversial topic, is one of the 
important pillars of the Salafee creed and researchers like Bin Ali (2012) claim that 
it perpetuates an extremist world view and encourages inter-communal violence. 
Bin Ali’s research offers understanding into one of the root causes of religious 
extremism, analyzing both takfeeree and Salafee discourses. The work also 
illustrates the gradation of the various interpretations of the concept of loyalty and 
disloyalty and how each interpretation varies with regards to its stance towards 
violence. Bin Ali‘s hypothesis is well argued, however it still relies upon the 
accepted categorization used by many in Western academia without challenging 
the assumed spectrum of Salafism: pacifist, politico, and violent. Based upon this 
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categorization he concludes that Salafee constructs of disavowal are problematic, 
hostile, and out of sync with contemporary globalization. 
 
Wagemakers (2013) looks at the transformation of the concept of loyalty and 
disavowal stating that it is a radical conception. The work analyses loyalty and 
disavowal from a historical perspective as practiced amongst Arab tribes and 
concludes it is a pre-Islamic concept.  The study posits that it was initially viewed by 
Hanbalees as religious innovation, and that Ibn Taimeeya broke with the Hanbalee 
view and adapted the concept to become something positive in order to preserve 
religious tradition and orthodoxy. Furthermore, he claims that Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
al-Wahhaab and later al-Maqdisee followed and expounded upon Ibn Taimeeya’s 
thoughts.  He concludes by including al-Maqdisee within the same Salafee tradition 
as the fore mentioned scholars with the exception that al-Maqdisee made loyalty 
and disavowal central to his ideology. Although useful in tracing the theory 
conceptually and historically the inclusion of radical jihaadists like al-Maqdisee into 
the broader Salafee tradition is problematic as it, like many of the texts surveyed for 
this research, contains assumptions and categorizations which do not accurately 
depict Salafist doctrine. 
 
Another useful resource is Ashraf‘s PhD thesis (2012) on the ideology of al-Qaeda. 
He argues that al-Qaeda’s ideology can only be understood by gaining an 
understanding of current political crises in the Middle East and Muslim grievances 
as articulated by fundamentalists. He concludes that al-Qaeda has no clear 
ideology but instead an unclear political agenda. This work supports the assumption 
that al-Qaeda should not be considered a Salafee movement or trend in Salafism. 
The research outlines the political dogma of al-Qaeda, which it asserts is only 
framed in religious terms. The study shows that the grievances of al-Qaeda tend to 
be more political in origin than religious.  
 
Finally, Weeks (2012) raises an important question: do current UK counter-terrorist 
strategies increase safety or contribute to radicalization of Muslims? The work 
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explores how counter-terrorism policy can lead to adverse policy results. This study, 
like Lambert’s, gauges models of cooperation between Western intelligence 
agencies and Salafee communities, set in the context of the UK. 
 
By questioning the common narrative that Salafees are responsible for political 
violence in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and Somalia, we can begin to 
uncover the ideology behind the rhetoric, identify the true perpetrators of political 
violence, and what factors influence them. Answering these questions can assist in 
forming effective counter-terrorism policy, as well as offer more in-depth analysis 
into the Salafee creed and methodology, which can benefit academics.  
 
Research Problem 
 
The research problem identified in this study is that Salafee Islam has been 
misconstrued and incorrectly categorized as a violent ideology, which consists of a 
pacifist dormant strand, a politico strand, and a violent jihaadist strand, with the 
latter being the ideology most attributable to violent takfeeree extremists.   
 
There are many advantages to acquiring a more precise understanding regarding 
the relationship between Salafism, extremist ideology and political violence. 
 
First, accurate information aids both academics and intelligence agencies, by 
identifying perpetrators and potential perpetrators of political violence, and assists 
in formulating anti-terror strategy. 
 
Second, factual information gives media better tools of recognizing terror suspects 
and aids in more accurate dissemination of information and quality reporting. 
 
Third, accurate data helps policy makers in formulating more effective counter-
terrorist policies with less risk of alienating whole groups or minority communities 
who are adversely affected by inaccurate intelligence and group profiling.  
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Fourth, by accurately identifying the ideology of perpetrators and propagators of 
extremist beliefs governments can prevent the criminalization and marginalization 
of Muslims internationally, and Muslim minority communities in Western countries.  
 
This study aims to identify and scrutinize Salafee scholarship, doctrine and 
literature, both early and contemporary, with a focus on the concept of jihaad, 
peaceful coexistence in non-Muslim societies, secularism and democracy, and 
violent political protest. 
 
Research Questions  
 
This research aims to investigate whether Salafees offer solutions to political 
violence, Islamic radicalization, and whether their scholarship counter-balances 
extremist propaganda internationally, since scholars in both Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen have tremendous influence on Salafee communities worldwide. In addition, 
this research aims to explore how, and to what extent, Salafee scholars counter 
radicalism in Muslim communities internationally, and to scrutinize groups like ISIS 
and al-Qaeda to determine whether they are in fact Salafee in their ideology, as 
they are commonly classified.  In addition, this research examines the following 
questions in the process of investigating the problem: 
 
1. Is it correct to classify Salafee Islam into various ideological strands? 
2. Does Salafee Islam encourage violent extremism and the radicalization of 
new converts? 
3. Is Salafee Islam a new ideology or trend within the broader Islamic tradition? 
4. What role if any does Salafee Islam play in countering violent extremism and 
proponents of violent jihaad? 
5. Can Salafee Islam operate in a pluralistic society where Muslims are the 
minority? 
 
The aims of this research are as follows: 
 
1. to find out if Salafism is a solution to extremist ideology 
2. attempt to provide a framework in which to authenticate Salafism and 
distinguish it from other religious trends  
3. to identify key proponents of Salafism 
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4. to critically analyze the categorization of Salafism commonly held by 
academics and detractors of Salafism; therefore, this research attempts to 
highlight some inherent flaws of this classification. 
 
The main benefit of exploring this research topic is that it can be a tool for analyzing 
Salafism as a movement adding to the gap in literature as well as rethinking and 
challenging existing assumptions that Salafees espouse violence and contribute to 
the rise in global extremism. 
This problem is important: 
 
• due to the controversy surrounding Salafees and their portrayal as violent 
extremists and radicals, 
• to clarify the Salafee role and position in countering radicalism and 
scrutinize the effectiveness of their approaches and methodology in 
countering extremism, 
• to see if there are common grounds and ways of forging new models of 
cooperation with the global Salafee movement in combating radicalism by 
further exploring the work of Helmus, York, and Chalk (2011) and the 
findings of Spalek and McDonald (2012), 
• in providing firsthand experience and an insider’s view of global Salafee 
involvement in countering extremist ideology. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
I propose to address the problem by extensive investigation into Salafist literature, 
websites, and audios as well as conduct personal interviews with leading Salafee 
scholars and clerics. In addition, the research will attempt to quantify the 
percentage of speeches Salafee clerics devote to refuting other sects and violent 
extremists. The means of testing these questions will be through analyzing sermons, 
lectures, and Salafee literature both in Arabic and English. Also, interviews will be 
conducted with leading Salafee scholars exploring questions of their ideology, 
stance on radicalism, their role in countering extremism, and their perception of 
their effectiveness. In addition, this study will investigate questions of cooperation 
with Western intelligence agencies in countering terrorism and the parameters for 
doing so. 
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Finally, an analysis of how Salafee scholars employ the science of jurisprudence 
fundamentals and terminologies will be analyzed to broaden the understanding of 
apparent contextual differences and diversity throughout the Salafee movement.     
 
Feasibility 
 
The researcher has the unique advantage of having both studied formally and 
informally in Yemen and Saudi Arabia with some of the world’s leading Salafee 
scholars, who play a prominent role in the dissemination of the Salafee paradigm.  
Possessing fluency in the Arabic language, and currently residing in Saudi Arabia 
give the applicant unique access to various scholars in both countries making it 
very feasible to complete the proposed study, as well as add significant insight and 
experience to the proposed research project. 
 
Limitations of Research 
 
Some clerics might feel apprehensive and resistant to involvement in the study, as 
it might be perceived as invasive and treated with suspicion. This would thus limit 
the sample of subjects to be interviewed and reduce the intended outcome of the 
research.   
 
Another limitation of this research is that much of the analysis and literature that 
will be reviewed is that of what is commonly classified as the Salafee purists since 
they fit the criterion and set parameters, which define Salafism. Part of the 
research question explored here is whether it is fair to, in fact, classify other groups 
as Salafee at all? 
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Chapters  
 
In chapter one Salafism is defined by outlining the creed and methodology as 
articulated by Salafee scholars to offer insight into how some of the most prominent 
Salafees see themselves. In addition, the literalist methodology commonly 
associated with Salafees is explored and its effects upon textual interpretation. This 
chapter attempts to lay down the foundation for determining parameters of Salafism, 
which will later serve as a criterion for judging certain actors and movements 
relevant to this analysis of extremist ideology.  
 
Chapter two explores the role of Salafees in denouncing terror and religious 
extremism by analyzing sermons and statements of Salafee scholars regarding 
groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.  
 
Chapter three looks at the views of critics of Salafism and the role think tanks play 
in classifying Salafees into politicos, jihaadees, and pacifists, and the implications of 
those taxonomies.  The putative classification is critiqued and challenged, and the 
researcher’s observations are given at the end of the chapter. 
 
Chapter four discusses Salafee perceptions of Western societies and the status of 
Muslim minorities. Pluralism and democracy are also critiqued from a Salafee 
perspective to determine if there is a correlation between Salafee discourse and 
extremist views. 
 
In chapter five observations will be drawn with a critical evaluation of the data 
presented and an overall assessment of Salafee scholarship as an anecdote to 
extremism in hopes that this will further contribute to the growing body of literature 
on Salafism by offering more relevant and substantial tools for classifying and 
identifying radical extremists within the Muslim community. 
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Chapter six will encapsulate the study by discussing its key findings and lessons 
learned throughout the research. Finally, the chapter will discuss limitations of the 
research and offer suggestions for further study.    
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Chapter One: Salafee Creed and Methodology 
 
 
Definition of Salafism 
 
Salafees are often percieved as extremely dogmatic due to the exclusivity of their 
views and practices. While this researcher concurs they exhibit exclusivity in their 
manhaj it must be acknowledged that they repudiate violent extremism. Similar to 
many non-violent Christian movements, like the Amish, they may not seem 
mainstream in their approach; however, in general they do not espouse violence. 
This is why during the course of this study it is hoped to determine their role as an 
antidote to violent extremism. Salafism, often referred to as the Salafee manhaj 
(methodology) or da’wa (call), is a complete belief system and practice aiming to 
adhere to the creed and methodology of the earliest Muslim community (Salaf). To 
understand Salafees’ paradigm and accurately comprehend their religious 
orientation, it is necessary to look at how they view themselves and their da’wa.  
Shaikh Muqbil al-Waadi’ee argues, “The founder of the Salafee da’wa is the 
Messenger of Allah (saw). The ascription to this da’wa is not like the association of 
the hizbees (partisan groups). Its whole purpose is to actualize in practice these 
esteemed attributes in the one who ascribes to it” (al-Qaleesee 2015:15).  Salafee 
scholars are insistent that their da’wa is distinguished from other groups and 
methodologies by claiming its origin stems directly from the Prophet’s (saw) da’wa. 
Shaikh al-Dhafeeree states, “The Salafee manhaj is not a man-made ideology that 
developed due to new ways of thinking and advancement like other ideologies and 
belief systems advanced by man, going through various stages: a stage of origin, 
then being spread, then another stage of progression” (2013:74).4 Salafees see 
their da’wa as the only acceptable propagation of Islam, which they claim, 																																																								
4 Critics like Wiktorowicz allege, “Salafees frequently exhibit the arrogance of scientific certitude. 
Because theirs is only one straight path and saved sect, the Salafee creed and method are seen as 
inexorably producing the “correct “Islamic understanding” (2005:5). Salafees do not claim to be 
pluralistic and accommodating towards other sects and ideologies; however, the question remains 
are they violent and do they espouse violence? This is one of the research questions that will be 
explored throughout this research.   	
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emanates from the Prophet’s (saw) da’wa based upon principles derived from the 
Qur’an and Sunna. Shaikh al-‘Uthaimeen asserts that the Salafee da’wa is: 
 
          the most authentic da’wa, because it does not contradict the sacred texts.  
          It is the most knowledge-based path because the Salaf took their creed  
          from the Book of Allah and the Sunna of His Messenger (saw). Moreover,  
          it is the wisest path because they took the way they were obligated to take,  
          based upon the literal meaning of the texts (al-Qaleesee 2015:21).                             
 
The general perception of most Muslims, with the exception of some Shi’a sects, is 
that the ascription to the earliest generations of Muslims is praiseworthy. Salafees 
view that ascription as an absolute necessity for Islamic legitimacy. Ibn Taimeeya 
asserts, “There is no harm for those who exemplify the mathhab of the Salaf, 
ascribe to it, and associate to it. Rather, it is an obligation to accept that from them 
by consensus because the mathhab of the Salaf is indisputably the truth” (2006:47). 
The crux of the Salafee argument is that the way of the Salaf is binding upon all 
Muslims to follow and ascribe to. Furthermore, that the understanding and practice 
of the Companions, the leaders of the Salaf, form an infallible system.5 Bin Baz, the 
former muftee of Saudi Arabia, was asked if it was from arrogance, or self-praise to 
call oneself a Salafee, and he responded, “If he is really Salafee then no problem. 
Similarly, the Salaf used to say: he is Salafee or so and so is Atharee” (al-Fawzaan 
2011:87). Another renowned scholar of Salafism, Shaikh Ahmad al-Najmee, states, 
“Salafism is an attribution to the Salaf. The Salaf denotes the Companions of the 
Messenger of Allah (saw) and their followers from the first three generations. Also, 
those who follow them in righteousness, then this is the concept of Salafism” (2004 
p.72).  
 
																																																								
5 This does not mean the Companions are considered infallible; however, their methodology and 
those issues that they had consensus upon are considered infallible (Ibn Taimeeya 2006:126). Al-
Albaanee stated, “If there is a statement of a Companion and it does not contradict the texts from the 
Book of Allah or the hadeeth of the Messenger (saw), and the action or statement was known 
between the Companions without any differing opinions, then we can be comfortable in practicing 
that Companion’s action or statement” (al-Sha’baan 2010:12). Some scholars posit that it is the 
collective understanding of the Companions that constitutes evidence rather than the statement of a 
single Companion.  
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Salafees like to emphasize that their da’wa is not simply based upon an empty 
claim and only true practitioners can be considered Salafee. An applicable fiqh 
principle often cited by Salafees is ‘the reality of something is not in its name but in 
its substance.’ This principle states that regardless of a claim something does not 
change its given characteristic. Therefore, although an individual may claim to be 
Salafee, that is not sufficient in determining the reality of that individual, or free him 
from sectarianism. For Salafees this means that it is not merely an empty slogan to 
refer to one’s organization, group, or an individual as Salafee, but instead it is the 
understanding and practical application of Salafee principles that determine 
whether one is Salafee or not.   
 
The Salafee creed and methodology can be traced back to the traditions of early 
Sunni Muslims such as Ahl al-Hadeeth (people of hadeeth). Salafees are known for 
their strong emphasis of the hadeeth sciences and literalism similar to Ahl al-
Hadeeth. Imaam al-Shahrastaanee states about the original group, “The reason 
they are called Ahl al-Hadeeth is because of their vigor in obtaining hadeeth, 
transmitting them, and extracting rulings from the texts. They did not use analogies 
as long as they had hadeeth or narrations to base their rulings” (2011: 1/84). Ahl al-
Hadeeth alludes to those individuals who collected, compiled, and spread hadeeth 
and were more literal in their approach to the texts.  They were very literal in their 
methodology probably due to their meticulous scholarship and rigid criterion used 
for authenticating texts by scrutinizing narrators, the texts themselves, and laying 
down principles for the hadeeth sciences.6 Another attribute of Ahl al-Hadeeth is 
that they were also critical of blind following anyone in rulings although other 
scholars after that era began to canonize the mathhabs and introduce the concept 
of taqleed 7  contrary to the way of the original Imaams. All of these various 																																																								
6 Some of the famous schools of Ahl Hadeeth were in Hijaaz, Iraq, Shaam, they were from the 
followers of Imam Maalik, Shaafi’ee, Sufyaan al-Thawree, Dawood al-Asfahanee, and Imam Ahmad 
bin Hanbal. During the second and third century hijra imams such as Yahya bin Sa’eed al-Qahtaan, 
Wak’ee bin al-Jaraah, Sufyaan al-Thawree, and Sufyaan bin ‘Ayaina, Shu’ba bin al-Hajaaj, ‘Abd al- 
Rahman al-Mahdee, Al-Awzaa’ee, and Laith amongst the many (al-Ashqaar 2005).  
7 The term is used to denote blind following a particular scholar or group without regard for the truth 
either as a result of being incapable of understanding an opposing viewpoint or unwilling to due to 
strict partisanship.   
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characteristics attributed to Ahl al-Hadeeth are also found in the methodology of 
contemporary Salafees and indicates why they place so much emphasis on 
hadeeth sciences. Al-Najmee asserts, “Associating to Salafee da’wa means 
adhering to what the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (saw) were upon, and 
to the path of Ahl al-Hadeeth. Ahl al-Hadeeth refers to those who traverse the path 
of the Salafee manhaj. Salafism is the belief in the divine names and attributes of 
Allah, belief in divine destiny, and in the status of the Companions” (2004:32).8 
The usage of the term Salafee signifies that the practitioner adheres to a certain set 
of values emphasizing creed with a particular orientation and methodology of how 
to articulate that creed as a means of reforming both individual and society. The 
term Salafee is an ascription for the practitioner of the creed and methodology of 
the Salaf. Haykel observes, “It is important to understand Salafis [sic] as 
constituting a group that defines its reformist project first and foremost through 
creedal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also, important, though secondary, for their self-
definition are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics” 
(2013:35). Salafees view themselves as reformers of the Muslim nation, reviving 
the orthodox creed using the same methodology of understanding used by the first 
generation of Muslims, in turn, their view is that it is an obligation to adhere and 
associate to the Salafee doctrine.  Shaikh al-Albaanee referred to this reformation 
process as tarbiya wa tasfiya (education and purification). His view was that 
reformation of the Muslim community could only come about through education of 
the masses in the pristine religious tenets espoused by the Salaf and the practice 
and reformation of the self (2007). This reformation would then allow the Muslim 
community to confront contemporary problems and issues. This concept of 
reformation is derived in part from the statement of Imaam Maalik who said, “The 
latter generations of this nation will not be corrected except by that which rectified 
the first generation” (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1999:3/221). This statement is a direct 
reference to the return in understanding and practice of the Salaf. Statements like 																																																								
8 Around the 3rd century hijra, some sects began to appear, collectively known as Ahl al-Kalaam, 
which began to dispute the literalism espoused by Ahl al-Hadeeth. Also, they differed over some of 
the creedal tenets and how they were interpreted. Al-Najmee was probably referring to those specific 
tenets of faith due to immense dissension between Ahl al-Hadeeth and Ahl al-Kalaam. 
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these lend credence to the Salafee perception that solutions of contemporary socio-
political problems of the Muslim community will come about only by revisiting the 
methodology of the Salaf.   
 
Salafees claim to adhere to a long and continuous tradition, which shuns both 
cultural interpretations of Islam, and any practices or beliefs deemed unorthodox, or 
seen as encouraging partisanship.9 According to the claims of scholars like al-
Najmee: 
 
          Salafism is one. Whoever claims that there is an old Salafism and a new  
          Salafism, has lied. If we ponder on the creed of the Salaf from the time of  
          the Companions until now we will find one creed. They did not disagree  
          regarding it. When they did disagree, it was not in belief or fundamentals,  
          but rather in subsidiary rulings. When they did differ in subsidiary issues  
          they did not consider one another blameworthy… (2004:244).  
 
Several points require highlighting in light of the Shaikh’s statement. First, the 
Salafee view that there is only one legitimate da’wa and there is no cause for 
distinction between the manhaj of the Salaf and contemporary Salafees 
methodology. Second, that this tradition, according to Salafees, is continuous and 
its proponents have existed throughout Islamic history from the time of the Prophet 
(saw). There is evidence from hadeeth to suggest that there is a Muslim group that 
will maintain orthodoxy from amongst the greater community that will be present 
until the last days before judgment, and this will be scrutinized in the section 
regarding Salafee creed.   
 
Some contemporary critics of Salafism claim that as a methodology it is impractical 
to attempt to apply puritanical principles to contemporary issues. El-Fadl asserts: 
 
          This approach besides being ahistorical, proved to be hopelessly simplistic  
          and naive (as) – it was impossible to return to Qur’an and Sunnah [sic] in a  																																																								
9 This point is hotly contested as some academics and indeed contemporary scholars deny Salafism 
as a concept and term were used outside of twentieth century (see section on Problems with 
Contemporary Classifications).   
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          vacuum (because) a return to the Qur’an necessarily meant a return to  
          classical sources that commented on the context and meaning of the  
          verses and that explained the collection and documentation of the Qur’anic  
          text (2001:174). 
 
El Fadl’s observation is valid in as far as recognizing the difficulties of 
contextualizing the sacred texts and the tensions that arise in using classical 
interpretations to apply to modern-day settings in a rapidly changing world. Also, El-
Fadl’s view illustrates, that for some, the issue is not the importance of the Salaf, 
but rather the applicability of their methodology in a modern-day context. For 
example, the role of women in society during the time of the Prophet (saw) and their 
relegation to predominately domestic roles in opposed to contemporary time where 
women are often in leadership positions, and where the norm is for a woman to 
function without a guardian. So how do Salafees reconcile classical interpretations 
with the varying complexities and differing realities faced in a contemporary world? 
The answer to that question will be deferred till the third chapter when discussing 
the critics of the Salafee methodology. 
 
Principles of Salafism  
 
So, what criterion is there for determining whether or not someone is Salafee after 
accounting for errors an individual may have? To answer this question precisely 
requires analyzing the criterion put forth by Salafee scholars. 
 
Salafism is a complex set of principles based upon a particular creed and 
methodology for understanding the sacred texts. According to Shaikh ‘Ubaid al-
Jaabiree some key principles of the Salafee da’wa are: ascribing to Salafism, strict 
adherence to the truth as articulated by the apparent meaning of sacred texts, 
loving and hating in accordance with principles of the religion, contesting those who 
differ with the Salafee understanding, and strict adherence in practice to the Qur’an 
and Sunna (2015). 
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This first principle, as mentioned by Shaikh al-Jaabiree, is ascribing to the Salafee 
manhaj. As previously mentioned, this ascription is deemed necessary by most 
Salafee scholars even if they do not deem it necessary to declare it openly. For 
example, Salafee scholars agree that following the Salaf in practice and creed and 
referencing them are obligations. However, the obligation of openly proclaiming one 
is Salafee is an area of contention between Salafee scholars.10 The position of 
scholars like al-Albaanee and al-Jaabiree seems clear: they both exhort to openly 
proclaiming one’s Salafism as an obligatory ascription to distinguish from the 
various Islamic sects that have arisen throughout time and to exemplify the creed 
and methodology of the Salaf (al-Jaabiree 2015). Shaikh al-Albaanee stated, “This 
ascription (to the Salaf) is not to an individual nor group of individuals in the same 
way we find other contemporary groups…rather it is an attribution to infallibility. 
That is because it is not possible for the pious Salaf to be united upon misguidance. 
However, this is not the case for those after them” (2011: 2/212). Shaikh al-
Albaanee’s comment underscores Salafees’ vehement disassociation from 
partisanship to other than the way of the Salaf, as posited previously, and that the 
Salafee paradigm is that the methodology of the Salaf in understanding Islam is 
perfect; however, on an individual level a person may err by deviating from those 
principles.  Other guidelines that follow under the ascription to Salafism and denote 
one’s authenticity as a Salafee are: 
 
1. that the basis for evidence for a Salafee comes from Qur’an, Sunna, and 
consensus 
2. in general, those who differ with those principles are considered deviant 
3. that the most legitimate consensus is that of the first three generations of 
Muslims 
4. the jamaa’a is based upon the Companions’ paradigm 
5. all issues mentioned as principle in sacred texts and by consensus is usool 
(Salafee foundation)   																																																								
10 However, as some scholars suggest, if there is harm in openly declaring one is Salafee then it 
becomes necessary to refrain from ascribing to it openly.  
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6. differing from usool is innovation  
7. not everyone who falls into religious heresy is a heretic, but they must be 
examined and meet the criterion for heresy (al-Najjaar 2011).11 
 
The second principle states that the apparent meaning of the sacred texts takes 
precedence over opinion or ijtihaad. This is an integral part of the Salafee manhaj 
because it illustrates the Salafees’ more literal approach to understanding the 
Qur’an and Sunna to deduce rulings.  In light of this principle, al-‘Uthaimeen 
mentions speech as being divided into two main categories: literal and figurative. 
Literal speech further separates into three categories: linguistic, sharee’a based, 
and customary usage. He then posits that the base methodology of Qur’anic 
exegesis is literal unless there is evidence to support that it is figurative. He states, 
“It is not permissible to interpret linguistic expressions as figurative unless there is 
sound evidence which prevents its literal meaning” (al-‘Uthaimeen 2006 p.78). The 
importance of this principle cannot be overstated because stemming from it is the 
Salafee interpretation of the sacred texts. Also, this literalism has a profound impact 
on the tenets of creed. For example, Salafees interpret the verse “The Most-
Merciful rose above His throne” (Qur’an 1996 5:20), literally as meaning Allah rose 
over His throne in a manner that suits His majesty without describing or inferring 
how, and at the same time rejecting anthropomorphism.  This was based upon a 
fundamental principle of the Salaf and their methodology. “We know that the 
mathhab of the Salaf from the Companions-may Allah be pleased with them-and 
the Taabi’een and those who followed them, was to understand the evidence 
regarding (divine) attributes literally without distorting the meaning or making 
analogy” (al-Shawkaanee 2013: 27). 
 
The third principle is challenging other groups and sects, which differ with the 
Salafee manhaj. It should not be understood that Salafees’ primary role should be 																																																								
11 Heresy is a term used to describe religious innovation or deviancy from the Salafee creed or 
manhaj. This does not necessitate one being excommunicated from Islam unless the action, belief, 
or statement necessitates expulsion from the religion according to the sacred texts or consensus of 
the scholars. For details regarding the criterion for heresy, bid’a and takfeer refer to The Khawaarij 
and the Creed of Takfeer (Green 2009).  
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to pursue debates and arguments regarding theological matters; however, as a part 
of the manhaj it is necessary to refute opposing ideologies if one is capable and 
possesses the appropriate scholarly credentials. Scholars like al-Fawzaan state, “It 
is impermissible for beginning students and laypersons to busy with declaring 
people to be innovators or sinners, because it is a serious matter and they do not 
possess knowledge and competency in these issues” (al-Fawzaan 2011:189). 
Although scholars like Imaam Ahmad described refuting Ahl al-Bid’a as a religious 
duty, and in fact a type of jihaad, it was never intended as the responsibility of all 
Muslims, especially if they did not have the prerequisite knowledge to do so 
effectively. The Salaf “prohibited debating and argumentation if the one debating 
was weak regarding knowledge and evidence, and ambiguous in responses, and it 
was feared that the deviant one would misguide him” (Ibn Taimeeya 1997:3/227). 
 
Also, stemming from this principle is Salafees’ repugnance for association to 
individual figureheads, which emanates from statements of classical scholars like 
Imaam Maalik who said, “Everyone’s statements can be accepted or rejected 
except the inhabitant of that grave” (Ibn ‘Abdul Barr 2011:2/118).12 The context of 
this narration is that Imaam Maalik was pointing to the grave of the Prophet (saw). 
This narration illustrates the concept that no scholar is beyond reproach and it 
emphasizes the command to follow the Prophet (saw), and the fundamental of 
returning all affairs back to the Sunna. Ibn ‘Abbaas said, as narrated in Ahmad, “I 
believe they will soon be destroyed. I say the Prophet (saw) said (such and such), 
and they say Abu Bakr and ‘Umar prohibited (such and such)” (1972: 4/112). 
 
Salafees as a group tend to be very decentralized and do not ascribe themselves to 
a particular leader or party, but instead they gain their prestige from their 
acknowledgement and strict adherence to following the path of the Salaf. This was 
also the case of the Companions, who are considered the leaders of Ahl al-Sunna, 																																																								
12 Echoing the statement used by Imam Maalik, Shaikh al-Albaanee said, “And do not say so and so 
said, because the truth is not understood by men, rather men are known by their adherence to the 
truth” (al-Sha’baan 2010:57).  This implicit reference to the statement of Imam Maalik illustrates two 
key points of Salafism: the texts of the Qur’an and Sunna take precedence over opinions and 
reasoning, and that scholars and groups are to be judged by those sacred texts and not vice versa.  
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Ibn ‘Abbaas said, “Muaawiyya said to me- may Allah have mercy upon him- Do you 
follow the religion of ‘Alee? I said no. Nor do I follow the religion of ‘Uthmaan.  
Instead I follow the religion of the Messenger of Allah (saw) (al-Laalakaa’ee 
2015:2/18). Although Salafees do not have a specific leader they do seemingly 
respect religious scholarship and authority. Salafism contains a decentralized 
hierarchy: the scholar, student of knowledge, and finally the layperson, which in turn 
forms the basic structure for how knowledge is disseminated. 
 
The fourth principle is the belief of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a (loyalty and disavowal for 
Allah). In the context of this study it refers to having love and brotherhood for 
believers, especially other Salafees, and disavowal from disbelievers and sects. 
Muslims who are believed to have deviated from the Salafee creed and manhaj are 
treated in accordance with the extent of their deviation. For example, a takfeeree, 
who although Muslim, may be boycotted with the objective of preserving orthodoxy 
and defending against the harm posed by allowing extremism to go unchecked.  
“There does not exist a clearer ruling containing more Qur’anic evidence of loving 
and disavowal after the obligation of tawheed and prohibition of what contradicts it: 
polytheism” (al-‘Ateeq 2010:78). 
 
Salafees are often portrayed as intolerant towards other sects, groups, and faiths. 
This is in part due to the concept of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a, which can be traced 
back to literalist interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna. In addition, the exegesis 
of the Salaf as well as contemporary Salafee scholars tends to be quite literal which 
is why al-wala’a wa al-bara’a is often seen as divisive and uncompromising. In the 
Qur’anic chapter al-Kaafiroon Allah says:  
    
          Say:  O disbelievers! I do not worship what you worship. Nor do you                       
          worship what I worship. I shall never worship what you worship, and nor    
          will you ever worship what I worship. To you be your religion, and to me  
          mine (1996 1:109). 
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Imaam Sa’dee13 explicates that this was an exhortation to proclaim openly and 
clearly disavowing everything worshipped besides Allah (2015). The Prophet (saw) 
explained as reported in Ahmad, “It is disavowal of polytheism” (1972:3/271). 
Imaam al-Qurtobee reported that Ibn ‘Abbaas said, “There is nothing in the Qur’an 
that is more harmful upon the devil than this verse because it is tawheed and 
disavowal of shirk (polytheism)” (2012: 22/533). This narration, which was reported 
in various collections, illustrates that tawheed, shirk, and al-bara’a were in fact 
sharee’a concepts and terms that existed during the advent of Islam and were in 
use long before it became common Salafee discourse.14 Another verse often cited 
when affirming the concept of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a is verse 5:51 in the Qur’an that 
states: 
 
          O believers, take not Jews and Christians as awliyaa (friends, protectors,    
          supporters); they are friends to one another. Whosoever of you takes them  
          as friends is one of them. Verily, Allah guides not the people of the  
          evildoers (1996). 
      
Here Shaikh Sa’dee mentions that accepting non-Muslims and taking them as 
supporters has different levels, and that those who do exhibit love for them do so at 
the expense of their faith (2015).  This verse sums up the concept of al-bara’a and 
what it means for Salafees; however many takfeeree groups also cite these same 
verses but misconstrue the meanings and use them as a pretext for violence 
(Meijer 2013). 
 
Al-wala’a wa al-bara’a forms an integral part of the Salafee creed. This concept is 
considered as a part of tawheed: embracing monotheism and its adherents and 
disavowing polytheism and its practitioners. In this belief the Muslims associate with 
other believers and express loyalty based upon an individual’s adherence to Islamic 
commandments and faith. In contrast, disavowal is shown towards those who are 																																																								
13 Abdul Rahman Sa’dee, died 1376 hijra, one of the renowned Salafee Scholars and teachers of 
Muhammad bin al-‘Uthaimeen.   
14 Some contemporary researchers agree that the terms were in existence since the advent of Islam; 
however, they suggest that the concept of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a has been broadened under 
contemporary Salafees to include Muslims who do not hold the Salafee creed and manhaj. 
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disobedient to Qur’anic principles or disbelievers. Thus, a person of heresy is 
disavowed and ostracized, but not in the same way as a disbeliever. For example, a 
Muslim that is sinful or oppressive towards others still has the general rights of a 
Muslim due to the bond of faith.  In contrast, a non-Muslim is not afforded those 
same rights due primarily to the absence of faith. Therefore, although both the sinful 
believer and non-Muslim have transgressions, one through inadequate faith, and 
the other due to a complete absence thereof, they both warrant a type of disavowal 
(al-Aa’simee 2012). 
 
Salafism is a multifarious set of beliefs, which at times appear to controvert one 
another according to the outsider; however additional analysis to discern those 
apparent contradictions is required.  For example, it must be discerned why some 
Salafee scholars justify the dichotomy of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a, and cooperation 
with non-Muslim militaries, or intelligence agencies against other Muslims. The 
answer to this lies in what scholars determine is for the general benefit of the 
Muslims (maslaha ‘aam) or the principle of choosing the lesser of two evils.  
 
One such example is the fatwa allowing for American troops to be stationed in 
Saudi Arabia to help defend it from invasion by Iraq during the first Gulf War. This 
issue caused immense controversy at the time resulting in many divisions amongst 
scholars internationally.   
 
The justification for the fatwa was that the threat posed by Baathists was greater 
than allowing non-Muslim troops into the Holy lands to help defend Saudi Arabia. 
Also, it was cited as a justification that the troops should not be permanent in Saudi 
Arabia and that they did not pose a threat to the holy sanctuaries as opposed to 
Iraqi forces that were invading and would have become an occupying force.    
 
Another example, which has evoked immense controversy in contemporary times 
and has relevance for this study, is the issue of voting and participation in elections. 
Central to Salafee belief is that it is prohibited even in a Muslim society and more so 
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in a non-Muslim state.  This is because participation in a non-Muslim political 
system is seen as clearly violating Allah’s sovereignty as the sole ruler and 
legislator of divine law, thus a violation of Islamic monotheism. However, some 
major Salafee scholars such as al-‘Abbaad, and al-Albaanee have argued that it is 
permissible under certain circumstances while invoking the principle of choosing the 
lesser of two evils. Al-Albaanee states, “If a Muslim is placed between two evils he 
chooses the lesser of the two evils. There is no doubt that having a Muslim as the 
president (mayor) of local government is less harmful –and I don’t say better- than 
having a mayor that is a disbeliever or an atheist” (madeenah.com 2016). After 
being asked about voting in elections in America Shaikh Waseeullah ‘Abbaas, a 
renowned Salafee hadeeth scholar responded, “That which appears correct to me, 
Insha’Allah, is that if some good is anticipated as a result of voting, then we vote. 
We vote for the candidate as long as he is presently benefiting the Muslims or 
promises to benefit the Muslims in the future, even if he is not a Muslim 
(madeenah.com 2016). Al-‘Abbaad states: 
 
          There is no harm in voting for candidates who will be of more benefit to the  
          Muslims than the others. In this instance, voting for them is an example of  
          doing the lesser of two evils to avoid the greater evil. All of the candidates  
          are disbelievers, and therefore, harmful. However, the candidate who is  
          less harmful to the Muslims is better than the candidate whose harm is far  
          greater (madeenah.com 2016)  
 
These examples illustrate cases in which major Salafee scholars differed with, and 
detailed, their position regarding contemporary issues breaking from the 
mainstream Salafee position without being accused of heresy. 
 
In sum, the core principles espoused by Salafee scholars are ascribing to the 
Salafee concept of monotheism and creed, practice of Salafee core tenets, 
adopting the more literal methodology of textual analysis, exercising adoration for 
fellow believers, and opposition to those who differ with these fundamental tenets.  
In order to comprehend Salafism their core beleifs must be properly analyzed 
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because Salafees adhere to a rigid doctrine that forms the basis of their 
propagation and seprates them from many of their antagonists. 
 
Creed  
 
Shaikh Muhammad Baazmool explains, “Salafism is based upon three fundamental 
beliefs. The first belief is sincerity in worshipping Allah the Most Exalted. The 
second is adhering to the main body of Muslims. The third belief is warning against 
religious heresy and heretics” (2015).   These pillars mentioned by Shaikh 
Baazmool are in fact similar to what was previously mentioned by Shaikh al-
Jaabiree. The beliefs and principles mentioned overlap one another and are 
comprised of creed and principles of manhaj.  
 
The central tenet of the Salafee creed is sincerity in worship, which centers on the 
concept of tawheed (monotheism). This refers to an ever-living God as the lord and 
creator of all things, who possesses unique attributes and divine characteristics, 
and who is the only God who should be worshiped.  This also includes the concept 
of faith as propounded by the Salaf and the concept of excommunication from the 
religion (Green 2009). These are the most relevant tenets of creed for the purpose 
of this research; however the Salafee creed includes “the foundation of the religion 
which is derived from issues that are obligatory to believe by professing them or by 
professing and practice: like issues of tawheed, divine attributes of Allah, divine 
destiny, prophethood, and resurrection, or evidences for those issues” (Ibn 
Taimeeya 2006:112). The Salafee belief comprises of both the pillars of Islam and 
pillars of faith, which are common to all Muslims as they are deduced from the 
Qur’an and Sunna. Practical application is a part of faith according to the Salafee 
creed and the theorem is, as Tahiree states, “if a person’s creed is sound then his 
deeds will be sound. However, if a person’s creed is specious then his deeds will be 
incorrect: his manners will be corrupt as well as his methodology” (2016). For 
Salafees the relationship between creed, methodology, and practice of Islamic 
tenets is intrinsically related, so by rectifying creed it necessitates correction of the 
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other aspects of the religion. This belief wholly centered on creed also has 
precedence from the Salaf. “For this reason, Imaam Abu Haneefa… referred to that 
branch of knowledge as fiqh al-akbar (major fiqh). He named the science of creed 
fiqh al-akbar and he was pointing to the fact that fiqh al-asghar (minor fiqh) had no 
benefit without fiqh al-akbar” (Tahiree 2016). The logic is as such: sound creed is 
what allows for a person to embrace the Islamic faith, and a corrupted creed is one 
of the main reasons for nullifying one’s faith (Green 2009). 
 
The second belief referred to by Baazmool is the encouragement for the Muslim 
community to be one community avoiding schisms. The dictates of Islam encourage 
community, harmony and cooperation. For Salafees, adhering to a common creed 
and manhaj can only manifest these principles of unity. Allah says, “And hold all of 
you to the rope of Allah and do not divide” (Qur’an 1996 3:103).  In a hadeeth 
narrated in Ahmad, the Prophet (saw) said, “The Jews separated into seventy-one 
sects, and the Christians into seventy-two sects, and my nation into seventy-three 
sects all of them in the fire except one.” He was asked, “Who are they Messenger 
of Allah?” He replied, “Those who are upon my way and the way of my Companions” 
(1972:4/121). The Salafee understanding of the above texts is that by adhering to 
the correct creed and manhaj one procures salvation and maintains communal 
unity avoiding schism; however, true unity can only be obtained by subscribing to a 
unified creed. 
 
The third tenet centers on the importance of disavowing religious heresy. Salafees 
argue that by shunning unorthodox religious practices they are defending religious 
orthodoxy and the manhaj of the Salaf. 15  The Prophet (saw) said, “Whoever 
innovates in this matter of ours will have it rejected” (Muslim 1999 3/160). For 
Salafees, hadeeth narrations like the aforementioned impede all religious 
discussion and debate over bid’a. Furthermore, Salafees believe they are 																																																								
15 Unorthodox practices include religious beleifs that violate faith such as grave worship, idolizing 
saints, or sacrificing animals to other than Allah. In addition, religious practices that do not invalidate 
faith, but rather distort belief or practice are also prohibited and considered unorthodox. For example, 
the bid’a of the Khawaarij who made takfeer of major sinners and introduced the concept of rebellion 
in Islam, which is relevant to this study. 
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connected to and bound by the creed and the manhaj of the Salaf, also that they 
are entrusted with preserving them. Bin Baz states regarding bid’a: 
 
          Bid’a in the sharee’a is every type of worship invented that does not have  
          an origin in the Qur’an, nor the Sunna, nor in the actions of the rightly  
          guided caliphate. Due to the statement of the Messenger (saw), “Whoever  
          innovates in this affair of ours will have it rejected.” Agreed upon in its  
          authenticity. And his (saw) statement, “Whoever does an action not in  
          accordance with our affairs will have it rejected.” Narrated by Muslim in his  
          authentic book. And his (saw) statement in the hadeeth of Irbaadh bin  
          Saariya, “It is upon you my Sunna and the Sunna of the rightly guided  
          caliphate after me. Adhere to it and cling to it with your molar teeth and  
          beware newly invented matters for every newly invented matter is an  
          innovation and every innovation leads astray.” Imaam Ahmad and Abu  
          Dawood and al-Tirmidhee and Ibn Maaja with an authentic chain of  
          narrators (Binbaz.org 2017).16 
 
Bin Baz’s statement shows the meticulousness that Salafee scholars seek to 
authenticate their premises by compiling hadeeth and Qur’anic verses to 
substantiate their positions, and rigid assessment of the hadeeth texts. However, it 
must be noted that this does not suggest that they simply compile evidences to 
validate their premises, but instead they affirm their understanding with roots in 
classical scholarship.  
 
A vital part of Salafism’s integrity rests upon their claim of possessing a consistent 
and unified creed deduced from divine texts. “Regarding creed and methodology of 
the Companions it was one and has continued to be one until contemporary times” 
(Al-Najmee 2004:24). A common principle which is often cited by Salafee scholars 
when discussing worship and creed is ‘the original principle is that all worship is 
forbidden unless sanctioned by the Qur’an and Sunna and the origin of all 
transactions is that they are permissible unless there is evidence to suggest they 
are forbidden’ (al-Mashaiqih 2015). Shaikh al-Albaanee posits in this regard, “The 
origin of worship is that it is not considered as worship except from the Messenger 																																																								
16 This is the Salafee perspective; however, some classical scholars felt the concept of bid’a was 
more nuanced, even to the extent of classifying it according to the five fiqh rulings: obligatory, 
recommended, permissible, disliked, and impermissible. Salafees generally argue that those 
references to bid’a are linguistic references, meaning a matter of semantics and that all religious 
innovation is unacceptable (Green 2009).  
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of Allah (saw), this is agreed upon between the scholars” (al-Sha’baan 2010:73). 
He also mentioned, “The origin of transactions is that they are permissible unless 
there is an explicit text (prohibiting that action)” (al-Sha’baan 2010:75). These 
principles form the fundamental way Salafees view worship and what constitutes 
heresy and what is considered legitimate worship. These principles also regulate 
creed and methodology. 
 
There are several verses Salafees cite to substantiate their da’wa to tawheed and 
emphasis on creedal issues. For example, Allah mentions in the Qur’an, “I have not 
created mankind and the jinn except that they should worship Me” (51:712). 
Salafees contend that this verse elucidates that the purpose of creation is to 
actualize tawheed, which is why they center their da’wa on monotheism and 
worship.  Imam al-Tabaree cites a narration of Ibn Abbas, a Companion, who states 
about this verse, “Mankind and jinn were created to worship (Allah alone) with 
complete subservience to His commands” (2012 9:7640). For Salafees, keeping 
within the classical tradition and understanding as espoused by the Companions is 
critical in their reformist movement and lends legitimacy to their da’wa. Salafees’ 
concept of tawheed (monotheism) is that it can be divided into three distinct 
categories: lordship, sincerity in worship, and the divinity of Allah’s names and 
attributes. Although the Salaf, according to Salafees, did not explicitly know these 
categories the evidences for their usage and the concepts are derived directly from 
the Qur’an and Sunna. For Salafees, to violate one of these three categories is to 
violate monotheism and can lead to polytheism. Depending upon the degree of the 
infraction determines whether one’s faith is nullified or not. The first category of 
tawheed, al-ruboobeeya or lordship, refers to the actions and essence of the 
Creator Himself. According to this category Allah is the sustainer, creator, provider, 
and lord of everything. The second category is al-ulooheeya or tawheed of worship. 
This category is a reference to the various acts of worship by created beings. For 
example, an action is considered a valid act of worship if it is sincerely directed to 
Allah and done in accordance with the authentic Sunna. The third category of 
tawheed is al-asmaa wa al-sifaat referring to the divine names and attributes unique 
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to Allah. The implication of this aspect of tawheed is that when one supplicates they 
should include the unique and divine names of Allah. In addition, this category of 
tawheed mandates that Allah is only to be described by Qur’anic texts or authentic 
Sunna of the Prophet (saw), which affirm His divine names and attributes.  
 
There are many core beliefs that are critical to understanding Salafism with many 
codified in classic works of the Salaf. For example, the pillars of faith, the concept of 
faith, issues pertaining to the belief in the Qur’an as divine revelation, paradise and 
hell, the divine attributes of Allah, and the concept of sin. Also, central to the 
Salafee creed is the concept of shirk or polytheism. Some of the later books of 
creed detailed the Salafee concept of polytheism, which is to direct any act of 
worship to other than Allah or associate partners with Him. For example, 
“ supplicating to saints, seeking assistance to remove a harm that only Allah is 
capable of removing, and making lawful that which Allah has made prohibited by 
believing it to be permissible” are all actions and beliefs that entail major shirk (Bin 
Baz 2001:1/43).17  In addition, the classical creedal texts from the four mathhabs all 
discussed the obligation to obey the tyrannical rulers and the concept of takfeer as 
a rebuttal of the Khawaarij sect. 18 The reason the Salaf cited the atrocities of the 
Khawaarij and documented their core principles in creedal texts was because they 
deviated from the orthodox concept of faith: they excommunicated tyrant rulers 
(according to the Khawaarij tyranny nullifies faith), and thus they felt compelled to 
revolt against them because they considered them apostates. This is vital in 
understanding the restrictive nature of the Salafee manhaj and why they view 
ideologues and groups that depart from the established method of the Salaf as 
being deviant or in error. Some of the contemporary ideologues often associated 
with Salafism are rejected for their political activism and position regarding rebellion 																																																								
17 To illustrate, if a Muslim knows the prohibition of alcohol but rejects it, making it lawful to indulge 
in, then this would constitute a belief of polytheism, because of his rejection of a clear prohibition 
from the Qur’an and believing it to be lawful. According to many scholars, his belief constitutes a 
nullification of Divine legislation.  
18 See Imaam Abu Haneefa’s Fiqh al-Akbar, Imaam al-Muzanee’s Sharh al-Sunna (shaafi’ee scholar 
Tahaaweeya -‘Aqueeda al ahaawee’sT-alm aSunna, Ima-Usool almad’s hImam Adied 264 Hijra), 
collections had sections devoted to  hadeethAlso, many of the . )Hijra died 321anafee scholar, H(
hadeeth refuting the Khawaarij and Murji’a sects.  
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against an unjust Muslim leader, or their concept of what constitutes a legitimate 
jihaad.19 Salafee’s scrutiny of individuals who appear to diverge with the accepted 
Salafee position may seem trivial to outside observers. However, through criticism 
and observing stringent criterion Salafees maintain a fairly consistent program of 
reform, which is useful for students of Salafism to determine what traits are 
acceptable according to the manhaj. Salafee scholars have written extensively 
about the relationship of politicos and jihaadists to thinkers such as Qutb and 
Mawdoodi. Salafees contend that thinkers like Mawdoodi were revivers of the creed 
of takfeer and rebellion in contemporary times and that the evidence suggests that 
his thought has had a huge impact on many contemporary scholars that are 
incorrectly associated with Salafism by academics. While discussing one of the 
contemporary ideologues, often classified as Salafee by external observers, 
Suhaimee observes, the manhaj of Muhammad Suroor “ contains some agreement 
with the Sunna and something from bid’a” (2005:99). This is a consistent claim 
among Salafee scholars regarding many of the ‘Sahwa’ scholars20 often referred to 
as politicos by outside academics. Suhaimee postulates that some of the reasons 
for Suroor’s expulsion from the Salafee manhaj, not Islam, is due to his harsh 
criticisms against Salafee scholars, his debasement of contemporary Muslim rulers, 
and that he considers violent jihaad as a mechanism to remove tyrant Muslim 
leaders. For example, Suroor claims there are different levels of servitude and ways 
that contemporary leaders worship the West. He believes Arab Muslim leaders are 
secular hypocrites, especially Saudi royals, and that these rulers believe their 
harms and benefits are in the hands of Western leaders, instead of Allah. Suroor 
describes Salafee scholars by stating, “As for today, freeing a slave is conditional… 
observe those who speak about tawheed and they are slaves of slaves of slaves of 
slaves of the slave and their master is a Christian” (Suhaimee 2005:183).  
 
																																																								
19 It is important to note that Salafees distinguish between laypersons and scholars. Therefore, a 
, izbeehscholar that propagates a consistent methodological difference from Salafees is seen as 
whereas laypersons are not evaluated in the same manner.  
20 Although the Sahwah movement initially called for political reform, many of its leaders began to 
openly challenge the state’s legitimacy (Meijer 2015).  
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Qutb’s works are quoted from and extolled by many contemporary politicos as well 
as takfeeris.  For example, Suroor expounds, “I do not know of a book during this 
time which deals with the problems like Syed’s…he had the most appropriate fixes 
for contemporary issues, far from extremism and his evidences were from the Book, 
the Sunna, and the statements of the imaams” (Suhaimee 2005:184). The praise of 
Qutb and his writings, according to Salafees, is a grave misstep due to his 
consistent methodological deviation from core Salafee concepts. In addition, 
Suroor’s derogatory commentary of Muslim leaders and Salafee scholars puts him 
at odds with the Salafee manhaj making it inaccurate to associate him with that 
methodology. Qutb was preceded by Mawdoodi as a revolutionary thinker, and 
many academics allege he was influenced by his writings. Nevertheless, both 
writers were clearly at odds with Salafism and influenced by the revolutionary 
thought of their time, which is reflected in their methodology and creed. Mawdoodi 
states, “The truth is that Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the 
social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and 
ideals. “Muslims” is the title of that “International Revolutionary Party” organized by 
Islam to carry out its revolutionary program” (1995:4). The rhetoric and terminology 
used by Mawdoodi illustrate a very politically centered analysis of Islam with 
Muslims being the vanguard of revolution. This is an essential pillar of those who 
are often referred to as politicos and Islamists: they see Islam as a political 
movement and a means to secure state power. On the other hand, Salafees focus 
on individual reform with a more bottom up approach to societal transformation. 
 
Mawdoodi and those influenced by his thought focus on statehood and authority. 
Both politicos and jihaadee groups share these aims; however, they differ when it 
comes to the question of violence. Whether violence is central to change or a 
political solution is required is key to understanding the methodological differences 
between politicos and takfeeree-jihaadee groups.   To illustrate how Mawddodi’s 
thought is echoed by many of the contemporary groups Mawdoodi states:  
          
          The purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the basis of this ideology       
          and programme, regardless of which nation assumes the role of  
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          standard-bearer of Islam, regardless of the rule of which nation is  
          undermined in the process of the establishment of an ideological  
          Islamic state. Islam requires the earth-not just a portion, but the entire  
          planet…” (1995:5). 
 
In the proceeding chapter it will become clearer the relationship between   
Mawdoodi and the effects of his thought upon some of the contemporary groups 
like ISIS. Mawdoodi states, “Fighting in the way of Allah refers to the struggle for 
the establishment of Allah’s just order in the world. The fighter in the way of Allah 
aims to abide by the law of Allah himself, and to enforce it among other human 
beings” (1995:6). He also states, “The illustrious Prophet Muhammad (SAAS) was 
the greatest Revolutionary Leader of all” (1995:9). From the Salafee perspective, 
referencing the Prophet (saw) in this context: a revolutionary, is unorthodox 
because it implies his mission was a quest for power, leadership and overthrowing 
existing power structures rather than the reform of polytheistic beliefs and 
propagating tawheed. This is not to suggest that Mawdoodi did not consider 
tawheed central to da’wa; however, his politicization of this call is considered an 
anomaly to Salafees. For Mawdoodi, Islam is “a comprehensive system which 
seeks to annihilate all evil and tyrannical systems in the world, and enforce its own 
program of reform, which it deems best for the well-being of mankind” (1995:10). 
Mawdoodi views Islam as a revolutionary movement with Muslims relegated as the 
vanguard of that revolutionary faction. He states, “Hence this party is left with no 
other option but to seize the authority of the state, for an evil system takes root and 
flourishes under the patronage of an evil government, and a pious cultural order 
can never be established until the authority of government is wrested from the 
wicked and transferred to the hands of the reformers” (1995:12). Contemporary 
jihaadist thought is filled with rhetoric espousing the need to remove tyrannical 
Muslim governments, rectification of the world order through violence, and in the 
case of ISIS, the need to conquer lands and acquire territory by subjugating 
disbelievers. These concepts will be explored further in chapter two.   
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Names of Ahl al-Sunna 
 
Historically, the Sunni Muslim community has used a variety of different names to 
refer to itself.  Some of the most renowned names mentioned in classical texts are 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a (the people of Sunna and community), Ahl al-Hadeeth, 
the Salaf al-Saalih (pious predecessors), Ahl al-Athaar (people of narrations)21,  and 
Firqatu al-Naajiya (the saved sect). All of the above terms are derived from hadeeth 
literature or classical texts written by scholars during the first three centuries of 
Islamic history (al-Rehailee 2002). 
 
During the period of the first three caliphates in Islam Muslims referred to 
themselves only as Muslims in accordance with the dictates of the Qur’an. However, 
during the time of the third generation of Muslims there began to appear 
sectarianism with groups like the Khawaarij and Shia splitting from the community 
and manifesting creedal differences. In response to the spread of unorthodox 
practices and concepts, the Sunni community began to refer to themselves as 
Sunni and terms like the Sunna became widespread. ‘Abdullah ibn Abbaas, a 
Companion, stated, “The faces of Ahl al-Sunna will be whitened on the Day of 
Judgment, and the faces of Ahl al-Bid’a and sectarianism will be darkened” (al-
Siyootee 2000:2/63). Maalik bin Maghool, a Taabi’ee, stated, “If a man refers to 
himself by other than Islam and the Sunna then consider him to be from another 
faith” (al-Laalakaa’ee 2015:1/72). While no direct reference to the term Salaf as a 
descriptor for Ahl al-Sunna is used in the Qur’an, Salafees often use a variety of 
verses referring to the merits of the Companions to substantiate its usage.  One 
such verse often cited from the Qur’an, “Whoever differs with the Messenger after 
clear guidance has been given to him and follows other than the believers’ path, 
then We shall give him what he has followed and place him in Hell, which is an evil 
destination” (1996 4:115). Salafee scholars explain that the path of the believers 																																																								
21 Imam al-Safaareenee (died 1188 Hijra) explained Ahl al-Athaar as those who take their creed from 
what was related by Allah the All-Mighty in His book, or from the Sunna of His Prophet (saw), or 
what was authenticated upon the Salaf al-Saalih…without the mistakes of Ahl al-Ra’yy” (al-
Safaareenee 2016:27). 
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mentioned in the verse is a reference to the practice and understanding of the 
Companions, which they consider to be a direct allusion to the Salafee 
methodology.  Another verse often cited reads: “And the first forerunners (in faith) 
among the emigrants and the People of Medina, and those that followed them in 
good conduct. Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him, and He 
has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide 
forever, that is the great attainment” (Qur’an 1996 9:100). Imaam al-Baghawee, 
(died 515 hijra), states that the verse was explained by many of the Taabi’een like 
Sa’eed bin Musayib, Ibn Sireen, and Qataada as referring to the Companions 
(1987). The Companions are considered to be the origin of Ahl al-Sunna and the 
Salaf. Salafees consider their usage of the term Salafee to be in accordance with 
how the Sunni community has used ascriptions to denote the orthodox creed and 
distinguish its adherents from other sects that have arisen throughout Islamic 
history. 
 
Reference to the Salaf in Hadeeth 
 
Numerous hadeeth describe the high status and rank of the first generations of 
Muslims and this gives the ascription to the Salaf immense importance and 
legitimacy. In one such narration collected in al-Bukharee the Prophet (saw) said, 
“The best of the people is my generation, then those who follow them, then those 
who follow them…” (2009:13/74). Also, a narration collected by Ahmad, “Whoever 
lives after me shall see many differences. Therefore, adhere to my Sunna and the 
Sunna of the rightly guided caliphs…” (1972:4/115). An additional narration 
collected in Muslim, often cited in Salafee literature to authenticate their 
methodology, emphasizes the role of the Salaf, and supports the concept that there 
would remain a legitimate group well after the demise of the earliest community. 
The hadeeth reads as such, “There will not cease to be a group from my nation 
which continues to be upon the truth, no one will harm them even if they differ from 
them until the Day of Judgment” (1999:7/184). Imaam ibn Hajar states in his 
exegesis of this hadeeth that Imaam al-Bukhari and Imaam Ahmad bin Hanbal say 
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that this is a direct reference to Ahl al-Hadeeth. Imaam ‘Alee bin Madeenee said, 
“They are Ahl al-Hadeeth and those who adhere to the path of the Messenger and 
defend knowledge. It is because of them that the Mu’tazilla, 22  Raafida, 23 
Jahmeeya,24 Ahl al-Irja’,25 and al-Ra’yy26 do not possess anything from the Sunan” 
(cited in al-Waadi’ee 2011:34). 
 
Methodology 
 
Methodology, commonly referred to as manhaj, is also central to the Salafee creed 
or da’wa. Methodology denotes how the creed is articulated and propagated to non-
Salafee Muslims. 27  Methodology also addresses the way or approach to 
understanding the central Islamic texts: Qur’an and hadeeth.  Shaikh Ahmad Al-
Najmee states, “Manhaj is the means in which a student of knowledge calls to Allah” 
(2004:28). Manhaj also includes whether scriptural texts are analyzed literally or 
more figuratively regarding interpretation.28  In the Qur’an it states, “We have made 
for everyone of you a law and manhaaj” (1996 5:48).  Ibn ‘Abbaas commented on 
the verse saying, “path and Sunna” (al-Tabaree 2012: 4/519).  Therefore, manhaj or 
manhaaj (plural) has numerous analogous meanings when referring to the various 																																																								
22 The Mu’tazilla appeared during the second century Hijra and were known for their preference for 
rationalism over the sacred texts if the texts did not appear to be comprehensible. Some of main 
tenets of this sect were: their claim that sinners were neither Muslim or disbeliever but between the 
two spheres of belief, negation of divine decree, and their claim the Qur’an was created (al-
Ghamadee 2013). 
23 The Raafida were a group from the Shia that appeared during the caliphate of ‘Ali the fourth caliph. 
They were known to be extreme in their exaggeration of ‘Ali, with some considering him divine, and 
their vilification of most of the Companions (al-Ghamadee 2013). 
24 The Jahmeeya appeared after the first century Hijra and they claimed: the Qur’an was created, 
negated divine destiny, and negated the divine names and attributes of Allah (al-Ghamadee 2013). 
25 Ahl al-Irja’ refers to those sects which believed that actions or deeds were not a part of faith, 
contrary to the creed of Ahl al-Sunna, who hold that faith is comprised of actions of the limbs, belief 
in the heart, and statements from the tongue (Green 2009).    
26 Ahl al-Ra’yy is a general term that denotes individuals or sects, which give preference to logic and 
analogy when interpreting the sacred texts. There will be further discussion of this methodology in 
the coming section. 
27 Manhaj as a term refers to “consistent principles of worship and interactions (including 
transactions) from Allah’s legislation according to the Book and the Sunna with understanding of the 
pious Salaf” (al-Jaabiree 2012:37).  
28 Critics of Salafism, like El Fadl, allege, “Puritans exaggerate the role of the text and minimize the 
role of the human agent who interprets the religious texts” (2007:96). For El Fadl, Salafism’s rigid 
literalism violates the sanctity of the texts and makes interpretation both whimsical and arbitrary. 
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Islamic sciences; however, in reference to creedal issues it implies the way of 
understanding and means of deriving textual evidences.  
 
There are many narrations of the Salaf that illustrate their common methodology for 
understanding Islam, da’wa, and how they derived rulings. Imaam Abu Haneefa 
stated, “I take from the Book of Allah, and if I cannot find (the evidence), then from 
the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah (saw). So, if I cannot find it in the Book of 
Allah nor the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah (saw), then I take from the 
statements of his Companions” (al-Khumees 2014:76). In another statement 
attributed to Imaam Abu Haneefa he said, “No one can speak from his opinions 
when the Book of Allah is present, nor in opposition to the Sunna of the Messenger 
of Allah (saw), nor in opposition to the consensus of the Companions” (al-Khumees 
2014 p.77).29 The Salaf were united in creed and their approach to the sacred texts 
and this is why Salafee scholars hold their particular orientation as a pillar of 
Salafism and scholarly legitimacy. A vital pillar of sound manhaj, thus religious 
legitimacy, is rejecting religious heresy. The Salaf were ardent in defending the 
creed of Ahl al-Sunna, which forms the basis of religious legitimacy, and explains 
the fervency of Salafees to root out heretical ideologies and its proponents. Ibn 
Maajashoon (died 212 Hijra) stated, “I heard Maalik saying whoever innovates in 
Islam and believes it to be hasana (good) has claimed that Muhammad was 
deceptive in delivering the message” (al-Shaatibee 2000:2/19).  The implication 
here is that by innovating something, in creed or practice, not legislated by the 
Qur’an and Sunna, a person is implying that the Prophet (saw) was deficient or 
inadequate in dispensing his duties as a messenger.  Imaam Shaafi’ee stated, 
“Allah made it an obligation for mankind to follow His revelation and the Sunna of 
His Messenger” (2010:49).  Imaam Ahmad stated, “We believe in the sound 
narrations and judge by them. Everything narrated upon the Prophet (saw) with an 
																																																								
29  Imaam Abu Haneefa was known for his use of ijtihaaad, al-ra’yy, and analogy for deriving rulings 
as long as these methods did not contravene the Qur’an, an authentic hadeeth, or consensus. His 
extensive use of these concepts was due to the prevalence of a plethora of unauthenticated 
narrations during his time.  
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acceptable chain of transmission we believe it and rule by it” (al-Laalakaa’ee 
2015:1/157).  
 
Jurisprudence 
 
Salafees claim that their jurisprudent understanding agrees with other Sunni 
schools of law. The main four canonical schools of law in Sunni Islam are Hanifee, 
Maalikee, Shaafi’ee, and Hanbalee. Many critics claim Salafees have created a 
new school of thought based upon literalism. Moreover, some critics assert that the 
Salafee school is similar to the Thaahireeya, 30  who adhered to an extremely 
literalist approach when understanding and interpreting texts. Although Salafee 
scholars do predominately base their rulings on the apparent meaning of the text 
this does not mean they do not consider contextual and implicit interpretations. The 
reason for their literalism is due to their adherence to the following principle: the 
origin of language is literal unless there is sufficient evidence or reason to support 
the statement in question or text being figurative (al-‘Uthaimeen 2006: 47). An 
example in the Qur’an would be the unambiguous command to pray, as it does not 
require any further explanation regarding the meaning of the command, nor is it to 
be taken figuratively, but instead by understanding it as a literal command it only 
requires the worshipper to refer to the Sunna for the details how to perform the 
Islamic prayer. This essentially forms the method for much of the Salafee 
interpretation of religious commands and textual analysis. 
 
Mathhabs and Taqleed  
 
Salafees are often criticized as being rejectionists of traditional schools of thought 
when it comes to Islamic law.  While discussing the influence of Shaikh Muhammad 																																																								
30 Imaam Dawood al-Asbahaanee born 200 hijra in Kufa, Iraq, was from Ahl al-Hadeeth and a 
student of Abu Thawr a student of Imaam Shaafi’ee. Imaam Dawood was the founder of the 
Thaahireeya school which arose in opposition to Ahl al-Ra’yy (the rationalists) who used analogy 
and reasoning in many of their jurisprudent rulings. The Thaahireeya, the most extreme of the 
literalists, reject analogy and reasoning, and restrict their rulings and understanding to only the 
apparent meaning of the text and rulings which have consensus (al-Ashqaar 2005).  
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ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, who Salafees consider a reviver of the Salafee creed during 
the 18th century, Lacroix states: “His basic principle is that the only sources upon 
which a valid religious judgment can be based are the Qur’an and Sunna and the 
ijma (consensus) of the pious ancestors. Theoretically, that comes down to a 
rejection of the taqlid (imitation) of the four canonical legal schools, and to the 
establishment of ijtihad (interpretation) as the pillar of law” (Meijer 2013:60).  While 
this analysis of Salafism is a fair assessment in light of the statements of some of 
its proponents; conversely by analyzing statements of contemporary Salafee 
scholars it can be deduced that they do not all reject taqleed in all situations and 
their ijtihaad does not fall outside of the canonical schools of law. Taqleed as a 
terminology refers to “following someone whose statement in and of itself is not 
evidence” (al-‘Uthaimeen 2006:48).31 Since only the Qur’an and Sunna are sacred 
texts to Salafees, then by following an Imaam unequivocally without evaluating his 
statement according to sacred texts can lead one to follow false judgments. As with 
any logical argumentation there must be evidence to support any claims being 
made.  For this reason, taqleed differs from ittibaa’ (following) as the latter refers to 
following the Prophet (saw) or other uncontested sharee’a evidences. Shaikh al-
Fawzaan states, “And Imaam Ahmad is from the Imaams of Ahl al-Sunna; however 
he is not infallible. We take from his statements that agree with the evidence just 
like other than him… this is also (the case of) the mathhab of Abu Haneefa or 
mathhab of Maalik, or mathhab of Shaafi’ee. All of them were from the mathhab of 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a” (al-‘Utaibee 2014:27). 
 
In general, Salafees do strongly denounce the practice of taqleed (blind following) a 
particular scholar or mathhab at the expense of extracting rulings, or interpretation 
directly from the Qur’an and hadeeth. However, this does not mean that all Salafee 
scholars categorically reject the concept. For instance, Ibn ‘Uthaimeen allows for 
taqleed for the layperson who does not possess the ability to deduce rulings and 
contemplate the scriptural evidences. He also includes the scholar who does not 																																																								
31 Other definitions include accepting the opinion of someone without knowing the evidence for their 
opinion.  
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possess the time or specialization in a particular science to rely upon the evidence 
and conclusions of his peers (2006). This is essentially the argument of many 
Salafee scholars. For instance, Shaikh Al-Fawzaan was asked about following a 
particular mathhab and replied:  
 
          Yes, the layperson and new student should follow one of the four  
          mathhabs, because the layperson follows the mathhab of the scholar who  
          makes fatwa on his behalf. Therefore, he should choose to follow someone  
          whose knowledge and religion he trusts, and take knowledge from him,  
          because the layperson is ignorant…. As for a person who possesses  
          knowledge and wisdom then he should only follow that which he believes  
          to be in accordance with the strongest evidence (al-‘Utaibee 2014:187). 
 
Shaikh al-Albaanee’s view was essentially the same as al-Fawzaan’s except that 
he felt the lay person does not really follow a mathhab at all, but instead follows the 
one who makes fatwa on his behalf, and this is due to the layman’s ignorance of the 
Qur’an and Sunna and inability to make judgments (2011). In contrast, Shaikh 
Muqbil bin Haadee sternly rejected the concept of taqleed and seemed to have 
even a stricter position than many of his Salafee counterparts (al-Waadi’ee 2011). 
However, these opposing stances regarding this issue do not negate the fact they 
are all considered Salafee scholars, and although they had disagreement over such 
a rudimentary issue they did not call into question each other’s legitimacy as 
Salafee scholars.32 
 
The aversion towards taqleed was essentially the view of the Salaf. 33  Imaam 
Ahmad stated in this regard, “Do not blindly follow me or Maalik, or Shaafi’ee, or al-
Awzaa’ee, or al-Thawree. But rather take from where we took” (Ibn al-Qayyim 																																																								
32 This differs greatly from the takfeeree groups like al-Shabaab and ISIS who delegitimize those 
who disagree with them and denounce them as apostates, even going so far as to kill their rivals. 
Shaikh Muhammad Amaan al-Jaamee was asked about his opposition to al-Albaanee, his teacher, 
regarding the issue of a Muslim seeking assistance from a non-Muslim and reiterated the importance 
of scholarly inquiry and rejecting taqleed and he mentioned that his difference with Shaikh al-
Albaanee did not affect his adoration for him in the least (Al-Jaamee 2016).  
33 While discussing the harms of taqleed Ibn al-Qayyim states,” the results of taqleed are division 
and arrogance and its proponents have split the religion and caused sectarianism; every group 
assisting the one they follow and calling to him and criticizing his opponents. In addition, they do not 
believe it permissible to practice a differing opinion as if their opponents follow another religion” 
(2012: 1/176). 
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2012:1/175). Imaam Ahmad was known for his strict observation of the Sunna, 
reliance on hadeeth, exhortation to analyze the sacred texts, and rejection, of 
taqleed. From the creed of Ahl al-Sunna is that no scholar, Imaam, or even a 
Companion is considered infallible warranting taqleed in every issue.  Imaam 
Maalik said, “Everyone’s statements can be accepted or rejected except the 
Prophet’s (saw)” (2011:4/37).  Probably the primary reason for the Salaf’s rejection 
of taqleed was that conceptually it requires rigid obedience to the opinions of men 
regardless of their usage or adherence to primary religious sources: the Qur’an and 
Sunna. Therefore, by practicing taqleed one does not consider, or may be unaware 
of, the potential for deviation from the divine texts and their intended explicative 
meanings. Furthermore, taqleed often is seen as the cause for various groups to 
make al-wala’a wa al-bara’a to their Shaikh or mathhab, which has many harmful 
effects upon the Muslim community. For example, some scholars of the past 
considered it invalid to pray behind Imaams who followed a different mathhab even 
going so far as to prohibit intermarriage between mathhabs. 
 
Some scholars suggest that through the evolution of the canonical schools of 
jurisprudence much of the founders’ approach to creed, and even methodology 
have been lost. For example, many contemporary texts refer to contemporary 
schools of thought vs. the classical ones. For instance, some contemporary 
Maalikee scholars believe it to be impermissible to pray two units of prayer as a 
greeting for the mosque before sitting down while the Imaam is preaching. Still 
others prohibit praying between the call to prayer and sunset prayer. Imaam Maalik 
had two views regarding these issues and one of his views was that they were 
recommended acts, which was in accordance with authentic narrations on the 
Prophet (saw) (‘Uthmaan 2011). Another example, but from the Shaafi’ee mathhab, 
is the issue of declaring openly one’s intention before performing an act of worship 
other than the pilgrimage. Imaam A’laa al-Deen al-Shaafi’ee scholar who died the 
year 72 Hijra, states, “To openly declare intention by raising one’s voice and 
disturbing worshippers is prohibited by consensus. (Declaring intention) without 
raising the voice is considered a wicked innovation… and this is a rejection of the 
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view of those who say this is a sound Sunna” (al-Kalbaanee 2016:12). Many of the 
proponents of the contemporary schools believe that their views are representative 
of the original creed and methodology of the Imaams of the mathhabs; however, 
many of the schools of thought have evolved in both fundamental and subsidiary 
issues. Dr. Umar al- Ashqaar believes: 
     
          It is imperative to point out that every mathhab includes statements and  
          legal opinions from the Imaam of that mathhab. Likewise, it includes all the  
          statements and legal opinions of the scholars of that mathhab. Therefore, it  
          is not possible to claim all viewpoints are from the originator of the  
          mathhab (2005:115). 
 
Here al-Ashqaar points out that all legal rulings of a given mathhab are not 
indicative of the Imaam’s position and this also appears to include creed and 
methodology. Imaam al-Nawawee said, “Every issue that you find two opinions for 
Shaafi’ee, may Allah have mercy on him: old and new, then the new statement is 
correct and should be practiced, because the old view has been revised” (Al-
Nawawee 1996:1/17). Many scholars who follow a particular mathhab have strayed 
from the creed held by the original Imaam while still associating with the mathhab. 
Imaam al-Samaa’nee, a former Hanifee scholar turned Shaafi’ee (died 489 hijra), 
stated, “It is not acceptable that a person supports his mathhab in subsidiary issues 
then traverses another path regarding fundamental issues” (al-Kalbaanee 2016:15). 
This view is stressed by contemporary Salafees as they mostly reject the notion of 
a scholar being for example Maalikee in fiqh but Asha’ree in creed, as this in their 
view is inconsistent with the creed and manhaj of Imaam Maalik. In contrast to the 
Salafee view many scholars, especially Asha’rees, consider it a legitimate 
classification to distinguish scholars by both creed and fiqh, as has been a practice 
for most of Islamic history.34 Shaikh al-Islam ibn Taimeeya stated, “And the Imaams 
like Maalik and Ahmad… and other than them mention the negative of heretics, 
disavowing, and punishing of them as Allah willed. The groups that blindly follow 
them were well aware of these positions. Then they mixed the Sunna with heresy” 
(Ibn Taimeeya 2015:81). The mathhabs of the canonical schools have evolved over 																																																								
34 In many of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab‘s writings he referred to himself as Salafee in creed 
hanbalee in fiqh.  
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time and some of the later proponents differed with regards to creed and 
methodology from the original position of the Imaams in all but some fiqh rulings.  
 
Rationalism and Mathhab al-Ra’yy 
 
Salafees believe sacred texts are to be analyzed literally before deriving rulings, 
and that this forms the methodology for understanding the fundamentals of the 
religion, whereas other traditional schools like the Rationalists view intellectual 
rationalization should guide interpretation of the divine texts. Issues of creed are 
understood directly from the Qur’an and Sunna and the recurring themes and 
principles espoused therein. Essentially this means that the mathhab of the Salaf 
was to accept the divine texts in a literal context regardless of whether they 
understood its full logical import. In contrast, the Rationalists attempted to 
understand the implied logic and rationalized the texts, which, they reasoned, was 
essential to understanding the texts. Ibn al-Qayyim states, “It is from the foundation 
of their religion that they build upon analogy which necessitates rejecting much of 
the Sunna…and no doubt those rationalists were denounced by the Salaf due to 
excessive use of improper analogies in codifying religious principles” (2006:1/115). 
Ahl al-Kalaam in their zeal for refuting anthropomorphism established their creed 
and arguments based upon logic. “Influenced, at least in part, by Greek and 
Christian philosophy, they used logic to construct arguments supporting the 
existence of God and the concept of tawhid” (Wiktorowicz 2005:5). An even more 
scathing criticism of the Ahl al-Kalaam came from Ibn Taimeeya when he states,  
 
          Ahl al-Kalaam are the people most in doubt and confusion, and the  
          weakest in knowledge and certainty, and this is something they admit  
          themselves and people witness from them. For this reason, you find that  
          they change from one statement to another. At one-point firm upon an  
          opinion, then stern in contradicting the same view at another time and  
          making takfeer of the one who holds their prior view, which is the biggest  
          proof of their lack of certainty (Ibn Taimeeya 1996:5/178).  
 
This statement of Ibn Taimeeya sums up the general Salafee assessment of Ahl al-
Kalaam and many of their contemporary manifestations like the Asha’rees.  
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Another classical school of thought that differed from Ahl al-Hadeeth was the 
mathhab of Ahl al-Ra’yy. This long-standing tradition also was existent at the time 
of the Salaf; however, it is considered at odds with Salafee methodology.35 This 
school forms a more interpretive approach to understanding both creed and 
jurisprudence. The mathhab of Ahl al-Ra’yy initially was not a school of thought or 
even a methodology, but initially referred to ijtihaad, which did not contradict the 
texts of the Qur’an and Sunna. This ijtihaad was known to the Companions prior to 
the death of the Prophet (saw) as illustrated in the following hadeeth. The Prophet 
(saw) sent Mu’aadh, a Companion, to Yemen to invite the Yemenis to Islam and 
adjudicate between them.  The Prophet (saw) said, “How will you adjudicate if you 
need to make judgment? He said, I will judge by the Book of Allah. He said, if you 
do not find it in the Book of Allah? He replied, I will judge by the Sunna of the 
Messenger of Allah (saw), He said, if you do not find it in the Sunna of the 
Messenger of Allah (saw)? He said, I will strive upmost with my intellect “(Abu 
Dawood 2008:1/134).  The classical scholars referred to this hadeeth as evidence 
for ijtihaad and using analogy from the Qur’an and Sunna.  The Taabi’een also 
followed the methodology of the Companions to deduce rulings by referencing the 
Qur’an and Sunna and if they encountered new issues they would refer to the 
rulings of the Companions and if they were unable to find a ruling they would resort 
to ijtihaad (al-Ashqaar 2005). 36 Therefore, if a new issue arises that has no 
precedence in divine texts it requires the use of ijtihaad.  
 
The Ra’yy that was considered unacceptable by the Taabi’een and was refuted 
extensively in the books of the Salaf, was that which was without reference to the 
																																																								
35Al-Ra’yy rejected by the Salaf was that which contradicted divine texts or was considered 
whimsical by the Salaf. Imaam Maaik states, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) died and the religion 
was completed with perfection. Therefore, it is necessary to follow the Athaar of the Messenger of 
Allah (saw) and not follow personal opinion. Because whenever you follow personal opinion another 
man appears with a stronger view and you will follow him, Therefore, whenever  someone appears 
who overcomes your argument you will follow him and I believe this will never cease “ (al-Shaatibee 
2000:1/186). 
36Ijtihaad should not be confused with the practice of bid’a, which includes those beliefs, practices, 
and actions that contradict the divine text or foundation principles of Islam.  
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sacred texts and based primarily upon opinion. Imaam al-Shaatibee states, “In any 
event, after everything previously discussed, the Ra’yy that is rejected is that which 
is based upon ignorance, whimsical, and without any (sharee’a) origin (2000: 1/187).   
‘Umar bin ‘Abd Al-Azeez wrote, “There is no acceptable opinion that is contrary to 
the Sunna laid down by the Messenger of Allah (saw)” (al-Ashqaar 2005:52). Using 
analogy and reasoning in making jurisprudent verdicts is considered a level of 
sharee’a evidence; however, it does not supersede Qur’anic texts or the Sunna. 
Imaam Shaafi’ee while discussing the various levels of evidence stated, “We judge 
with the consensus, then analogy; however analogy is weaker than consensus and 
it is used out of necessity, because it is not permissible to use analogy when there 
is a hadeeth present” (cited in al-Ashqaar 2005 p.27). In addition, al-Ra’yy was 
severely rejected by the Salaf in creedal matters. Ibn Abee ‘Aasim (died 287 hijra) 
said, “I have seen hadeeth which encouraged asceticism in this world, hope in the 
hereafter, following the righteous and saints, encouraging one towards piety, and 
leaving what does not concern a person, for that which concerns him” (al-
Asbahaanee 2012:17). The Salaf considered unfounded opinion a distraction from 
religious duties and a distortion of the limits set by the Qur’an and Sunna, and in 
some cases a means to apostasy.  
 
Differences 
 
Ahl al-Hadeeth (who Salafees closely imitate), Ahl al-Kalaam, and Ahl al-Ra’yy, all 
possess some key methodological differences, which have been a source of 
contention throughout Islamic history. For the purpose of this study two types of 
differences will be scrutinized: ikhtilaaf tadaad (irreconcilable differences), which 
describes the difference between Ahl al-Hadeeth and its rivals, and ikhtilaaf 
tanawwu’ (slight interpretive difference). These two categories will be analyzed with 
the aim of showing that differences do not necessarily negate one’s adherence to 
the Salafee creed and manhaj.  
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The first category is ikhtilaaf tadaad, which refers to two contradictory 
interpretations while accepting one of them as correct. Imaam Shaafi’ee, in his 
discussion of the impermissible differences which highlights the concept of ikhtilaaf 
tadaad, stated, “It is not permissible for a knowledgeable person to differ with 
anything that Allah has established as clear evidence in His book, or been clarified 
on the tongue of His Messenger (saw)” (1940:16). In light of this, the clear 
prohibition of usury in the Qur’an, Sunna, and by consensus is hardly ever an issue 
of contention; however, there are contemporary debates, especially in western 
countries, about the necessity to pay usury on a bank loan and what constitutes 
necessity, which fall under the classification of ikhtilaaf tadaad.  
 
The second category is ikhtilaaf tanawwu’. This refers to when there is more than 
one acceptable interpretation of a verse or hadeeth and the various interpretations 
do not constitute an irreconcilable contradiction in meaning (al-Ma’ithar 2013:27). It 
was reported that Imaam Sufyaan bin ‘Ayeena (died 198 hijra) said, “There is no 
difference in the explanation of the Qur’an. Verily, it is comprehensive in meaning…” 
(al-Ma’ithar 2013:28). Here the Imaam was underscoring that although some 
exegesis from the Salaf differed that it was possible in many instances to 
accommodate more than one view if they did not contradict one another within 
reason.  
 
The literalism of Salafism has caused some critics to assert that Salafees do not 
allow any room for interpretive discourse claiming that “there is really no such thing 
as interpretation-sources either sanction or prohibit particular beliefs, choices, and 
behavior; there is a single truth, as revealed by the Qur’an and the Prophet 
Muhammad; and there is no room for interpretive differences or religious pluralism” 
(Wiktorowicz 2005:4). However, interpretive differences are allowed by Salafees, 
especially with regards to matters of jurisprudence and Qur’anic exegesis and there 
are countless examples to substantiate this (al-Ma’ithar 2013). 
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Reasons for Differences 
 
Some of the predominant reasons listed by Ibn Taimeeya for scholarly differences 
are: 
 
1. a lack of one scholar encountering a hadeeth used as evidence 
2. that a scholar may doubt the authenticity of a hadeeth in question 
3. differences in comprehension and interpretation of divine texts 
4. differences in jurisprudent school of thought and the principles used to 
deduce rulings 
5. differences in judgment and reasoning due to lack of explicit textual evidence 
(al-Ma’ithar 2013). 
 
Examples of How Ahl al-Sunna Dealt with Errors  
 
As was mentioned previously scholarly differences are not always the result of 
heresy and Salafees do acknowledge that there are legitimate differences and 
interpretations especially in fiqh issues. “Look to see how the scholars of Ahl al-
Sunna deal with al-Nawawee, Ibn Hajr, and Ibn Khuzaima who the scholars 
classified as the leader of the Imaams. Even though he made mistakes and 
misinterpreted (some issues) in creed. However, he strove in seeking and 
spreading knowledge and serving the Sunna” (al-Suhaimee 2016:73). 
 
From an athaar of the Salaf it was reported that Imaam Asbahaanee said, 
“Muhammad bin Khuzaima made a mistake regarding the hadeeth of al-suwwar 
(the picture) and he was not disparaged because of that. Rather this view is not to 
be accepted from him and that is it” (Ibn Taimeeya 2005:81). 
 
This gives insight into the mathhab of the Salaf showing that they did not take one 
position regarding a scholar’s mistakes, but instead the status of the scholar was 
considered, their adherence to the Sunna, and whether they were known for bias or 
not was also taken into consideration. Also, it can be deduced that even a scholar 
who errs in creed, although refuted, is not rejected. This also forms an integral part 
of the Salafee manhaj with regards to dealing with a scholar’s errors.  
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Shaikh Rabee’a al-Madkhalee was asked about individuals who fall into religious 
innovation and he replied, “Whoever innovates clearly like saying the Qur’an is 
created or supplicates or slaughters sacrificial animals to other than Allah, or some 
other clear innovation then he is declared heretical. However, if it is something 
minute and the person is striving to attain the truth and errs, then he is not declared 
a heretic initially” (2009:27). This illustrates that the Salafee approach is not always 
clear-cut, although it is often oversimplified, with even laypersons engaging in the 
complexities of tabdee’, to the dismay of Salafee scholars. The often-overlooked 
means of dealing with a scholar that errs is that “he should be advised, and his 
mistake be clarified, then (if he does not repent) he is declared an innovator” 
(2009:257).  Ibn Taimeeya states, “If an esteemed scholar is known for his honesty, 
sincerity, opposing heresy, and calling to the Sunna and warning against innovation 
then for some reason he commits a small innovation, then we do not rush to 
declare him a heretic. This is the correct view. Because if we ruled everyone who 
fell into a heresy as a heretic there would be no one from the scholars of Islam who 
would be safe” (2006:75). 
 
In addition to the above categories Salafees also have a criterion for how they treat 
and react to other Salafees’ mistakes and the mistakes of other groups who differ 
with them. This precedence can be found in the statements of classical scholars 
from the Salaf like Imaam Barbahaaree (died 329 Hijra) who said: 
 
          Understand that leaving the path occurs in two ways: The first way is a     
          man could deviate from the path and he only desired good. Therefore, do  
          not imitate his errors because he is destroyed. The other is a person who      
          is arrogant regarding the truth and he contradicts the pious who preceded  
          him, so he is misguided and misguides others (2009:12). 
 
From athaar 37 such as this Salafees explain that a scholar who is known for his 
service and dedication to the Sunna, and sound creed and manhaj is excused for 
his mistakes although his errors should be warned against while maintaining his 
scholarly status. The other case is when the individual in question is not considered 																																																								
37 The term is used to denote narrations of the Salaf. 
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Salafee and errs, then this person is warned against as well as his mistakes in 
order to prevent his da’wa from spreading throughout the community (al-Jaabiree 
2012). Bin ‘Uthaimeen states about those individuals who rush to make judgments 
upon others regarding perceived mistakes: 
    
          It is upon those youth to contextualize what takes place between the  
          scholars in the most positive light, and if the issue pertains to ijtihaad,  
          then excuse them for their mistake. There is no problem with speaking to   
          them about the issue they believe they were mistaken about to clarify  
          whether the mistake is from them or those who claim it was a mistake.         
          Because sometimes a person believes a scholar has made a mistake then       
          after discussion it becomes clear he was correct… As far as rejoicing  
          about a scholar's error to spread it amongst people the division and is not  
          the way of the Salaf (2011:43).  
 
Hizbeeya 
 
Hizbeeya (partisanship) is the antithesis of the Salafee da’wa. The concept of 
partisanship to other than Islam and the Sunna is considered one of the biggest 
violations of the principles of Salafism. “The Salafee da’wa contests hizbeeya in 
every way. The reason is entirely clear. The Salafee da’wa is affiliated with an 
infallible person, and he is the Messenger of Allah (saw). Therefore, the one who 
leaves their da’wa cannot be considered Salafee. As for other groups, they are 
affiliated with individuals who are fallible” (al-Albaanee 2011:3/139). This claim by 
al-Albaanee highlights the perception that Salafees follow a purist approach to 
Islam and that partisanship is considered an unsubstantiated aberration from true 
Islam and therefore illegitimate.  
 
Salafee scholars abhor hizbeeya, which is why there are countless lectures, 
sermons, and books dedicated to the topic. The view held by many Salafee 
scholars is that practical application of the Salafee manhaj is the only means of 
removing oneself from false partisanship. Al-Waadi’ee states: 
 
          Our scholars in their books named others as Ahl al-Sunna and Salafee.  
          Nevertheless, the actual practice of (of some individuals) contradicts the   
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          label. You claim you are Ahl al-Hadeeth and you have no knowledge about  
          hadeeth. You claim that you are Ahl Sunna, while you have no desire to  
          study the Sunna or act by it. You declare, ‘I am Salafee’ all the while you  
          call to division and separation between Muslims (1999:218). 
 
This statement also shows the emphasis with which Salafees place on the 
acquisition of what they perceive to be correct knowledge of the various Islamic 
sciences, as well as the importance of self-purification, and adherence to Islamic 
rituals, all of which serve as a deterrence to hizbeeya. Shaikh al-Fawzaan states,  
 
          A Hizbee is the person who is with a group that differs from the correct  
          manhaj: manhaj of the Book and the Sunna. Allah states, ‘They divided  
          their affairs between them with every group pleased with what they are  
          upon.’ They divided after they left the Book of Allah and the Sunna of His  
          Messenger (saw), and choose contradictory paths, methodologies, and  
          groups, thus they became sinners (al-‘Utaibee 2014:19).   
 
Although the concept of hizbeeya has a negative connotation in Salafee literature, 
the term hizb (group) has both a positive and negative usage in the Qur’an. Hizb is 
used to refer to the partisans of Allah as successful and good, and the partisans of 
the Devil as sinful losers. The Qur’an explicitly describes the partisans of Allah as 
those who follow His commands, avoid His prohibitions, and practice the concept of 
al-wala’a wa al-bara’a.  Allah states in the Qur’an: 
 
          You will not find a people who believe in Allah and the Day of Judgment   
          Loving those who oppose Allah and His Messenger even if they were their  
          fathers, or sons, or brothers, or kin. They are those whose hearts have    
          been written with faith… Verily, the partisans of Allah are the successful  
          ones (1996 58:22). 
 
From the aforementioned verse the partisans of Allah are described by loyalty and 
allegiance to the believers in general terms; however, Salafees specify that 
allegiance to the truth takes precedence; however, their claim is that the more 
adherent one is to Allah’s commands: the Salafee creed, and manhaj, the more 
they are deserving of loyalty and adoration. The blameworthy hizb as mentioned in 
the Qur’an refers to deviation from the commands of the Qur’an. Allah says, “They 
are the partisans of Satan. Verily, the party of Satan will be the losers” (1996 58:22). 
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Characteristics of Hizbeeya 
 
One of the common traits of hizbee groups is fanaticism according to Salafee 
scholars. Al-Najmee states, “A person being fanatical for his group and aiding them 
even though they are wrong is not permissible…it is only permissible to stand up for 
the truth” (2013:7). Al-Waadi’ee states, “The fanaticism of hizbeeya is isolation. The 
Hizbee does not want any good for anyone except those inside his group” 
(1999:31) Fanatical behavior based upon partisanship is the main cause of division 
and animosity, which even affects recent converts to Islam. By ushering converts 
into existing controversy between scholars or causing them to focus on provocative 
and complex issues which they are unable to grasp and forcing them to choose 
sides, or have an uninformed opinion about a particular issue, groups foment 
discord and partisanship. For example, some new Muslims are sometimes coerced 
into choosing a particular viewpoint or asked to warn against a particular person or 
group of individuals whom they are unfamiliar of. On the other hand, recent 
converts might be asked to accept and follow other individuals or groups without 
questioning. This creates disharmony between Muslims and is a trait of hizbeeya 
(al-Suhaimee 2016). Salafee scholars warn that unwarranted or excessive criticism 
of scholars coupled with fanaticism is also a trait of hizbeeya. At times a student 
may devote extensive time and energy to following up the faults of scholars or 
seeking to defame them when they err instead of the intended purpose, which is to 
clarify the truth (al-Suhaimee 2016). While discussing the importance and status of 
religious scholars Shaikh al-Fawzaan said: 
 
          No one reviles the honor of the scholars from religious people of the truth  
          except that they are one of three individuals: a hypocrite known for  
          hypocrisy, or a wicked person who detests them because they prohibit his  
          sinfulness, or a misguided Hizbee, who reviles them because they do not  
          sanction his partisanship and misguided ideology (2011:46-47).   
 
Some individuals who do not possess sound knowledge engage in criticizing 
individuals and cause more harm than good. The Salafee da’wa, according to 
Salafees, is about both individual and societal rectification through adherence to the 
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pristine sources of the faith, which can only bring about the maximum good. 
Therefore, hizbeeya, its antithesis, brings about division, and is a distortion of those 
principles. Excessive criticism of the scholars is deemed to be a direct attack upon 
those who interpret the divine texts. Al-Suhaimee states regarding individuals who 
censure scholars unduly, “It is not permissible for them to busy with the science of 
criticizing and praising individuals before they understand knowledge and become 
grounded in its principles” (2016:49).  
 
The aforementioned characteristics are just some of the traits of hizbeeya 
mentioned by Salafee scholars. Moreover, it is worth noting that the view held by 
many scholars is that an individual Salafee may possess a trait of hizbeeya but he 
or she may not be considered a Hizbee unless a certain criterion is observed.38 
 
Problems with Contemporary Classifications  
 
Amongst academics there is immense controversy surrounding the origin of 
Salafism, its usage as an expression, and the relevance and implications of its 
classification. Conflicting data about the origin of Salafism, especially from outside 
sources, and the context in which the term Salafee is used in are generally not 
issues which Salafees must contend with as they deem their origin to be from the 
original Salaf. However, Salafees are forced into the discussion to defend their 
paradigm against the various presumptions and negative connotations of the term 
Salafism. For this reason, analysis of Salafism becomes necessary to cast off old 
conventions, which have an impact upon the bias of academics and implications for 
policy. 
 
          Putting away standard assumptions about Salafiyya further helps us to  
          notice the conspicuous absence of any discussion of a concept called  
          Salafism in either Muslim or non-Muslim scholarship until about the  																																																								
38 Ibn Taimeeya detailed the issues of takfeer and tabdee’ extensively in his writings and Salafee 
scholars often refer to his verdicts. In sum, Salafee scholars are well aware of the dangers of 
fanaticism and that an individual Salafee can at one time or another display these sinful traits. The 
consistency at an individual’s display of hizbeeya is to be considered before ruling one as a hizbee. 
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          1920s… one thing is clear from the sources: prior to the last hundred  
          years, scholars, regardless of their background, did not use the notion of  
          Salafism, nor did they define it or argue about it (Lauzie’re 2016:23). 
 
While there is a need for breaking with the many suppositions about Salafees and 
Salafism, especially from outside secondary sources, which this study aims to 
achieve, it must be noted that Salafism was codified from the time of Ahl al-Hadeeth, 
although not explicitly used as a term. Secondly, the creed itself, manhaj, and 
sources have existed, and been documented, since the time of the Companions. 
Thirdly, various names have been used overtime by Sunnis to denote the same 
creedal orientation, which shows that Sunnis have used descriptors from the time of 
the Taabi’een with Salafism being included in this long tradition. 
 
Most researchers in the West categorize Salafees into distinct trends of thought 
which often overlap one another. Consequently, these categorizations complicate 
defining Salafism rendering the classification meaningless due to being over 
inclusive. This tendency by academics to include such varying trends into one 
simplified category is imprecise and many of those classified subjects contradict 
underlying Salafee principles. For example, Olidort mistakenly classifies Salafees 
with Jihaadees when he posits: 
           
          Whereas Islamists and jihadists [sic] seek specific political ends (for  
          Example the establishment of a caliphate), and at times have  
          compromised traditional teachings in pursuit of these ends, Salafists’ 
          first priority is to correct the means that Muslims use to meet their ends, 
          their method.This is why so-called quietist Salafists advocate for involvement  
          in some cases and restraint in others-the driving factor being whether action  
          or inaction in a particular case is in keeping with what the Prophet  
          Muhammad and his immediate followers would have done in a similar  
          situation (2015:5). 39 
 
While all those groups have Islamic objectives, Salafees claim to adhere to a 
specified set of principles derived from the sacred texts and those groups or 
individuals that do not enact those principles cannot accurately be referred to as 																																																								
39 Olidart conflates both Islamists, who aspire to Islamicize the state usually through political means 
and the jihaadists, who attempt to overthrow existing regimes through violence. 
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Salafee as their means for obtaining their goals are considered un-Islamic and 
therefore unjustified. Another example of incongruous categorization is that 
modernists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida are 
also often classified as Salafee due to their usage of the term Salafee to refer to 
their movements “leading some observers to erroneously conclude a common 
ideological lineage” (Wiktorowicz 2005:6).  While many academics classify Salafee 
and jihaadee-takfeeree scholars together, although their manhaj and approach may 
differ, it serves as a disservice to honest academic discourse. Bin Ali asserts, 
“While most Salafis are unanimous on matters of aqidah [sic], they are divided 
mainly in issues of jurisprudence and politics” (2012:52). This statement does not 
consider the criterion Salafees themselves use to determine who is Salafee and 
who is not. Bin Ali incorporates many non-Salafee adherents who clearly contradict 
Salafee manhaj with some espousing critical differences in creed from what is 
propagated by Salafee scholars. One such example he uses is Faisal al-Jamaikee 
and his concept of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a which is clearly at odds with Salafee 
scholars. Faisal’s fundamental view of al-wala’a wa bara’a results in excessive use 
of the concept of takfeer and abuse of its principles. This misclassification shows 
the common pitfall many academics fall into by overgeneralizing Salafism by 
ignoring important criterion and polemics used by Salafee scholars in their literature. 
Bin Ali, as he himself asserts, uses the often-cited classification of Wiktorowicz, 
which divides Salafees into three distinct categories: purists, politicos, and 
jihaadees.  According to Wiktorowicz, purists are those most associated with 
religious purity and for taking an apolitical stance regarding worldly issues. The 
second classification being politicos who are essentially a hybrid movement of 
activist scholars who support much of the politicking of the Muslim Brotherhood 
along with general adherence to the Salafee creed. The third category being the 
jihaadees who claim to espouse Salafee creed emphasizing principles of al-wala’a 
wa al-bara’a, takfeer, and jihaad with the aim of establishing a pure Islamic state.  
 
Another problem observed with many of the contemporary academics’ critique of 
Salafism is their excessive use of secondary sources instead of the primary sources 
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of Salafee scholarly discourse. This in turn further reinforces many of the negative 
preconceived notions of Salafism while at the same time distorting the general 
perception of the da’wa stunting real academic analysis and discourse.  “The only 
way forward is to recognize that the secondary literature is often part of the problem, 
not part of the solution. As long as we allow preconceptions and ready-made 
paradigms to determine the parameters of our historical investigations we shall 
remain prisoners of our own mythologies” (Lauzie’re 2016:13).  Another example of 
inaccurate classification is Bin Ali’s citing of Morten Storm, Abu Osama al-
Denmarkee, once a stern critic of Salafees, as a credible Salafee scholar.40 A 
recent Rand report reads:  
 
          The Salafi-jihadi [sic] organization ISI evolved from AQI, officially formed  
           by al-Zarqawi in October 2004. ISI was Salafi [sic] in that it adhered to an  
           ideological strain in Sunni Islam that seeks to emulate, as purer, the  
           thinking and practices of the prophet Muhammad and the earliest  
           generations of Muslims. It was jihadi [sic] in that it believed that violent  
           struggle against non-Muslims and Muslims it judged to be apostate is an  
           important religious duty” (Johnston 2016:4).  
  
It is very common for Western academics to classify Salafees with other 
contemporary trends and movements as the Rand report illustrates.  The common 
assumption is that “there are various types of modern Salafi [sic] groups. While 
most Salafis [sic] are unanimous in matters of aqidah [sic], they are divided mainly 
in issues of jurisprudence and politics” (bin Ali 2012:52). Another example of how 
many academics assign individuals and groups rejected by Salafees as 
representative of the da’wa is the case of Muhammad Surur. Steinberg posits 
Muhammad Surur is “the head of a Salafi [sic] trend called ‘Sururiya’- a term 
rejected by Sururis [sic] themselves. In his teachings, Surur combines Salafi 
thought and practice in the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya…with the revolutionary 
concepts of the Muslim Brotherhood as worked out by Sayyid Qutb” (Meijer 																																																								
40  The credentials of Morten Storm are dubious at best as he was a former convert to Islam, turned 
informant for various intelligence agencies who later became apostate according to his own account 
(2014). He was not known for scholarship or representative of any Salafee school and this 
researcher was personally acquainted with him in Yemen. While Bin Ali may have attempted to show 
a broad spectrum of Salafee ideologues it shows the common pitfall many academics fall into when 
attempting to find authentic Salafee sources.    
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2013:120). Just as Muhammad Surur and his followers reject the term Sururee, 
Salafees reject them as Salafee and consider classifications such as Sururee-
Salafee or Salafee-Jihaadee to be misnomers. Primarily this is because of contrasts 
in important aspects of creed or manhaj between Salafees and groups who may 
share some of their base interpretations of creedal tenets. For example, due to the 
fact of differences in application of issues such as takfeer and jihaad, which 
become contested methodological points, Salafees would never classify 
Muhammad Surur and his followers as Salafee. “These labels are intended to 
provide better tools for analysis, but it must be remembered that they are often 
imposed by outsiders. Moreover, they attempt to capture differences on questions 
pertaining to politics and the use of violence, which, although important are not at 
the core of purist Salafism” (Lauzie’re 2016:9). Academics like Wagmakers assert 
that differences between Salafees and jihaadees, like the infamous al-Maqdisee, 
are only in methodology or manhaj “the ideas on al-Maqdisi’s underlying justification 
of jihad [sic] against the rulers – kufr and takfir [sic] - are virtually the same as those 
of some quietists. That is ‘aqida, [sic] however” (2012:75). Wagemakers concludes 
that Salafees and jihaadees share a common creed, but differ in manhaj. However, 
according to the Salafee paradigm it is an absolute requirement that one’s creed 
and manhaj are both consistent. Whether an actor is considered Salafee or not is 
entirely dependent upon this uniformity. To the outsider this may seem trivial, but 
for Salafees it is paramount, and for research purposes and proper classification it 
is necessary to consider the criterion and manhaj according to Salafee literature.     
 
It appears that according to the principles of creed and methodology already 
discussed in this research that those classified as being ‘purist’ by Wiktorowicz and 
others are the most befitting of being labeled as Salafees. Salafees themselves 
reject the other two classifications due to issues of methodology. The other 
categories do not fit within the framework of the Salafee da’wa because of clear 
manhaj differences and distortions of important aspects of the Salafee creed. For 
example, the case of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaaliq, whom Wiktorowicz has 
labeled as a politico because of his organization’s political activism amalgamated 
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with elements of the Salafee creed. ‘Abd al-Khaaliq’s open criticism of Salafee 
scholars as well as his activism contains more elements of Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen’s 
manhaj than Salafees. These violations of manhaj, according to many Salafee 
scholars, warrant expulsion from the Salafee da’wa.41 
 
In contrast, Salafees usually take the argument that they restrict themselves to 
sharee’a politics. They prefer to align themselves closely with sharee'a-based 
principles, which reinforce societal stability by considering the harms and benefits of 
their activism. From amongst the commonly observed characteristics of Salafees 
through their literature is that they are not interested in leadership and authority in 
general but may take a position regarding general affairs that affect Muslims as 
long as it does not contradict political stability and threaten current Muslim 
leadership. 42 
 
Dissimilar to the jihaadee paradigm Salafees believe the means do not justify the 
ends. Salafees strictly adhere to principles such as ‘the means carries the same 
ruling as what was intended.’ Imaam Shaafi’ee explained this principle in his book 
Al-Umm by stating, “the means to that which is lawful and unlawful resembles the 
same meaning as that which is lawful and unlawful” (2004:70). For example, if a 
Muslim were to use a vehicle to attend a nightclub, a prohibited action, then the 
usage of the automobile to fulfill this purpose would also incur sin, as its intended 
outcome was immoral. On the other hand, the Muslim who drives his vehicle to 
attend prayer or a study circle is rewarded for his use of his vehicle (the means) as 
well as the action of prayer or study.  A more relevant illustration might be the 
contemporary trend amongst jihaadists to use car bombs to attack soft targets or in 
combat. According to Salafee scholars these actions constitute suicide and are 
illegitimate in aim and means. According to the principle, as presented by Imaam 																																																								
41Some of the methodological differences held by’Abd al-Khaaliq documented by Suhaimee are:  his 
stance towards contemporary leaders, da’wa priorities, takfeer and jihaad (2005:186). 
42 Even regarding the conflict in Syria Salafee scholars were against the initial protest against the 
Syrian regime citing protests as heretical and against the manhaj. Although Salafee scholars are 
unanimous in their takfeer of Bashar al-Assad they did not call for a coup or protests due to the 
perceived inability of his opposition to remove him and the potential for widespread bloodshed.  
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Shaafi’ee, the means (suicide bombing) does not justify the ends (potential victory 
on the battlefield), therefore, since the means is unlawful the result is considered 
unlawful, and this is without considering the carnage and civilian casualties that 
often result in these types of operations.  
 
Wiktorowicz posits regarding Salafee and Hizbee amalgamation “Salafis [sic] share 
this religious perspective, divisions have emerged as a result of the inherently 
subjective nature of applying religion to new issues and problems… The splits are 
about contextual analysis, not belief” (2005:2). However, for Salafees creed, 
manhaj and strategy all overlap, so this appears to be an oversimplification to fulfill 
the need to understand Salafism as a phenomenon. For Salafees, a defect in creed 
is reflected in manhaj and or strategy.   
 
Other academics like Hegghamer maintain that “the term Salafism […] is a 
theological, not a political category” (Meijer 2013:250). He suggests that the 
category has little value due to the diverse political actors and stances that fall 
under the Salafee banner. Again, Salafees would contend that many of the actions 
and methodology of those actors contradict Salafism.  
 
 Salafees and Jihaadees both reference Ibn Taimeeya as well as a host of classical 
scholars to substantiate their core beliefs. Due to this some academics allege “the 
different uses of Ibn Taymiyya [sic] are not a matter of belief; all of the factions 
accept him as a Salafi [sic] scholar par excellence. Divergent conclusions about 
which of his writings to emphasize are contingent on contextual interpretation, not 
theology” (Wiktorowicz 2005:10). The mere fact that both Salafees and jihaadists 
reference Ibn Taimeeya does not show that both groups are similar in origin 
because their methodologies and outcomes tend to be divergent. For example, one 
cannot equate the Salafee methodology of da’wa with excessive takfeer 
accompanied by violence and mayhem often espoused by Jihaadee ideologues 
(Green 2009).   
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One must not be hasty in drawing the conclusion that because some groups have 
overlapping characteristics that they are the same, and thus should be classified as 
such. Groups that share some aspects of the Salafee creed but hold a divergent 
view regarding the applicability of takfeer or the means and conditions of jihaad 
should not be considered Salafee as the criterion put forth in this research 
illustrates. The term Salafee becomes meaningless if academics continue to 
overgeneralize or by broadening the precepts of Salafism too wide. 
 
In sum, the commonly held assumption is that Salafism is comprised of three 
unique strands: purist, politico, and jihaadee. “The purists refrain from taking part in 
politics as they believe it corrupts the sanctity of the religion. The politicos see the 
participation in politics as an important means to address pressing problems. Finally, 
the Jihadis [sic] believe in physically opposing regimes and their opponents in order 
to uphold what they believe is proper” (bin Ali 2012:65). 
 
Jihaadee-Takfeeree Paradigm 
 
For the purpose of this research it is necessary to analyze the Jihaadee exemplar, 
as they are most commonly confused with Salafees. Before analyzing the paradigm 
of jihaadist-takfeeree groups it is important to define the terms jihaadee and 
takfeeree. The term jihaadee refers to those individuals or groups, which require or 
encourage violence as a force of political change as a manhaj (Green 2009). This 
excludes the Islamic concept of jihaad, which has been explained and codified by 
Muslim scholars as being a collective duty under Muslim leadership as a means of 
defending the community or an offensive jihaad guided by sharee'a principles and 
objectives. Therefore, a jihaadee manhaj is a consistent call for violence or threat of 
violence, which is considered the only means of political change in violation of 
sharee'a principles or objectives. The term takfeeree refers to those individuals or 
groups, which flout the principles of takfeer either by being excessive in their 
judgments, ignorant, or totally disregarding Islamic law and precepts. Egerton, 
although he blurs the categories of Salafees and jihaadees, claims “Militant 
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Salafism is a movement inspired by a religious and political metanarrative that 
demands militancy in the face of alleged Western hostility towards Islam. A militant 
Salafist is someone who considers their identity as a Muslim as paramount and 
holds that Muslims face hostility and aggression to which they have a duty to 
respond with violence” (2011:21). Egerton’s definition appears to encompass the 
belief of many, if not most Muslims, who feel that their Muslim identity is central to 
who they are, and overwhelmingly believe that there are both internal and external 
actors hostile towards Islam. This broad categorization begs the need for more 
precise scholarship and classification, so as not to render both hostile and friendly 
elements as equal rendering the classification useless and too broad.   
 
Jihaadees generally argue that Salafee scholars hide the truth and are pawns of the 
regime; whereas politicos say they are ignorant of contemporary events (Green 
2009). Wiktorowicz contends the difference between Salafees and takfeerees does 
not lie in conditions of takfeer or creed but rather application of when and who to 
declare a non-believer from amongst the Muslim leaders (2005). Evidence suggests 
a sharp rise in jihadism and there are a multitude of theories that purport to give rise 
to this ideology. Some of the common theories for the rise in jihaadism and its 
threat to the West in the twentieth century according to Turner’s assessment are: 
 
1. there is an inherent clash of civilizations; culture and opposing world view 
2. the rise of globalism and displacement of peoples, cultures, resulting in 
disenfranchisement 
3. cultural value conflict and opposition to liberalism and democracy 
4. the Palestinian cause and quest for statehood 
5. U.S policy and support for authoritarian regimes 
6. inherent clash between nation-state and the concept of a transnational 
Muslim identity under a caliph (2014). 
 
While many of these factors have relevance in the phenomenon of the rise in 
violent Muslim extremism they do not account for ideology and inherent schisms in 
the Muslim community, or detail accurately the relationship between Salafism and 
violent jihaadists. 
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Diagram 1: Aims and goals of various movements 
 
 
The above diagram illustrates the varied aims and socio-political goals of each of 
the above movements. Salafees generally concentrate their efforts on 
individual reform, which according to their theory will lead to greater societal 
reform. The da’wa movement of the politicos is more concentrated upon issues 
of leadership and the various means of attaining an authoritative role in a  
given society. Their methodology may include both electoral politics and usurping 
leadership through revolutionary means. 43  The third movement category may 
combine the tactic of rebellion; however, in contemporary times appears to be more 
focused upon joining conflict zones for the purpose of sowing discord to aid in the 
fall of existing apostate regimes or simply to terrorize the enemy. The following 
chapters will illustrate in depth ISIS’s political project of establishing a caliphate. 
 
 																																																								
43 The Salafee position regarding rebellion stems from the evidences of the Qur’an, Sunna, and the 
methodology of the Salaf. Although some Taabi’een and other classicists rebelled against tyrranical 
leadership, this was more the exception than the rule and prior to the codification of abstaining from 
-mad, alhMuzanee, Imaam A-revolt against a despot. Some of the classicists like, Imaam al
-Barr, and Imaam Nawawee declared consensus regarding this issue (al-aabaree, ibn ‘Abd alT
 afeeree 2009:1/283). Dh  
Primary	Political	Aims	
Salafees	
Individual	and		societal	reform	
Politicos	
Leadership	and	authority	
Jihaadees	
Fall	of	Secular	regimes	 		fall	or	terrorize	far	enemy		
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Chart 1: Methodological differences 
 
Group Jihaad 
Salafee • Offensive holy war requiring 
leader, parents’ permission, 
capability of victory 
• Defensive holy war  
• Seeking religious knowledge 
• Self-reformation 
• Refuting Ahl al-Bid’a 
Takfeeree • Perpetual armed conflict 
• Ends justify the means: suicide 
bombs, soft targets, and civilian 
causalities 
• Lone wolf attacks 
 
 
 
The above chart shows the general methodological tactics the various groups 
employ to achieve their aims. It also illustrates that Salafees are not predisposed 
to violence which is contrary to the aims of their da’wa.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, this chapter set out to define Salafism as a movement, discussed its 
origins, and what it means to be a Salafee from the perspective of Salafee 
scholars. In addition, the main components of the Salafee creed, concept of 
manhaj, and the Salafee critique of taqleed were explored. These tenets of 
Salafism were analyzed to contrast them with violent takfeeree conceptualizations 
of Islam and their interpretive discourse. 
 
The next chapter will survey Salafee scholars’ view of religious extremism, and 
their role in denouncing extremist ideology, with a focus on their censure of 
contemporary violent groups. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Salafees View on Religious Extremism 
 
In this chapter the concept of religious extremism will be analyzed from the Salafee 
perspective and the role of Salafee scholars in denouncing extremism will be 
scrutinized with the aim of measuring their effectiveness in influencing Muslim youth 
to condemn extremism. Special attention will be given to the ideology of 
contemporary groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, contrasting them with the Salafee 
manhaj and the view of contemporary Salafee scholars.  This will be measured 
through analyzing key texts, speeches, and fatwa from Salafee scholars and by 
examining blogs, and websites, that contain western Salafee discourse.  
 
Extremism According to Salafee Scholars 
 
Terms like extremism and terrorism are both general and ambiguous making it 
difficult to pin point universally accepted definitions; however, with that in mind this 
chapter will introduce some commonly held definitions contrasting them with the 
Salafee perspective.  
 
The term rahaba or extreme fear is mentioned in the Qur’an as a term, which at 
times refers to worshipping Allah in a state of humility and fear of disobeying His 
commands. In other verses the Qur’an alludes to causing fear or ‘terrorizing’ non-
Muslim combatants. Allah says, “And make ready against them (spread fear 
tarhabun) all you can of power, including steeds of war to threaten the enemy of 
Allah and your enemy…” (Qur’an 8:60). Imaam al-Baghawee comments that fear 
should be spread amongst the enemies of Islam to deter future combatants from 
attacking Muslims (1987:2/259). Salafee scholars mention that through preparation 
and the display of military strength the objective of spreading fear and terrorizing 
the enemy is achieved without contradicting the Islamic principles of safeguarding 
civilian lives, prohibition of burning by fire, and preserving places of worship. All the 
above categories are protected according to prophetic tradition. Ibn ‘Umar, a 
companion said, “During one of the battles a dead woman was found, so Allah’s 
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Messenger (saw) forbade the killing of women and children” (al-Bukhari 
1996:4/301).   
 
In contrast, groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS interpret the above verses to carryout 
wanton violence against anyone they perceive as their enemies by literally 
terrorizing them through indiscriminate violence. This is best illustrated by their 
numerous descriptions of suicide attacks. In one such incident the bomber attacked 
a group of Shi’a during their religious festival, ISIS reported by saying, “Our 
istishhadi brother Abu Fahd al-‘Iraqi entered into the midst of a group of Rafidi 
mushrikin [sic] during one of their shirki [sic] processions in the city of Sha’b 
towards the northeast of Baghdad and detonated his explosive vest on them. The 
blessed operation resulted in approximately 100 murtaddin being killed and 
wounded” (Rumiya 2016:3/42).44 For ISIS the Shi’a are pagans who should be 
exterminated as a religious duty and they do not discern between combatants and 
non-combatants. They even go as far as labeling these attacks as martyrdom 
operations rather than suicide missions. Apart from the jihaadist themselves, there 
are few who consider these actions as praiseworthy or necessary; however, the 
perception of violent actions and what is considered a legitimate form of resistance 
is subjective. For example, ISIS publications often portray suicide missions in a 
positive way. They extoll the ‘merits and virtues’ of such operations and scrutinize 
those who question their legitimacy. Salafees are particularly repulsed by these 
actions as they are both extreme and un-Islamic: distorting principles of jihaad and 
a setback to da’wa. Although these acts are a distortion and violation of Islamic 
jihaad, the general perception of most observers is that jihaad is synonymous with 
terrorism, which reinforces the negative stereotyping of a pure Islamic concept. 
Hoffman states: 
          On one point, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is  
          a word with Intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to  
          one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and     																																																								
44 Istishhadi [sic] refers to a person who participates in a suicide mission or what they refer to as 
martyrdom operation. The term murtaddin refers to a group of people who have been 
excommunicated from Islam and the takfeerees frequently use this term to describe their opposition. 
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          would otherwise prefer to ignore (1998:31).         
 
Defining Terrorism 
 
“Generally speaking, terrorism involves the use, or threat of use, of violence as a 
means of attempting to achieve some social or political effect” (Horgan 2014:10). 
Similarly, Salafees also view violence and the threat of violence as being a part of 
terrorism, but they view actions legislated by the sharee'a ordinances to be outside 
of its scope. Still another definition of terrorism is “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTI 2016). However, 
the database used by the Global Terrorism Index excludes state terrorism instead 
focusing on non-state actors and groups. 
 
Terrorism, according to Dr. ‘Abdullah al-Mutlaq is an act of aggression or threat of 
violence by an individual, group, or state seeking to spread fear by using one of the 
various means of violence to accomplish an unlegislated (non-compliant with 
sharee'a)45 end” (2010:131). This definition excludes legislated jihaad, which is 
carried out under the leadership of a Muslim state or leader for the benefit of, or 
defense, of the Muslim community. Likewise, although Horgan’s definition is broad 
it does not include (nor does he imply) what is commonly considered “just war 
theory” by Western academics. Examples of “just war” might be the violence 
commissioned by legitimate state actors against other states or actors that threaten 
their sovereignty or territory. Hoffman best articulates the distinction between more 
traditional warfare and terrorism when he states, “Even in war there are rules and 
accepted norms of behavior that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons…and 
proscribe various tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets” (cited 
in Horgan 2016:19).  Groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Shabaab do not operate in 
accordance with international law, and many argue, they flout Islamic law and 
																																																								45Sharee'a can be defined as a system of law derived from the Qur’an and Sunna which governs 
everyday life, providing the basis for law, governing both public and private affairs. Ibn Taimeeya 
states, sharee'a is “that which Allah has legislated from creed and actions” (1996: 3/256).   
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norms as will be observed.46 Shaikh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhaab al-‘Aqeel 
goes to great length to distance Islam from the actions of takfeeree groups by 
saying:  
 
           Terrorism is the terror that is caused by those groups or individuals who  
            resort to killing and wreaking havoc and destruction. Terrorism is      
            therefore, according to the contemporary compilers of modern Arabic  
            dictionaries, killing akin to the riotous killing that is mentioned within the  
            texts of Shar’eeah [sic]. As the Prophet (sallallaahu alayhi wassallam)   
            mentioned with regards to the signs of the end of time, the spread of ‘al- 
            Harj’ (riotous killing). The meaning of ‘al-Harj’ is killing and the increase in  
            spilling blood, which is all from the signs of the end of time. To the extent  
            that the one killing will not know why he is killing and the one that was  
            killed will not know why he/she was killed. Islaam is free from this riotous  
            killing, free from this terrorism and free from this kind of corruption.  
            Terrorism is established upon destruction of properties such as factories,  
            farms, places of worship, train stations, airports and the likes; Islaam is  
            clearly free from such actions that are based upon corruption and not  
            upon rectification (salafimanhaj.com).  
 
Recognizing terrorists before they commit acts of violence is a nearly impossible 
task and countless articles, books, and publications have been dedicated to trying 
to do so with very limited success. However, there does appear to be common 
characteristics of groups that resort to terrorism. “Most terrorist movements are 
relatively small, (semi-) clandestine collectives built on anti-establishment 
sociopolitical or religious ideologies. They seek to overthrow or at least destabilize a 
target regime, or influence it (be it a domestic or foreign-based power) by using 
violence or the threat thereof to exert pressure” (Horgan 2016:11). 47  As per 
Horgan’s definition, Salafees do not fit the criterion as a group with a specific 
ideology oriented towards rebellion or revolutionary politics, in fact, it can be 
asserted that Salafees are not perpetrators of terrorist acts or espousers of violence, 																																																								
46 While there is a rising amount of evidence of human rights abuses by the Saudi regime from the 
war in Yemen to the killing of the journalist Jamal Kashoogi, these actions of the regime are in no 
way reflective of Salafism. Salafism, as was mentioned previously, is an understanding of Islam and 
in no way does an organization, individual, or govenrment’s behaviour reflect on the movement 
unless the action is authenticated by the Qur’an and Sunna. The Saudi government may promote 
Salafism; however, its actions and politics are not reflective of Salafism. Salafees emphasize that 
Salafism existed long before the Saudi regime deriving its roots to the movement of Ahl Hadeeth.    
47 ISIS with their claim of statehood as well as control of large swathes of territory do not fit perfectly 
in accordance with Horgan’s definition. 
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contrary to the many misnomers around Salafism perpetuated by media. This 
researcher has not come across any verifiable data suggesting a link between 
Salafees and violence. In contrast, there is a plethora of data linking violence and 
takfeeree movements whom Salafees are known to repudiate, while at the same 
time rejecting revolutionary theory (Green 2009). The takfeeree-jihaadee groups 
have become proficient in spreading terror globally, not always by effective attacks, 
but by simply instilling fear in their intended targets and keeping them on edge. 
Fear for these groups is more effective than committing violence.48 Jenkins states, 
"The jihaadists clearly have discovered this and have recently modified their 
strategy to exploit these vulnerabilities. Jihaadist rhetoric now urges followers with 
limited capabilities to launch low-level attacks, even if they are likely to fail, 
confident that public and political reactions will still provide a good return on their 
investment" (Rand 2017:2). Simply classifying Salafees, who do not call for violence 
nor share a common ideology, manhaj, or concept of jihaad, with these groups 
does not make sense, nor is it useful academically, and unfortunately it is a 
common pitfall of Western academics. Salafees view extremism as actions, 
ideologies, statements, and methodologies that transgress sharee'a boundaries.  
This is important for understanding Salafees because they deem all affairs within 
the parameters of the sharee'a as acceptable.  
 
ISIS on the Scale 
 
ISIS and other al-Qaeda inspired factions, like other guerilla groups, break all 
standards of conventional warfare as a consistent practice. ISIS probably more so 
than al-Qaeda have engaged in both guerilla warfare tactics while trying to establish 
a state and defend territory, as well as terrorize their enemy. For ISIS the means 
justify the ends and they are not restrained by any external rules of engagement, 
																																																								
48 The recent U.S ban on onboard electronic devices from several Muslim countries, the attempted 
ban on immigration from certain Muslim majority states, and heightened security measures globally 
are just some examples of how this fear of terrorists and terrorism, however justified, can have a 
direct impact on policy and achieve the goal of extremist groups: to instill fear. 
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which, coincidently, they deem to be un-Islamic. According to the ISIS publication of 
Rumiya:   
            
          As the soldiers of the Khilafah [sic] continue waging war on the forces of  
          kufr, we take a glimpse at a number of recent operations conducted by the  
          mujahidin of the Islamic State that have succeeded in expanding the  
          territory of the Khilafah, or terrorizing, massacring, and humiliating the  
          enemies of Allah. These operations are merely a selection of the  
          numerous operations that the Islamic State has conducted on various  
          fronts across many regions over the course of the last few weeks  
          (2017:1/22-23). 
 
ISIS is very clear in its resolve to conquer, spread fear, and destroy any and all 
adversaries in order to achieve its stated goal of an Islamic state, and they believe 
in maintaining a perpetual state of warfare in order to make Islam dominant by any 
means. Their brutality and methods of terrorizing their opponents and the populace 
they govern show they are willing to use whatever means at their disposal to 
achieve their aims. In a recent Brookings Institute article Byman asserts: 
  
          The Islamic State evolved out of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and its  
          tactics reflect this context. The Islamic State seeks to conquer; thus it  
          deploys artillery, massed forces, and even tanks and MANPADS as it  
          sweeps into new areas or defends existing holdings. Terrorism, in this  
          context, is part of revolutionary war: it is used to undermine morale in the  
          army and police, force a sectarian backlash, or otherwise create dynamics  
          that help conquest on the ground (2016:3). 
 
ISIS ‘s primary tactics and tools of influence are through terror and ruthlessness. 
According to the Global Terrorism Index, “ISIL-affiliated groups undertook attacks in 
28 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014” (2016:2). ISIS does not restrict 
their attacks to any one battle front for them the whole world is a place of conflict 
between faith and disbelief. According to GTI "ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the 
deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 
2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year" (2016:4). Many war crimes 
are attributed to ISIS fighters and their atrocities are well documented: from rape to 
beheadings and public crucifixions, and even burning their captives of war. 
Countless Salafee scholars have denounced these actions declaring them evil, 
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inhumane, and overall un-Islamic. Shaikh ‘Abdul Muhsin al-Abbaad referred to the 
leader of ISIS as a “takfeeree murderer” who declares Sunnis as apostates for 
working alongside the Iraqi government and law enforcement agencies. He further 
likened ISIS to the original Khawaarij sect (takfiris.com). 
 
            ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group in Iraq’s history with over 11,000  
            deaths. The next deadliest group in Iraq is al-Qa’ida [sic]. However, the  
            number of deaths attributed to these groups is underestimated as nearly  
            two thirds of the 50,000 deaths in Iraq from terrorism in the last 13 years  
            have not been claimed by any group. Other groups active in Iraq include  
            the al-Naqshabandiya Army, a Sufi group that has been active since 2006,  
            and the Mukhtar Army, a Shi’a militia group (GTI 2016:5). 
 
  
ISIS although openly hostile towards Shi’a, and anyone who opposes it, “should be 
given much credit for Iran's rise in the region. An avowedly anti-Shi'a group, the 
Islamic State has inadvertently allowed Iran to accumulate more power in Iraq and 
Syria and gain closer ties to major international powers such as Russia” (Rand 
2017:5). This shows ISIS’s lack of political astuteness or suggests it is not 
concerned truly with Shi’a hegemony, but only opportunity, instead of strict 
adherence to specific principles, especially Salafee ones. The rise of ISIS and its 
expansion can be partly attributed to its alleged enemies who purchased petrol, 
allowed them temporary refuge, and in the case of the Syrian regime, released 
many of their fighters to fight the Americans. “Iranian allies such as Iraqi Shi'a 
militias, the Syrian regime, and Lebanese Hezbollah have been key in fighting the 
Islamic State and other Sunni Jihadi [sic] groups. Of course, the Syrian regime and 
Hezbollah have spent much of their energies fighting the Syrian opposition and not 
the Islamic State, but Iran has been able to paint itself as a force against violent 
Sunni jihadism [sic]” (Rand 2017:7).  Some Salafees suggest that this is evidence 
that Iran and ISIS are aligned with similar goals or at least complacent regarding 
Shi’a domination focusing much of their energy and brutality fighting against Sunnis 
and causing instability amongst Muslim regimes like the original Khawaarij sect did. 
However, this requires more in-depth analysis outside the scope of the study. 
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ISIS claims to adhere to Islamic values and uphold sharee'a law; however, it 
violates Islamic standards of jihaad as articulated in the Qur’an and Sunna and 
criterion of traditional Sunni jurists. Contrary to its claims of purity, ISIS attacks 
many civilians and spreads trepidation throughout the populations they inhabit. 
These are clear violations of the principles guiding Islamic jihaad.  In 2015, “the 
majority of attacks targeted civilians, who account for 43 per cent of deaths. Over 
half of attacks on civilians were bombings or explosions, with the number of 
assassinations decreasing from the previous year” (GTI 2016:3). ISIS attempts to 
justify attacks against civilians and their places of worship by claiming they are 
legitimate targets because they are a part of a larger crusade against Islam and 
they are citizens of a coalition of nations who attack its caliphate like its 
predecessors in al-Qaeda. "In Lyon, a daring Muslim came to the defense of the 
Khilafah [sic] by storming a French factory and beheading a kafir [sic] belonging to 
France, a crusader coalition nation waging war against the Khilafah [sic] " (Dabiq 
2015:10/3). While it may seem insignificant to many analyzing "the war on terror", 
ISIS views every attack as a propaganda victory and counterstrike against all those 
who oppose their vision of an Islamic state. These killings are repulsive to Salafees 
who deem these activities as setbacks to their da’wa efforts. Dabiq, the ISIS online 
publication, reports on the beach attack that took place "in Tunisa, the mujahid [sic] 
Abu Yahya al-Qayrawini made his way into a hotel beach resort…with an assault 
rifle and massacred dozens of citizens belonging to a number of European crusader 
states…" (2016:10/3). ISIS’s brutality seems limitless with even more ruthless 
attacks than al-Qaeda, and although its strategies are similar both groups are 
critical of each other. For ISIS, al-Qaeda is weak and negligent in its duties because 
they "have the ability to take and hold territory and impose their will. Yet they refuse 
to establish the rule of Allah…" (Dabiq 2015:10/3).49 ISIS further characterizes its 
fighters as those who hope to attain the glory of the afterlife regardless of how their 
heinous acts are perceived in the media and by governments.  In contrast, ISIS 
views al-Qaeda's fighters as being overly concerned, and restrained, by the 																																																								
49 This is also indicative of many of the jihaadee groups fighting in Syria: splintering and infighting based 
upon differing objectives and perceptions of sharee'a applicability.  
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perception of world opinion, which paralyzes it from sharee'a implementation. In 
their critique of Mulla Umar, the former Taliban leader of Afghanistan, ISIS states, 
"the man is not striving to establish general shari Khilafah [sic] whose supervision 
affects the whole world from its kafir [sic] and apostate governments" (Dabiq 
2015:10/20). It further accuses him of nationalism and not having a broad vision 
and concern for the whole Muslim nation. In addition, ISIS did not deem his focus to 
be on removing disbelieving despots who rule over Muslim lands. This shows that 
ISIS views movements like al-Qaeda and Taliban as illegitimate mujahideen and 
the Muslim regimes as illegitimate apostate governments ruling over Muslim 
territories. Finally, ISIS saw Mulla Umar as an illegitimate leader for Muslims, and 
that al-Qaeda must pledge allegiance to ISIS's chosen leader.   
 
Differences with Salafee Manhaj 
 
There are many ways in which ISIS differs from the Salafee methodology; however, 
for the purpose of this research, the three most significant ways will be analyzed: its 
call to violence and brutality, its jihaadee tactics, and its excessive use of takfeer.50  
 
First, ISIS primarily directs its da'wa towards other Muslims by exhorting them to 
violence. Killing and terror, to ISIS, are divine mandates, which legitimizes attacking 
soft targets. ISIS's propaganda is far reaching, and it encourages and inspires 
attacks worldwide. It describes a recent knife attack in the U.S by saying, “A soldier 
of the Khilafah – our brother Dahir Adan – stabbed 10 kuffar [sic] in the state of 
Minnesota in response to the calls to target the citizens of the nations involved in 
the Crusader coalition” (Rumiya 2017:2/34). As part of ISIS’S propaganda, it 
exploits various lone-wolf attacks to show that its da'wa to violence is effective and 
heeded; however, it is not always clear if these attacks have a link to ISIS contrary 
to its claims. The da'wa of ISIS is a form of violent propaganda “similar to its 
predecessors the Khawaarij. It is not known for da’wa to Allah. Instead it calls to its 																																																								50	Also,	part	of	the	irony	of	ISIS's	violence	and	brutal	paradigm	is	that	it	shares	a	common	narrative	to	the	Islamaphobes:	Islam	is	a	violent	and	imposing	religion	(Beck	2015).		
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wicked mathhab and it never stands together with the umma to fight their 
enemies… instead it exerts its efforts to fight them, destroy the da’wa to Allah, thus 
causing people to hate Islam” (al-Rehailee 2017:80-81).   
Although, ISIS claims to be defenders of Sunni Islam and defenders of the faith 
many of its attacks have been against Sunnis. According to a proclamation by one 
of their scholars Muharub al-Juburi who claims ISIS is the defender of Sunni blood 
and honor then he states, “We will confront, by the power of Allah, any aggression 
against it with the severest and most vexing of responses, the brutality which has 
no limits” (Rumiya 2017:2/35). Al-Juburi claims his group is the defender of Sunnis; 
however, evidence suggests that many causalities of ISIS’s violence are in fact 
Sunnis in Iraq and Syria although exact statistics are difficult to substantiate (GTI 
2016:7). 
 
Another way in which the Salafee da’wa differs from the violence filled rhetoric of 
ISIS can be illustrated through their Friday sermons. Most Salafee sermons deal 
with personal reform and removing sinfulness from society with most preaching 
being unusually apolitical. This also varies to a certain degree depending upon the 
society in which the Salafees reside. Due to both strict government control and 
support for the da’wa in Saudi Arabia, Salafee scholars rarely if ever engage in 
political rhetoric unless it is favorable to the government. This is in part due to the 
adherence to the principle of obedience to the ruler and the prohibition of openly 
criticizing the leader and his policies. However, due to the more open nature of  
Yemeni society, prior to the recent civil war, it appears Yemeni Salafee scholars 
were more open in their advice and acknowledge the government's mistakes 
without contradicting the principle of encouraging rebellion or disobedience to the 
ruling authority. For example, Shaikh Muhammad al-Imaam, a well-known student 
of Shaikh Muqbil bin Haadee, is known for lecturing about more controversial topics 
like the role of international organizations in Yemen and Muslim societies in general 
as well as offering advice about coping with oppression from the government, and 
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advice for the ruling political party (olemalyemen.com 2017). 
Second, ISIS as a movement developed in a conflict zone, Iraq, evolving from al-
Qaeda, which bases its movement on its concept of jihaad and revolutionary 
struggle. Byman states regarding ISIS’s tactics: 
           
           The Islamic State does not follow Al Qaeda’s “far enemy” strategy,  
           preferring instead the “near enemy” strategy, albeit on a regional level. As  
           such, the primary target of the Islamic State has not been the United  
           States, but rather “apostate” regimes in the Arab world—namely, the Asad  
           regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. Like his predecessors,  
           Baghdadi favors purifying the Islamic community first by attacking Shi’a  
           and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist [sic] groups  
           (Brookings 2016:6). 
 
ISIS’s focus before being put on the defensive by coalition forces, was primarily to 
obtain territory and destabilize the regimes in Iraq and Syria. Salafee scholars 
repudiated both goals because the incitement to revolution and violence against 
those regimes would likely lead to the scenarios in which those states live today: 
chaos, wanton violence and fear affecting the Muslim residents of those countries.  
  
ISIS’s understanding of jihaad conflicts with traditional concepts because anyone 
anywhere can participate by just committing acts of violence against civilians. One 
of the ideologues that writes for ISIS states that a Muslim “barred from hijrah must 
purify him- self of the branches of lesser hypocrisy that hold him back from 
performing jihād [sic] in his location. Let him record his will, renew his bay’ah [sic], 
carry the Khilāfah [sic] banner, and strike the crusaders and their pagan and 
apostate allies wherever he can find them, even if he is alone” (Dabiq 2015:12/4). 
ISIS puts great emphasis on conquest, vengeance and literal bleeding of its 
enemies, and they attempt to justify their brutality through Islamic texts. For 
Jihaadists, it is possible for anyone to join their concept of jihaad if it is carried out 
for the betterment of their perceived goals and to terrorize their enemies. This 
departs from traditional juristic rulings and the Salafee concept of jihaad. 
Wagemakers observes, "It is possible for any organization, group or individual 
convinced of its method, its goals, and its way to join it, directly or indirectly" 
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(2012:80). These principles have no Salaf (legitimate Islamic predecessor) nor can 
it be associated with Salafism due to its deviation from core Islamic principles. For 
example, Salafees believe that jihaad must be under a Muslim leader, whether he is 
righteous or oppressive and that jihaad is a collective struggle, not an individual one, 
against those non-Muslim nations that do not have a pact or treatise with the 
Muslims. Furthermore, Salafee scholars, unlike ISIS, do not deem it impermissible 
to have affection and relations with non-Muslims. Shaikh Bazmool explains that 
affection for non-Muslims is of two main types: one that expels a person from Islam 
and the other type, which does not. In the former category it can further be divided 
into the five juristic rulings. In short, loving a non-Muslim for their religion or creed, 
or assisting them in disbelief nullifies a person’s Islam (2015). This highlights a 
methodological difference between Salafees’ understanding of al-wala'a wa al-
bara’a and takfeerees.  
 
ISIS uses a plethora of dictates from classical scholars to justify its brutality without 
any effort to contextualize the verses and hadeeth they quote or the verdicts it 
appropriates to validate its violent methodology. In fact, in some of the statements it 
issues there are flagrant transgressions of sharee'a principles that safe guard 
human life, as well as arbitrary accusations of takfeer and declarations of apostasy, 
which it issues against any Muslim, that dares criticize or disagree with its 
interpretations of sharee'a or grand scheme of attaining a universal leader through 
violence and trepidation. This methodology of wreaking havoc and committing 
violent atrocities against civilians is a phenomena alien to Islam except to the extent 
that the original Khawaarij sect carried out outrages against fellow Muslims. 
Jihaadee groups like ISIS revive this trend and methodology (Green 2009). “One of 
these great principles is that all people must be fought until they accept Islam or 
come under a shar’i [sic] covenant. This principle establishes the prohibition of 
shedding Muslim and covenant-bound kafir blood as well as the permissibility of 
shedding the blood of all other kuffar [sic].” (Rumiya 2017:2/17). A significant part of 
ISIS’s da’wa is to encourage lone wolf attacks, especially for those who are unable 
to join the main battlefront.    
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           Muslims currently living in Daar al-Kufr must be reminded that the blood of  
           the disbelievers is halal, and killing them is a form of worship to Allah, the  
           Lord, King, and God of mankind. This includes the businessman riding to  
           work in a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent “children”) engaged in  
           sports activities in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a  
           sandwich. Indeed, even the blood of the kaffir [sic] street vendor selling  
           flowers to those passing by is halal to shed and striking terror into the  
           hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty (Rumiya 2017:2/17).  
 
The vivid imagery and violent use of language is what inspires often marginalized 
and disenfranchised youth to become inspired to participate in ISIS’s version of 
jihaad, with promises of paradise, righting injustices, and being apart of the struggle 
to restore the lost glory of the Muslim community. For those individuals who cannot 
migrate to the only ‘true Islamic state’ then their role is advancing the cause through 
violence and individual lone wolf attacks, thus fulfilling their duty to achieve the 
collective goal of spreading terror and fear amongst their enemies.  ISIS’s rhetoric 
legitimizes the targeting of all opposition, and for them, as well as their jihaadist 
predecessors, these are sharee'a objectives.  
          Jihadist [sic] discourse is full of polemical, dichotomist, Manichean,  
          incriminating agonistic, warmongering, and resentment-laden words. Jihad  
          [sic] is waged against the Shiites [sic] quietist Muslims, the West, and all      
          Muslim rulers. The fight against the disbelievers and the "fake Muslims"  
          obsesses jihadist discourse. Those who are called hypocrites (munafiq)  
          are only Muslims by name; their major crime is to disagree with jihadists on  
          the necessity of holy war. Their obsession makes the jihadist [sic] version  
          of Islam almost entirely devoted to violence and its justification  
          (Khosrokhavar 2009:73).  
 
This violent polemic argumentation differs with Salafee discourse, which never 
reaches the level of violence or takfeer. Discourse between Salafee groups is 
sanctioned by sharee'a, and if differences persist, usually they result in 
excommunication from the manhaj not the religion. For example, in a file entitled 
“Collection of Shaikh Rabee’a’s Refutations of al-Hadaadeeya” taken from the 
Shaikh’s official website, there are over 63 different articles refuting opponents, 
whom according to the Shaikh, contain errors in manhaj by holding extremist views 
regarding criticizing individuals and declaring them to be heretics. Although some of 
the criticisms contain hyperbolic and polemic language, nevertheless he does not 
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issue a ruling of takfeer against his opponents, but rather excommunicates them 
from the Salafee manhaj (rabee.net 2017).51 This highlights Salafees’ caution in 
issuing rulings of takfeer even against their detractors and those whom they 
censure. In a hadeeth, it was mentioned that a man was fearful of being resurrected 
and punished due to his many sins so, he ordered his children to burn his body and 
distribute the ashes in the sea after his death. (Muslim 1999) Shaikh Sulimaan al-
Rehailee comments about this hadeeth, stating "whoever denies the ability of Allah 
to resurrect him then this is disbelief by consensus of the Muslims" (2017:107). He 
then explains that although the man made a statement of disbelief he was forgiven 
due to ignorance of the ability of Allah and his severe fear and humility, which was 
evidence of his faith. Ibn Taimeeya states, "The person who is capable of making 
ijtihaad, while striving to follow the Messenger (saw), is more deserving of 
forgiveness than the person who misinterprets" (1996 3/231).52 The purpose of 
mentioning these statements is to illustrate the difference between takfeeree 
methodology and interpretation of core texts, and the principles of Salafees, who 
exercise caution in the issue of takfeer, avoiding verdicts of violence, and restraint 
regarding jihaad. 
Salafees emphasize the need to rectify the greater Muslim community and the 
societies in which they live by exhorting them to monotheism and shunning 
sinfulness. To illustrate this point when analyzing one hundred fataawa from a 
collection of verdicts from Bin Baz, taken exclusively from the chapter of jihaad, 
only six percent of the verdicts were directly related to conducting warfare with the 
remaining ninety four percent pertinent to da’wa, commanding righteousness and 
rebuking sin in the society. (Bin Baz 2010:18). This shows that even for the highest 
and most respected religious authority amongst Salafees, the discussion and 																																																								
51 Scholars from the time of the Salaf until present day scholars classified bid’a and heresy, into 
those infractions that are considered disbelief and those which do not nullify faith, but instead are 
sinful (al-Rehailee 2001). The term excommunication used above does not refer to disbelief or 
takfeer, but rather sinful, unorthodox infractions, which expel an individual or group from Salafism: 
meaning they are unorthodox Muslims.  
52 A further point to be noted is that both takfeeree groups and Salafees quote extensively from Ibn 
Taimeeya, but takfeerees rarely highlight those intricate details and conditions for takfeer discussed 
by Ibn Taimeeya. 
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verdicts pertaining to jihaad and fighting were of less importance than da’wa. Da’wa 
and learning Islamic knowledge, for Salafees, are considered types of jihaad and 
both contain high merits. Shaikh al-Fawzaan was asked about whether jihaad of the 
sword or striving to seek knowledge takes precedence. He replied, “The jihaad of 
knowledge takes priority. It is an absolute necessity that a person studies that which 
allows him to correctly practice his religion…so his jihaad is based upon knowledge 
and insight and not ignorance and mistakes” (al-Fawzaan 2004:44).  It can also be 
inferred from this text as well as the numerous treatises on da’wa and jihaad, that 
fighting is not prioritized in the Salafee community, unless the conditions are met 
according to Salafee scholars, unlike the jihaadee groups who make that their 
primacy. “If the conditions for jihaad are not met, nor does one possess ability to 
fight, then wait until the Muslims regain their strength and are established and 
prepared, then they fight” (al-Fawzaan 2004:48).  
    
The third distinction between ISIS’s manhaj and that of the Salafee da’wa is the 
implementation of the principle of takfeer. Takfeeree ideology is an integral part of 
ISIS’s manhaj because it delegitimizes their Muslim opponents and deflects 
scholarly criticism of their brutal tactics. ISIS abuses the principles of takfeer casting 
a broad net encapsulating all opposition to its ideology, which is an attempt to 
delegitimize its Muslim critics. In an article discussing the various Syrian opposition 
factions it states, “If those holding supposedly good intentions were truthful they 
would abandon the Sahwah alliance, repent from their apostasy pronounce takfir 
[sic] upon their former allies and wage war against them, not the Islamic State” 
(Dabiq 2015:12/17). ISIS excommunicates all opposition, makes penitence a 
condition to join it, and requires judging its former allies with takfeer in order to 
establish legitimacy. It also requires its former opposition to reinstatement their 
Islam. In addition, they use the same tactics to deflect scholarly criticism. ISIS 
criticizes Salafee scholars and those who condemn it by questioning their 
authenticity by querying, “Or have they just become – with their own approval – 
mere sticks in the hands of the tawaghit used to strike the mujahidin [sic], all in the 
	 87	
name of the Shari’ah [sic] and the religion? These people are no more than 
“Imaams” of misguidance and “scholars” of taghut [sic]” (Rumiya 2017:1/30). In fact, 
ISIS considers those scholars to be like Orientalists who are lauded by the West as 
experts, but considered by Muslim scholars as ignorant, ill informed, and dubious.  
         Yet Muslims today are discouraged by the so-called “Salafī” [sic] or even    
         “Salafī Jihādī” [sic] claimants from approaching the Qur’ān and the Sunnah  
         [sic] without blinding goggles limiting them to the desires of contemporary  
         “scholars” from amongst those supporting the tawāghīt [sic] or those sitting  
         back amongst their women in the shades of the tawāghīt [sic]” (Dabiq  
         2015:11/10).  
 
Much of the enmity between Salafees and takfeeree groups is due to varying 
interpretations of core Islamic texts, understanding, methodology, and even issues 
of creed, with takfeer being one of the many issues they differ over. Long before the 
rise of ISIS, Salafee scholars like bin ‘Uthaimeen rebuked their dogma and the 
hizbee groups that disseminated the takfeeree ideology. A large part of their da’wa 
is oriented towards excommunicating individual Muslims from the faith through 
nefariously capricious rulings. In fact, it appears by the numbers of declarations of 
apostasy it issues in its online publications that it places the burden of takfeer upon 
the general Muslims, whereas Salafees reserve those rulings for the scholars. Bin 
‘Uthaimeen explains that the Salafee manhaj consists of principles and conditions, 
which do not allow for easy judgments of apostasy. He states, “The origin of a 
person who is an adherent of Islam is that he remains in that original state until 
something proves that it is no longer the case based upon sharee'a evidence” 
(2002:137-138). There is a noticeable difference between how ISIS views Muslim 
communities that do not accept its manhaj, and the Salafee methodology, which 
attempts to analyze individuals according to sharee’a principles, not paranoia and 
hizbeeya. Furthermore, the implications of such takfeeree thinking, according to Bin 
‘Uthaimeen is that it entails “discrediting Allah’s judgment, and mischaracterizing 
those whom have been presumed to be heretics (by excommunicating them from 
Islam unjustly)” (2002:137-138).  Moreover, Bin ‘Uthaimeen declares that these 
judgments are usurping Allah’s right to judgment and similar to ruling by other than 
divine law because it involves excommunicating those individuals who Allah did not 
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anathematize. Therefore, it makes lawful that which is unlawful: the sanctity of the 
Muslim by wrongfully accusing him or her. Of interest, this judgment of the Shaikh's 
illustrates how Salafees turn the claims of the takfeerees against them in their 
discourse, because a common theme of the takfeerees is that their antagonists do 
not rule by Allah’s divine law or they have al-wala’a for disbelievers (Green 2009).  
To illustrate the difference between ISIS and Salafee scholars in Qur’anic exegesis 
is the verse in Aali-Imran, which prohibits taking disbelievers as supporters. Salafee 
scholars interpret the phrase ‘taking supporters’ as meaning to love disbelievers 
with one’s heart, which is an intrinsic value, therefore negating faith. The other 
concept of love, according to Salafees, entails openly declaring love to protect 
oneself from the harm of disbelievers who may threaten one’s wealth or person. 
Thus, if faith remains in one’s heart and he or she is at ease, then this is considered 
permissible and a form of defending against evil (al-Rehailee 2017). Imaam al-
Tabaree says “If the disbelievers are uppermost and they have power and strength, 
and a Muslim fears for himself, or the leader is fearful for the Muslims, then he can 
display gentle speech, open kindness, and compassion with his words” 
(2012:5/317). Imaam al-Tabaree also narrated on al-Sud’ee regarding the term 
protectors mentioned in several verses, “Then it is loving them for their religion” 
(2012:5/317). Imaam ibn Katheer and many other scholars of Qur’anic exegesis 
also concur with this meaning. Shaikh Sulimaan mentions, “If we agree with them 
for the sake of argument…it is important to note that all love in the heart for a 
disbeliever does not entail disbelief which nullifies faith. Instead, that which nullifies 
faith is love in the heart for the sake of religion. As for loving the disbeliever for a 
worldly benefit then this is sinfulness and not disbelief which expels one from Islam” 
(2017:205). Ibn Taimeeya comments, “It is possible a man could have love for them 
due to kinship or necessity and it can be a sin which reduces his faith in which case 
he does not become a disbeliever” (2006:7/522-523).  
 
Additionally, there are numerous examples from the Salaf, which exemplify the 
Salafee manhaj in exercising restraint in issues of takfeer. One such example is the 
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labeling of the Qur'an as a created entity. The Salaf reached consensus on takfeer 
of the one who claims the Qur'an was created and not the speech of Allah. 
Although this was the case, Imaam Ahmad bin Hanbal "did not make takfeer of 
specific individuals (regarding this controversy), even the leader who ordered 
people to say the Qur'an was created and punished people over this issue" (al-
Rehailee 2017:112).  
 
Overall, the tactic used by ISIS, and in fact all the hizbee groups surveyed for this 
research, is one in which they declare all opposition as having betrayed Islam, lost 
legitimacy as Muslims, thus deeming them worthy of death for opposing the “true 
Islamic state”, which is in stark contrast to the Salafee methodology. It seems ISIS 
has lost sight of sharee'a objectives. According to ISIS, sharee'a is a series of 
punishments, which enable it to subjagate those under its authority and wage war 
against its enemies, which includes Salafee scholars. 
 Scholars of ISIS 
ISIS expresses vehement hatred towards Salafee scholars viewing them as 
hypocrites at best and enemies of Islam at worst. When analyzing ISIS’s rhetoric 
and their criticisms of Salafees they describe the Salafee scholars as learned men 
who hide the truth and do not act upon their knowledge.53 They also assert they 
issue religious verdicts defending apostate regimes, legitimizing their rule, and 
attacking the true ‘defenders of the faith’: ISIS. “Therefore, Ibn Baz, Ibn ‘Uthaymin, 
al-Fawzan, Al ash- Shaykh (the contemporaries), Muhammad Hassan, al-Huwayni, 
Husayn Ya’qub, al-Qardawi, al-Buti, an-Nabulusi, al-Ghiryani, al-Maqdisi, Abu 
Qatadah, al-Haddushi, and al-Fahl are not scholars” (Rumiya 2017:1/30). ISIS 
issues verbal attacks upon a wide range of scholars from major well-known Salafee 																																																								53	Abul Mughira a commander for ISIS in Libya was asked about their campaign in Libya to secure 
territory and he mentioned some opposition they had from Salafee fighters there by saying, “There 
was also resistance from some of the Madkhalī Murji’ah [sic], who carried arms against the Islamic 
State.” (Dabiq 2015:11/62). This illustrates the enmity Salafees and groups like ISIS have for one 
another. 
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scholars to supporters of Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, and even other takfeeree 
ideologues, in addition to known Sufi clerics due to their opposition to their 
methodology. ISIS claims that these scholars do not practice the knowledge they 
possess and are tools of the various regimes they represent that are being used to 
criticize the legitimate caliph of the Muslims and his vanguards.  “Where is their 
acting upon knowledge?! Where is their open declaration of the truth?! Where is 
their rejection of the shirk of the tawaghit [sic]?! Where is their fighting, combat, and 
ribat [sic]?!54 Where is their clarifying the truth and guiding the people?! Where is 
their confronting of the disbelievers’ violent campaigns against the Muslims?!” 
(Rumiya 2017:1/30). ISIS is at odds with Salafees and their methodology and they 
are both extremely critical of one another, both accusing the other of hizbeeya, and 
contrary to what many pundits claim, it appears inaccurate to classify them together 
with their divergent paradigms regarding issues they both deem fundamental to the 
faith. In Dabiq, they critique Salafee scholars in particular by saying they 
“abandoned jihād [sic] in an era where jihād is fard ‘ayn [sic]. They ask the Muslims 
to follow those “scholars” who are silent about the evils of rulers who are tawāghīt 
[sic] not merely tyrannical… who call to deviance and apostasy and who side with 
the crusaders and apostates against the Muslims” (2015:11/13).  
 
In contrast, ISIS has their own scholars; however, to Salafees they are considered 
young ignorant heretics who are not known for Islamic knowledge, instead they 
consider them to be youthful zealots and ex-proponents of al-Qaeda. According to 
Ether Abdul Haq and the website Zaman al-Wasal, captured ISIS documents reveal 
that youth between ages of 18 to 30 form the majority of ISIS recruits and fighters 
offering “vitality by investing their energies and enthusiasm. The ‘simple minded’ 
form the majority of those joining ISIS’s ranks… Based on the documents, no 
persons above the age of 60 have joined ISIS” (2017). This report suggests most 
ISIS members, as well as many of the jihaadee groups, are very young and have 																																																								
54 The term tawaghit is used to describe anyone or anything worshipped other than Allah (false Gods) 
and this is a specific reference to those who rule or legislate man made laws.  
Ribat refers to war and combat. 
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had limited Islamic training. Moreover, most of their scholars are unknown in 
Salafee circles, being considered youthful and inexperienced with few exceptions, 
and even those they herald as being scholars, according to Salafees, have dubious 
credentials. Shaikh Muhammad Taahiree claims that many of the takfeeree youth 
are ignorant and duplicitous and they reject Salafee scholars especially in issues of 
manhaj, jihaad, and takfeer. He states, “What is so preposterous is if you ask one of 
them about an issue of purification or transactions or something else, he will not 
answer according to his understanding or intellectual endorsement, rather he will 
research from the statements of the scholars and make fatwa according to their 
statements” (2009:507). Most of the individuals ISIS praises as scholars in their 
online publications are unknown. ISIS only acknowledges those ‘scholars’ who are 
apart of their so-called jihaad and in agreement with their fundamental principles. 
According to ISIS, authentic scholars are “those by whom Allah revived both 
knowledge and creed, those who went public with the truth and by whom the truth 
became manifest. They were those who joined knowledge with jihaad, like Shaykh 
Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, Shaykh Abu Anas ash-Shami, Shaykh ‘Abdullah ar-
Rashud, Shaykh Abul-Hasan al-Filistini, and Shaykh Maysarah al-Gharib” (Rumiya 
2017:1/30).  
 
ISIS is a jihaadee organization first and foremost and accepts recruits who are 
willing to embrace their ideology and methods. This means that many are 
uneducated in any traditional Islamic education and easily indoctrinated. According 
to Ether Abdul Haq, “Amongst the new recruits only 4.5% have traditional Islamic 
academic training” (2017:1). However, other data provided by GTI suggests, “ISIL 
foreign fighters who have gone to Syria generally have higher levels of education 
but low incomes with many fighters joining in part due to a feeling of exclusion in 
their home countries” (2016:6). While there may be a variety of motives for 
individuals, who have different educational backgrounds to join jihaadee groups, 
much of the data suggests the typical recruit has limited Islamic educational 
background, which makes them easily susceptible to ISIS’s methods. 
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ISIS’s Methodological Contradictions 
 
ISIS transgresses methodological guidelines that violate Salafees’ code of ethics. 
Salafee scholars lash out against any critics and suggestions of similarities to the 
takfeeree-jihaadee groups. Shaikh ‘Abd al-Salaam al-Suhaimee states:  
 
          What is so outlandish is that there are those who declare the hizbee  
          groups Salafee-jihaadee. How can they be Salafee and they differ with  
          them in creed and manhaj? How can they be proponents of jihaad? When  
          the correct sharee'a meaning of jihaad is nonexistent in the traits of those  
          groups due to the absence of the fulfillment of conditions for correct jihaad  
          in those factions, when the reality is in the substance and meanings not in  
          claims and characterizations” (2005:7).   
 
Shaikh Bazmool describes the methodology of Ahl al-Sunna regarding textual 
interpretive discourse and how it differs with various hizbee groups like ISIS by 
mentioning that using texts as evidence involves four stages. The first stage 
requires an analysis of the evidence to determine its authenticity. Second, looking 
to see if the interpretation is sound in accordance with the Salaf. Third, analysis into 
whether the text in question has been abrogated by other authentic texts. Fourth, 
analysis into whether the text in question contradicts other authentic texts and their 
interpretations (2015). Shaikh Bazmool suggests that takfeeree groups simply 
adhere to literalism and do not refer ambiguous texts, which they use to declare 
takfeer and substantiate terror, to the clear texts that offer the most sound and 
comprehensible meanings. For example, many Qur’anic verses clearly urge mercy 
and justice and that one of Allah’s divine characteristics is mercy. However, 
takfeerees tend only to emphasize punishments, fighting and enmity while 
deemphasizing mercy, treaties and pacts with non-Muslims. This is further 
demonstrated by their methodological differences with Salafees and their excessive 
use of takfeer. They deem all opposition to their manhaj as being apostates from 
Islam and it appears that they find it easy to substantiate their general rulings of 
takfeer and violence by misuse of sharee'a evidences, decontextualizing core texts, 
and misconstruing their meanings.  
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For Muslims, the duty of the believer is to worship Allah through the various means 
that are dictated by the sharee'a, conversely for ISIS the most legitimate means for 
doing so is through brutality, shock, and terror, at the same time they attempt to 
frame their tactics and discourse by decontextualizing the Qur’an to legitimize their 
methodology.  
          But Allah did not only command the “fighting” of disbelievers, as if to say  
          He only wants us to conduct frontline operations against them. Rather, He  
          has also ordered that they be slain wherever they may be on or off the  
          battlefield. He said, “So when the sacred have passed, then kill the  
          mushrikin [sic] wherever you find them and take them, surround them, and  
          wait for them at every outpost” (At-Tawbah 5). All of this becomes all the  
          more apparent for those who have realized that the blood of a kafir is  
          cheap, filthy, and permissible to shed (Rumiya 2016:1/12).  
 
For ISIS the concept of martyrdom supersedes everything: they use suicide 
bombings, trucks as weapons against civilians and knifings as a part of their broad 
array of weaponry. The publication Dabiq describes in detail how to perform knife 
attacks, choosing the proper concealable weapon, and effective choosing of soft 
targets. In addition, it details how to weaponize vehicles and maximize causalities 
(2015:3/15). A brief perusal of ISIS’s online publications shows they devote a high 
percentage of their articles to describing martyrdom operations and battlefronts with 
short articles dedicated to acts of worship like prayer and fasting, which is a radical 
aberration from the Salafee manhaj. In a video entitled “We Will Surely Guide Them 
to Our Ways” it depicts the suicide operations of several Western fighters of ISIS 
from Canada and the UK.  The Canadian declares after entering his explosive 
laden armored vehicle, “There is no Islam without jihaad” (2017). For ISIS, jihaad is 
the core of Islam, so fighting is deemed both a means and objective. Weimann, 
after his analysis of terrorist website content concludes: “Terrorist rhetoric on the 
Internet tries to present a mix of images and arguments in which the terrorists 
appear as victims forced to turn to violence to achieve their just goals in the face of 
a brutal, merciless enemy devoid of moral restraints” (2008:82). ISIS’s rhetoric is 
used to dehumanize their opponents to make it easier to enact violence against 
them. 
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ISIS and Salafee Sources 
When classifying ISIS, many pundits tend to categorize them as a Salafee-jihaadee 
group due to their usage of core classical texts to substantiate their methodology. 
This presents a quandary for Salafees as they attempt to distance themselves from 
jihaadee groups. The propaganda used by ISIS to recruit is quite effective and 
many of the classical source texts used by them are the same texts used by 
Salafees and traditionalists; however, they decontextualize the meanings to justify 
their violence. The narrative ISIS presents to their target audience is that they are 
defenders of the faith and aim to restore the lost prestige of the greater Muslim 
community by restoring its leadership based upon the manhaj of the Prophet (saw). 
For both the unlearned and those with an Islamic academic background the 
arguments they put forth backed with classical fatwa and interpretations of concepts 
like al-wala'a wa al-bara'a can be persuasive, especially for those who have a more 
literal orientation towards textual analysis. This presents a problem for Salafees 
who reach a radically different conclusion based upon those same texts. Essentially 
Salafees and takfeeree groups are propagating a different message to the same 
potential target audience. 
 
Tactical Goals of al-Qaeda  
 
Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, one of the most notorious takfeeree-jihaadee 
organizations to arise in the 1980’s initially recruiting fighters and sponsoring them 
to fight in the Afghan jihaad. Al-Qaeda evolved over the years and expanded their 
goals to terrorize the West and their Muslim allies. Al-Qaeda has lost much of their 
prestige amongst jihaadees primarily due to the killing of some of their top leaders 
and the rise of ISIS; however, they remain a critical threat. Some have highlighted 
that al-Qaeda's strategy is very broad based on a multitude of fronts with the 
primary aim of destabilizing instead of gaining territory unlike groups like ISIS 
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(Wagemakers 2012). Al-Qaeda, being the predecessor to ISIS, do not differ in 
creed or manhaj from ISIS except in that the latter claim to take a more purist 
approach, denying any elements of hizbeeya and making great efforts, according to 
their claims, to distance themselves from takfeeree ideology (al-‘Adnani 2014). 
Some academics like Byman discern between tactics of al-Qaeda and ISIS, when 
he observes: 
           Although the ultimate goal of Al Qaeda is to overthrow the corrupt  
           “apostate” regimes in the Middle East and replace them with “true” Islamic  
           governments, Al Qaeda’s primary enemy is the United States, which it  
           sees as the root cause of the Middle East’s problems. By targeting the  
           United States, Al Qaeda believes it will eventually induce the United  
           States to end support for these Muslim state regimes and withdraw from  
           the region altogether, thus leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from  
           within. Al Qaeda considers Shi’a Muslims to be apostates but sees their  
           killing to be too extreme, a waste of resources, and detrimental to the  
           broader jihadist [sic] project (Brookings 2016). 
 
Salafee sources this researcher has encountered do not concern themselves with 
the details or minute differences in methodology or tactics between these two 
groups, but rather their concern is primarily analyzing creed and manhaj and the 
deviance of takfeeree groups from orthodoxy. Salafee scholars generally view ISIS 
as simply a derivative of al-Qaeda and their ideology. Shaikh Sulimaan al-Rehailee 
states, “From here we understand the difference between al-Qaeda and Daesh 
organization (ISIS), they have one ideology, takfeeree ideology; however, they 
differ in two distinct ways” (2017:50). The Shaikh then mentioned their differences 
were regarding leadership and tactics. 
Jihaadee groups like al-Qaeda believe in interaction with non-Muslim communities 
by two means: da'wa to convert to Islam or coercion and subversion. Some 
researchers allege that Salafees whom they refer to as fundamentalists share 
jihaadist goals like al-Qaeda except for the use of violence. "Fundamentalists agree 
with this message but reject the use of violence to achieve it, whereas jihadists [sic] 
believe that violence should be the major means to fulfill the aim of universal Islam" 
(Khosrokhavar 2009:74). As the jihaadist groups, especially ISIS, strive for and 
essentially believe they have established a caliphate, Salafees do not reject having 
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a universal Imaam to rule over Muslims; however, they have a completely different 
methodology for doing so that requires personal and societal reform. For Salafees 
the goal is to attain this reform of the community that in turn will lead to universal 
righteous leadership.  
 
Another common precept shared by jihaadee groups like al-Qaeda and Salafees is 
the concept of hijra (migration); however, they differ in implementation. Groups like 
al-Qaeda, similar to their predecessors the Khawaarij, believe that hijra is 
absolutely imperative to maintain Islamic legitimacy: a Muslim must migrate from a 
non-Muslim land to a Muslim land. In the case of ISIS, all lands are illegitimate and 
make up the land of war; therefore, the only valid hijra is to their self-declared 
Islamic state. During the height of al-Qaeda, migration was considered mandatory 
to the Afghan state under the Talibaan. Although the precept of hijra is shared by 
Salafees, they do not consider a Muslim to be a disbeliever if they remain in non-
Muslim lands. Some Salafee scholars, like their classical predecessors, believe it is 
highly recommended to immigrate to Muslim lands where one can practice their 
Islamic rites more easily and safely without compromising their Islamic morays and 
identity. Still some Salafee scholars claim it is conditional to propagate the faith if 
one possesses knowledge and is a strong practitioner of the faith (Wanees 2017). 
The concept of hijra is one example illustrating takfeerees’ misappropriation of 
classical Salafee texts. For example, ISIS substantiates their version of hijra by 
using religious verdicts of Ibn Hazm and Imaam Tahaawee. Ibn Hazm states, “If he 
moves there [the lands of the crusaders and pagans] for the sake of what he might 
acquire from dunyā [sic] but lives there like a dhimmī [sic]  – despite being able to 
join the body of the Muslims, then his deed is not far from kufr and we find no 
excuse for him” (1996:8/138). ISIS appropriates this fatwa to rebuke all those who 
leave Muslim lands in general, even during conflict, famine, and turmoil, to migrate 
to non-Muslim lands. However, like al-Qaeda, they hold that the only legitimate land 
to migrate to is their self-declared state, even singling out states like Saudi Arabia 
as abodes of war (Dabiq 2015:11/23). Another example is the ruling issued by Al-
Hasan Ibn Hayy (died 169AH) who said, “If a man moves to dārul-harb [sic] without 
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apostatizing from Islam, he is a murtadd [sic] for abandoning Dārul-Islām [sic]” 
(cited in Dabiq 2015:11/23). This classical fatwa is cited to substantiate takfeer of 
those who migrate to non-Muslim lands (any lands outside their control), thus 
allowing them to be targeted as apostates because they do not consider them to be 
Muslim with the rest of their adversaries. In an article extolling righteous deeds ISIS 
exhorts their supporters to join them or at least contribute by spreading terror and 
violence throughout the world and this they deem as righteous jihaad.    
 
          As for the Muslim who is unable to perform hijrah from dārul-kufr [sic] to  
          The Khilāfah, then there is much opportunity for him to strike out against  
          the kāfir [sic] enemies of the Islamic State. There are more than seventy  
          crusader nations, tāghūt [sic] regimes, apostate armies, Rāfidī [sic] militias,  
          and sahwah [sic] factions for him to choose from. Their interests are  
          located all over the world. He should not hesitate in striking them wherever  
          he can. In addition to killing crusader citizens anywhere on the earth, what,  
          for example, prevents him from targeting Rāfidī [sic] communities in  
          Dearborn (Michigan), Los Angeles, and New York City? Or targeting  
          Panamanian diplomatic missions in Jakarta, Doha, and Dubai? Or  
          targeting Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and  
          Indonesia? Or targeting Saudi diplomats in Tirana (Albania), Sarajevo  
          (Bosnia), and Pristina (Kosovo)? Or executing major Sahwah sponsors in  
          Qatar, Kuwait, and “Saudi” Arabia? (Dabiq 2015:11/54). 
 
Another tactic used by al-Qaeda that differs with the Salafee methodology and has 
been denounced in Salafee literature is Suicide missions in general and the use of 
women as fighters specifically. Al-Qaeda is known for their brutality and even 
though they claim to adhere to Islamic principles they use women fighters for 
suicide missions. This is a trait that distinguishes al-Qaeda from ISIS who generally 
relegate women’s role to rearing children, policing females in areas they control, 
and online recruitment for ‘jihaadee brides’. Until now there is no evidence to 
suggest using female fighters will become common place amongst ISIS; however 
recent documents do allude to serving the Islamic nation with their blood sacrifice if 
ordered to by the caliph. The principle Islamic edict is that women can assist in the 
battlefield as nurses and supporting the male fighters. One of the wives of the 
Prophet (saw) said, “We consider jihaad the best deed. Should we not fight in 
Allah’s cause?” The Prophet (saw) responded, “The best jihaad (for women) is an 
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accepted pilgrimage” (al-Bukhari 2009:4/307). Thus, in effect, the jihaadee groups 
like al-Qaeda, their affiliate al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram have distorted an Islamic 
concept: jihaad by making it synonymous with terror and using women as suicide 
bombers. Thus, depicting a fundamental Islamic concept in a negative or 
derogatory way. This is one of the predominant reasons most of the world 
associates jihaad with acts of terror and terrorism. Furthermore, Salafee scholars 
reject the concept of suicide missions and indiscriminate bombings used by the 
jihaadee organizations. They argue “it is well-known in the sharee’a that good 
intentions alone are not sufficient to say something is a permissible action. Those 
individuals claim the means to something takes the same ruling as its intended 
result. Therefore, (they understand) if their result is permissible, then their means is 
permissible” (Suhaimee 2015:138). This critique further serves to highlight just how 
divergent jihaadees and Salafees are in their interpretive discourse and conclusions. 
For Jihaadees, the ends justify the means, whereas for Salafees the opposite is 
true. Suhaimee affirms, “The end does not always justify the means, instead the 
means must be permissible to make the end permissible” (2015:138). Those groups 
that practice suicide operations accept that suicide is impermissible in Islam; 
however, they argue that it is a means to a just end, which is effective in warfare by 
causing mass destructions and disheartening their enemies. Furthermore, they 
attempt to justify their actions by describing them as martyrdom operations instead 
of suicide missions; however, the reality of their actions is not disguised by the 
change in terminology, and Salafees absolutely reject these operations (Green 
2009).   
 
Al-Qaeda, like ISIS and other takfeeree groups, differ with the Salafee manhaj by 
their excessive use of takfeer. Another common theme and tactic of al-Qaeda is to 
use takfeer to delegitimize their Muslim opposition and undermine their authority 
that legitimizes, for jihaadees, the use of violence to destabilize those societies. 
According to al-Suri, a leading al-Qaeda ideologue, all regimes are apostate so 
dhimis under them are lawful to kill and pacts between 'apostate regimes' and non-
Muslim states are nullified. In addition, all regimes have violated Islamic law, and 
	 99	
anyone can wage global jihaad against them (Wagemakers 2012). According to the 
al-Qaeda manifesto entitled “Goals”, they state, “we believe that anyone who 
performs a statement, or an action of unbelief is an unbeliever because of this 
(statement or act) even if he did not intend unbelief by this” (jihadology.net 2017). 
This statement violates important principles and statements of Ahl al-Sunna that 
make up both contemporary Salafees’ manhaj and that of classical scholars 
regarding takfeer. Al-Albaanee states, “Whoever has the evidence presented and 
clarified for him (regarding an issue of disbelief), then rejects that evidence has 
become a disbeliever” (5/558). A central difference between Salafees and 
takfeerees is Salafees emphasize that one cannot be accused of apostasy in 
general without having evidences presented to him and his rejection of those 
evidences, except in the case where the action which necessitates expulsion from 
the religion due to it being common knowledge that it is a nullifier of the faith (Green 
2009). Ibn Hazm states, “That no one is declared a disbeliever until the command 
of the Prophet (saw) has reached him. Then if he rejects it he is a disbeliever” 
(2005:3/302). Ibn al-‘Arabee states, “The person who is ignorant or makes a 
mistake from this nation, even if it is an action of disbelief or polytheism is not 
considered a polytheist or disbeliever, because he is excused for being ignorant or 
from having made a mistake (regarding the action of disbelief)” (cited in al-Rehailee 
2008:8). Bin ‘Uthaimeen states, “Therefore, a statement or action could be 
considered disbelief or wickedness, however the person who uttered it or did the 
action may not be a disbeliever or wicked” (2005:92). 
 
Another statement which illustrates their fervency for issuing edicts of takfeer is, 
“We believe that he who accomplishes an aspect of worship, such as an act of 
disobedience, love, fear, beseeching, seeking aid, invocation, asking for succor, 
involving other than God, such a person is incontestably an infidel whose act of 
unbelief is the greatest way of falling outside the Muslim community” (jihadology.net 
2017). When analyzing the statements of takfeeree groups it seems that 
excommunicating ‘the other’ is not only of utmost importance, but it seems it is a 
pillar of their creed that allows them to distinguish between allies aligned with the 
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same manhaj, and foes which they view as legitimate targets of violence.  Al-Qaeda 
declares, “We believe that the ruler who does not rule in accordance with God’s 
revelation, as well as his supporters, who substitute the sharia’, [sic] are infidel 
apostates. Armed and violent rebellion against them is an individual duty on every 
Muslim” (jihadology.net 2017). In this case according to al-Qaeda the ruler’s 
authority is nullified, which necessitates rebellion, thus the ruler and any of his allies 
are now legitimate targets of violence. Shaikh Sulimaan al-Rehailee dispels the 
myth, propagated by many takfeeree groups, regarding ruling by other than divine 
law by stating, “Every law which is not in the Qur’an and Sunna is not considered 
ruling by other than divine law. Instead, ruling by other than Allah’s legislation 
entails ruling by what opposes Allah’s sharee'a” (2017:221). The Shaikh also 
mentions that the verses referring to Allah’s law are not restricted to governments 
and that ruling by other than divine law is not always a sin, which nullifies a person's 
IsIam. He states: 
 
          We have analyzed from the statements of the Salaf from the time of the  
          companions to contemporary times and we have found that most of the  
          statements of the Salaf entail exactly these details: ruling by other than divine  
          law is not always disbelief. We found that some of them make the rulings  
          general; however, what is understood from their statements is there are  
          details not mentioned. Ibn ‘Abbas states that it is the lesser disbelief…we  
          have found more than fifty Imaams and scholars of Ahl al-Sunna wa al- 
          Jamaa’a mentioning these exact details (2017:225).  
 
Salafee Role in Online Anti-Terror Propaganda 
 
Generally, Salafee scholars and preachers deal with extremism and acts of terror 
through propaganda and proselyting because they are not in positions of political 
authority apart from Saudi Arabia and individuals in various governments 
throughout the Muslim world. Therefore, the speeches and verdicts of select well-
known Salafee scholars in some of the Muslim states who have global reach will be 
analyzed, as well as an analysis of Saudi efforts in combatting extremism will be 
critiqued.  
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Scholars in the Arab world predominately engage extremist ideology through, 
lectures, seminars, fatwaa, and in the case of Jordanian scholars, through direct 
debate (al-Albaanee 2010). On the other hand, Salafee students and organizations 
in the Western world tend to have a more aggressive campaign against extremists 
dedicating whole websites, conferences, and even direct engagement through 
debates with jihaadee-takfeeree ideologues, this is probably due to the fact that 
Salafee organizations in the West tend to have only grassroots support and lack 
government funding, and are faced with the challenge of living in a non-Muslim 
society where their identity is challenged and allegiance is questioned. For example, 
the website takfiris.com which is an affiliate site of salafipublications.com, 1995-
2017, one of the most popular Salafee websites in the Western world, had 
approximately fifty articles on the topic of takfeer, refuting the various extremist 
ideologues and their dogma. Although many of their articles present an alternative 
to the takfeeree paradigm, at times the language contained in some of the articles 
tends to be hyperbolic often-targeting individuals instead of addressing their 
contention with takfeeree discourse. For example, in a six-part series entitled “The 
Takfiri Retard Series “they used terms like “retard” and “Takfiri, Kharijite, [sic] 
Pretenders” to describe and undermine their antagonist. These terms do not serve 
to strengthen their arguments or disprove the ideas espoused by their takfeeree 
antagonists. Madeenah.com another popular Salafee website contains 
approximately eight articles on terrorism in contemporary times. Another 
contemporary Salafee website known for disseminating anti-takfeeree discourse is 
salafimanhaj.com. The website contains over 11 articles and booklets dedicated to 
countering extremist ideology and ideologues with in-depth articles ranging from 
analysis of the origins of Boko Haram to articles criticizing ISIS. 
 
Statements Denouncing Extremism 
 
To many policy pundits the association between Salafism, jihaadism and terror is 
accepted without analyzing the statements and works of Salafee scholars and their 
role in denouncing extremism. Some of the leading Salafee scholars in places like 
	 102	
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen have been very active in combatting takfeeree-
jihaadee ideals and ideologues. For example, Shaikh ’AbdulMaalik ar-Ramadanee, 
an Algerian Salafee scholar residing in Saudi Arabia, stated about the Algerian 
takfeeree group known as the ‘Salafee Group for Da’wah [sic] and Combat’:  
          How can, with all of this, making permissible the blood of the police and  
          killing them, be clean (i.e. permitted)? Then they live on stolen monies  
          which have been ransacked from people by force! They also destroy the  
          souls of the Muslim soldiers...As a result, we do not however absolve  
          ourselves from ‘Salafism’ as it is the truth, yet we absolve ourselves for  
          Allaah from the ‘Salafist Group for Dawah[sic] and Combat’ and from all  
          those who grasp weapons today in our country against the system or the  
          people. I say this so that the creation knows that the ascription of those  
          revolutionary groups (i.e. the GSPC) to Salafism is a distortion of  
          Salafism, just as how ascribing deviant Muslims to Islam is also a  
          distortion of Islam, blocking the true path of Allaah and causing people to  
          flee from the victorious ones (firqat un-Naajiyah). However, Salafism is     
          Salafism, just as Islaam is Islaam, even though it is distorted by the  
          deviants (salafimanhaj.com 2017). 
 
The statement of the Shaikh highlights several important differences between 
Salafee positions and takfeeree-jihaadee ideology. First, Salafees do not support 
rebellion and killing of authorities even if they are oppressive or deceptive in their 
policies. Second, Salafees reject any actions that call for usurping the wealth of the 
general population or causing harm to civilians and this is in accordance with 
Islamic law. Third, this statement further shows the efforts at which Salafee 
scholars distance themselves and the manhaj from revolutionary groups and the 
malevolent violence they commit. 
A common trait of Salafees is their disdain for revolution and restraint regarding 
participation in violent conflict. Salafee scholars claim to be strict in adherence to 
principles espoused by classical jurists and often cite the principle of observing the 
harm and benefits of participating in contemporary conflicts. This is best illustrated 
by the limited amount of conflicts in contemporary times which they deem as 
legitimate Islamic jihaad (Green 2009). The jihaadists commit atrocities and attack 
civilian targets claiming that these actions are a part of legitimate jihaad; however, 
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Salafees repudiate these claims. Shaikh ‘Alee al-Halabee said regarding a terrorist 
attack upon a hotel in Amman, Jordan: 
          Without any fear of Allaah, and with no shame for the servants of Allaah,  
          Those ignorant ones who get in the way and issue rulings, spoke with  
          great ignorance regarding matters related to the spilling of blood and then  
          turned their corrupted speech towards something worse and caused killing,  
          calamities, tribulations and ordeals for the Ummah, all in the name of  
          jihaad and in the name of spreading the deen and commanding the good  
          and forbidding the evil (salafimanhaj.com 2017). 
 
Shaikh ‘Alee’s statement emphasizes that jihaadist, according to Salafees, prevent 
the true Islamic da’wa, give false verdicts, legitimize terror and violence, all under 
the guise of jihaad. What is of interest is that these claims are what the jihaadists 
claim about Salafees: they hinder true Islamic da’wa (jihaad) decree false verdicts 
on behalf of apostate despots, and distort the principles of the real jihaad.55 Shaikh 
Ramadaanee states regarding Abu Qataada "he viewed his country as being a 
disbelieving country and thus fled to the land of Britain and its rule and governance, 
taking from its wealth. He created methodologies, which are alien to human 
societies not to mention Islaam. He was the first to allow multiple bombings and he 
gave a fatwaa that was very strange in Islaam, clear in its savagery and outside the 
realm of humanity" (salafimanhaj.com 2017). This stinging critique of Abu Qataada 
is indicative of the Salafee position towards takfeerees. Also, contained in this 
critique is the accusation of hypocrisy: takfeerees do not live up to their own 
stringent principles; many of the heads of those hizbee groups have migrated from 
Muslim countries to reside in relevant comfort in the West, their alleged arch enemy 
(Green 2009). Another point that can be observed is that the Shaikh distances the 
Salafee manhaj from that of Abu Qataada even implying it as heretical and savage.  
Finally, the Shaikh disparaged Abu Qataada's fatwa for legitimizing the killing of 
women and children and road banditry (salafimanhaj.com 2017). Shaikh Sulimaan 
al-Rehailee states, “It is well-known that the Sunna came with mercy and justice. It 																																																								
55 Salafees often refer to jihaadists as takfeerees or Khawaarij due to excessive usage of the 
principles of takfeer and their extremist views. On the other hand, jihaadists claim Salafees are Murji’ 
by not observing real faith, according to their perception, by refusing to excommunicate apostate 
leaders and rebel against them. 
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also came with jihaad in the cause of Allah. This jihaad in the cause of Allah was 
legislated for a reason, and has conditions, also the Prophet (saw) did not come to 
fight every disbeliever” (2017:237). The countless statements in jihaadee videos, 
literature and publications show the tremendous differences in fatwa, methodology, 
and in fact creed between the jihaadee-takfeeree ideologues and that of the 
Salafees. The takfeeree creed holds that jihaad in and of itself is a goal and that 
disbelievers must submit or be subdued by all means. Shaikh Sulimaan al-Rehailee 
states, “The scholars of jurisprudence differ over the origin of the relations between 
Muslims and disbelievers…the most correct view of the scholars and those who 
analyze these issues from amongst them is that the origin is peace and jihaad is 
legislated for particular situations” (2017:237). Shaikh ’Abdul Muhsin al-’Ubaikaan 
was also asked after the horrific London bombings if it was allowed for Muslims to 
inform the police if they are aware of such terrorist plots and replied:  
            Yes (he can). We say this is considered forbidding an evil. We already  
            know that Islaam has judged this type of act to be impermissible, and the  
            Prophet (sallallaahu ’alayhi wassallam) said: “Whoever amongst you sees  
            an evil then let him change it with his hand. If he is unable then let him  
            change it with his tongue (i.e. by speaking out against the evil). If he is  
            unable to do this, then let him hate it with his heart and that is the lowest  
            level of eemaan.” This act (i.e. terrorism) is evil, it is a crime and it is  
            forbidden. Therefore, it is obligatory upon the one who can change an evil  
            in the way he is capable of, and one of the ways is to inform on those     
            criminals (salafimanhaj.com 2017). 
 
This shows that Salafee scholars allow informing on deviant groups even in non-
Muslim societies and in conjunction with non-Muslim authorities to prevent the harm 
that these groups pose to society and the spread of their aberrant ideology. This 
cooperation with non-Muslim authorities is viewed as a means of combatting 
distorted, deviant, methodologies. However, cooperation in this context is not 
without criticism from other groups in the greater Islamic community, as was the 
case with the Brixton Mosque in the UK (Lambert 2013). In addition, this highlights 
a point of great contention between the takfeeree groups and Salafee scholars who 
issue fatwa that encourage cooperation with non-Muslim authorities for mutual 
benefit. The takfeerees see fatwa like these as pure treachery, hypocrisy, and open 
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disbelief. Thus, oftentimes those who issue or follow these verdicts are threatened 
with violence. Anyone suspected of treachery or that they condemn as a spy is 
excommunicated and killed. ISIS and al-Qaeda have a multitude of propaganda 
videos of their fighters executing alleged spies and traitors. In one such video taken 
in Syria alleged spies admit their guilt and apostasy, then ISIS fighters file out of 
their vehicles and shoot them in the head multiple times while they are blindfolded 
at point blank range. This according to the lead fighter shown in the video is a 
warning to spies and traitors (Harvest of Spies #3 2015). 
 
For al-Qaeda one of the greatest violations of tawheed and al-wala'a wa al-bara’a is 
to cooperate with non-Muslims against fellow Muslims or assisting them militarily in 
any form. “We believe that he who supports the associationists (mushrikun) [sic] 
against the Muslims, in whatever form this support takes, such a person is 
incontestably guilty of the gravest form of unbelief” (jihadology.net 2017). In 
contrast, Salafee scholars allow cooperation with non-Muslim states even in conflict 
if the situation necessitates. Bin Baz states “The Lord All-Mighty clarified for us in 
His Book that He made it permissible for His believing servants to do that which is 
prohibited if they are forced. Allah says, “We have explained for you what is 
prohibited for you except that which you were forced to do” (Qur’an 6:119) …The 
point is that the country in this situation has been forced to seek assistance from 
some disbelieving countries against the oppressive tyrant because he poses a 
serious threat” (Bin Baz 2000:6/147). This was the general premise behind the 
issuing of the fatwa allowing American forces to enter Saudi Arabia to defend it 
against Iraqi forces under Sadam Hussein. This fatwa has been accepted and 
defended by most Salafees as a necessary evil; however, it was not without great 
controversy and many takfeerees rebuked the Salafee scholars and declared 
takfeer of the Saudi regime for allowing non-Muslim troops in the Holy lands.   
 
Salafee scholars attribute the rise in takfeeree-jihaadee ideology in the 
contemporary context to thinkers like Syed Qutb and Mawdoodi and their 
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revolutionary inspired theology (Green 2009). Shaykh Muhammad al-Madkhalee 
states:  
          Those who set off the explosions in the Kingdom admitted with their own  
          mouths, that they were affected by the Jamaa’atut-Takfeer (one of the  
          Egyptian Qutbist groups) and that they were from the group of Osama Bin  
          Laden and al-Masari, and they were spreading their literature. Osama Bin  
          Laden - who taught this man? Who educated him about the Shariah  
          (Islamic laws)? He is a businessman; this is his field of specialization...they  
          admitted, as we said, with their own mouths, we saw it and read it in the  
          newspapers, and I have it here with me recorded with their own voices,  
          that they were affected by some of the people of takfeer (from the Qutbist  
          groups) of Afghanistan (salafimanhaj.com 2017).  
 
Salafees and many academics around the world concur that there is a strong link 
between the ideas of Syed Qutb and Mawdoodi and many takfeeree-jihaadee 
groups as well as poitico Islamists. While Salafees take exception to being 
associated to those groups many academics argue otherwise. Meijer asserts: 
          Salafism’s political dimension adopts three forms: quietist and discreet (with  
          behind the scens advice to rulers), covert (professing quietism, but acting 
          politically while condemning open political involvement as hizbiyya [sic], 
          leading to fitna or factionalism) and openly activist by calling for political  
          reform. When Salafist groups openly propagate politics, they shade off into 
          the Islamism (political Islam)of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is the case with  
          the Saudi Sahwa movement…(2013:17).   
 
There appears to be a strong corealation between the various trends of political 
activism whether they opt to take a more violent path like ISIS, or a more political 
solution such as the Sahwa movement. The commonality shared by these divergent 
trends is the influence of thinkers like Qutb. Haykel postulates: 
         A number of activist Salafi as well as jihadi-Salafi groups-the Sahwis and    
         Sururis [sic] mentioned above as well as al-Qaeda- have been influenced by  
         the Muslim Brotherhood’s organaisational teachings and political concepts,  
         especially those of Sayyid Qutb. Here the two most important ideas are  
         Qutb’s hakimiyya [sic] (God’s sovereignty, which he adopted from the writings  
         of the Indo-Pakistani intellectual Abu al-A’la Mawdudi (d 1979) and jahiliyya  
         [sic] (idolatrous condition). These Salafis, for instance, have added a new  
         creedal principle to their theology, that of tawhid al-hakimiyya (the oneness of  
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         God’s sovereignty, which is often subsumed under tawhid al-Uluhiyya) [sic]  
         (Meijer 2013:50). 
 
These are some of the fundamental characteristics that unite jihaadists and 
politicos and Haykel’s statement reveals why they are casitigated by Salafees and 
how divergent their ideologies are from the Salafee Manhaj. These passages also 
underscore how both Salafees and academics view these variant trends and 
believe they share common origins. However, whereas academics view these 
groups to be trends within Salafism, Salafees take exception to this claim. 
Unfortunately, many critics of Salafism show their ignorance of the methodology 
and statements and texts of its adherents Silber states, “To this day, no major 
Muslim cleric or religious body has ever issued a fatwa condemning Osama bin 
Laden” (salafimanhaj.com). However, the above statement of al-Madkhalee 
disproves that claim and there are countless other denouncements of Bin Laden 
made by Salafee scholars and clerics. A constant criticism of Bin Laden, as well as 
many of the ‘jihaadee scholars’, by Salafees is that they lack scholarly credentials 
and many of them are young zealots affected by extremist thinking and limited 
scholarly training, and the result is that they evolve into takfeeree propagandists.   
Speaking about the radicalization of Muslim youth during the Afghan jihaad 
Muhammad al-Madkhalee states, "The majority of our youth that returned from the 
jihaad in Afghanistan to our country were affected, either by the ideology of the 
Ikhwaan (the group al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon) in general, or by the revolutionary, 
takfeeree ideology. So, they left us believing that we were Muslims, and they 
returned to us believing that we were disbelievers" (salafimanhaj.com 2017). Shaikh 
Muhammad observes that often the youth who answer the call to jihaad come back 
indoctrinated by the takfeeree manhaj and this is often the intent of jihaadee groups. 
This is so that their methodology is spread, and the struggle continues for global 
conquest. When these youth return to their respective countries they can continue 
fighting and advancing the cause and this is legitimized through takfeer: 
delegitimizing Muslim societies and governments thus making them targets of 
violence. Shaikh Muhammad comments: 
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          So with that, they saw us as being disbelievers, the rulers, and the  
          scholars, not to mention the common folk. They labelled the (Saudi) state  
          apostate, and they rendered the major scholars as apostates. They  
          admitted this with their own mouths. They declared the scholars to be  
          disbelievers, and mentioned specifically the two Shaykhs, Shaykh Abdul- 
          Aziz Bin Baaz and Shaykh Muhammad Bin al-’Uthaymin, may Allaah  
          preserve them. They mentioned their connection with al-Masari and  
          Osama Bin Laden. Did they get this from the scholars of Salafeeyyah [sic]?  
          No! Rather they got it from the people of takfeer (salafimanhaj.com 2017).  
 
Salafee scholars are persistent in distancing themselves from takfeeree ideologues 
and those who espouse violence. Salafees view the manhaj of extremist groups as 
the anti-thesis of Salafism. Al-Madkhalee’s statement shows the general animosity 
Salafee scholars have for takfeeree ideology, their disavowal of jihaadee groups, 
and disassociation from their manhaj. Also, he articulates the Salafee position 
regarding the Saudi regime: regardless of mistakes made by the rulers, Saudi 
Arabia is still revered as a Muslim state ruled by sharee'a edicts. “Attributing to 
Islam acts of individual or collective killings, bombings, destruction of properties and 
the terrorizing of peaceful people is unfair, because they are alien to the divine 
religion,” said the muftee of Saudi Arabia, Shaikh 'Abd al- 'Azeez (salafimanhaj.com 
2017). The muftee is Saudi Arabia’s highest religious authority and his statement is 
held in high regard by Salafees the world over. Salafee lectures are filled with 
refutations against violent extremism. The muftee then went on to say, “Islam is a 
religion of reforms and righteousness. It envisages the progress of humanity and 
takes it from darkness to light. It also calls for respecting agreements and prohibits 
their violation” (salafimanhaj.com 2017). This statement from the highest religious 
authority in Saudi Arabia, which is often criticized as being the source of Islamic 
terrorism and the spread of extremist ideology, highlights several important points. 
First, it highlights the efforts of the Saudi government in fighting extremist ideology 
since 9/11. This is significant because it is one of the only states that claim to 
adhere to Salafism. Second, that it must be acknowledged that some of the 
contemporary sources used by groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda are some of the 
same texts Salafee scholars refer to; however, the conclusions are entirely different 
on how they perceive interactions with non-Muslims. The statement of the muftee 
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best describes how Salafees view violent takfeeree interpretations of core Islamic 
texts when he said, “Causing corruption on earth is one of the biggest crimes in 
Islam” (salafimanhaj.com 2017). This statement is a reference to the harm and 
chaos that often results from takfeeree ideology for both individuals and 
communities. In addition, it is a reference to a Qur’anic verse in which Allah 
describes the hypocrites as claiming that they are a force of rectification when in 
fact they are incognizant of the harm and wickedness they spread throughout the 
earth. Allah says, “And if it is said to them do not spread wickedness throughout the 
earth. They say, ‘Verily, we are those who rectify.’ However, they are the wicked 
doers (spoiler) but they are unaware” (Qur’an 2:11). Third, the Saudis who were 
accused of perpetrating the 9/11 attacks have no known links to Salafees or 
Salafee scholars and, in fact, most of them were known for irreligious behavior with 
some being known as al-Qaeda affiliates (Hoffman and Reinares 2014). Shaikh 
Saalih Aalee-Shaikh, the head of the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, mentions 
non-Muslims are considered either as “a dhimmi; a mu’aahid; a musta’min or a 
harbee. And the Prophet (saw) instructed to give each one their due rights. Rather, 
Allah commanded to give non-Muslims rights in His Book, if they are not at war 
(with Muslims) and do not manifest enmity (against the Muslims)” 
(salafimanhaj.com 2017).56 To substantiate his statement, he used the verse in 
which Allah says, “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you 
because of religion and do not expel you from your homes – from being righteous 
toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly 
(Qur’an 60:8-9). Salafees interpret the above verse to mean that non-Muslims have 
different categories and rights and as long as there is no hostility directed towards 
Muslims than the applicable sharee'a edicts apply and govern these relationships. 
While takfeerees acknowledge these categories of non-Muslims they consider 
pacts with them nullified, due to their perceived illegitimacy of the Muslim authorities, 																																																								
56 Dhimmi refers to specific individuals living in Muslim lands, who were granted special status and 
safety in Islamic law in return for paying the capital tax. The Mu’aahad is a citizen of a foreign state 
with which the Islamic State has a treaty. The Must’aman is a citizen of a foreign state with which the 
Islamic state has no treaty; however, they are protected by the state and permitted to do activities 
allowed by the host Islamic state. Harbee refers to a person who belongs to a nation at war with the 
Islamic state. 
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which made pacts and treaties with them. Allah says, "Allah only forbids you from 
those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in 
your expulsion – (forbids) that you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies 
of them, then it is those who are the wrongdoers” (Qur’an 60:8-9). Imaam Sa’di, a 
well-known Salafee scholar explains, “Allah does not prohibit you from 
righteousness and relations and spending in goodness, being just with pagans (al-
Mushrikeen) from family and others, so long as they are not fighting against you 
and forcing you from your homes” (1998:1010). This elucidation differs drastically 
from the explanation and orientation of the takfeeree groups that tend to explain the 
Qur’an, especially verses articulating jihaad, in a way, which fits their violent 
narrative and political aspirations. Their tendency is not to even mention verses that 
convey mercy between communities. Shaikh Saalih Aalee Shaikh states, “The 
Prophet (saw) stated, “Whoever harms a dhimmi has harmed me," or as is stated in 
the hadeeth. (Also)…he said, “Whoever kills a mu’aahad will not smell the 
fragrance of Paradise, the smell of which can be smelt for the distance of forty 
years.” Why? Because the Muslims honour their lives as they came with an 
agreement, they came with a trust and is not to be transgressed against …” 
(salafimanhaj.com 2017).  An argument often put forth by Salafee scholars is that 
jihaadee groups often do not rule by Islamic law and rules of engagement, as they 
do not respect covenants, which are sanctioned by divine texts such as those 
previously mentioned. This again illustrates the principle that the reality of 
something is in its substance not in its claim, therefore takfeerees claim to follow 
and exalt divine law but they flout it and transgress against those protected by it 
through bombings of churches, killing of priest and common folk protected in 
Muslim lands. Shaikh Abdul Salaam al-Suhaimee states: 
           What is really strange is that some of these partisan Islamic groups  
           named themselves “Salafee Jihaadees”, yet how can they be Salafee  
           when they oppose its creed and manhaj? However, the reality is in the  
           application (of Salafism) not in mere claims and terms. It is imperative to  
           bring attention to this confusion and misguidance, which is present in the  
           Islamic world today” (2005:4). 
 
Salafees go to great lengths to clarify their beliefs and distance themselves from 
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takfeeree-jihaadee extremism and violence. Shaikh al-‘Aqeel also states: 
            
           The Muslim scholars denounced the attacks on the world trade buildings  
           in New York and made clear that those who committed the act were  
           criminals and that they had nothing to do with Islaam and that they merely  
           killed themselves, and whoever kills themselves intentionally will be in  
           hellfire killing themselves, and Allaah’s refuge is sought. Similarly, the   
           Muslim scholars denounced the terrorist attacks committed by those who  
           associate themselves with Islaam that took place in the Kingdom of Saudi  
           Arabia. The scholars also denounced the terrorist attacks committed by  
           those who associate themselves with Islaam that took place in Sharm  
           ash-Sheikh in Egypt. The scholars also denounced the terrorist attacks  
           that took place on the tube stations in London, they denounced this and  
           made clear that Islaam [sic] has nothing to do with such actions and that  
           Islaam is free of them. (salafimanhaj.com 2017). 
 
In contrast, there are many academics who believe that the main distinction 
between Salafism and jihaadism is in how the creed and manhaj is implemented in 
contemporary politics. However, even if some aspects of creed overlap it does not 
necessitate similarities in manhaj which is a very important distinction. However, 
critics like Meijer claim: 
          The main difference with mainstream Salafism is that, Jihadi-Salafism is  
          primarily concerned with analysis of reality (waqi') and changing that  
          reality. In contrast, to mainstream Salafism, whose creed ('aqida) is based  
          on the basic principles of Wahhabism (tawhid, shirk, etc), and separating  
          oneself from that reality and avoiding politics, Jihadi-Salafism concentrates  
          on the analysis of political reality, devising strategies and practice for how  
          to change it, and applying them (tatbiq) to different situations and     
          circumstances. In return, also its 'aqida is transformed into being fully  
          geared to jihad (Meijer 2013:24).  
 
Meijer suggests that jihaadees’ primary concern is altering the political reality, which 
suggests there is a difference in creed and manhaj. Furthermore, highlighting the 
Salafee paradigm Shaikh Turkmani states, “As for what should occur in terms of 
political, economic and social change and advancement, this is a result of being 
upright upon the religion; it is not an objective which is intended in and of itself” 
(madeenah.com 2017). This is a powerful indictment of those who allege Salafees 
and takfeeree-jihaadees share a common manhaj or even worldview because this 
	 112	
statement illustrates the Salafee paradigm which emphasizes worship and personal 
reform, dissimilar to the more material view of jihaadees who desire a state, or to 
usurp power. Shaikh Turkmani continues, “The obligation upon us is to strive to 
fulfill the obligation of the religion, and the result of this is: political, economic and 
social advancement” (madeenah.com 2017). 
 
Statements Debunking ISIS 
 
ISIS, although ideologically rigid, has shown that it is equally practical as an 
organization willing to do transactions with its enemies to profit and finance its state 
and so-called jihaad.57 
 
In stark contrast to the Salafee paradigm, many Jihaadees are heavily influenced 
by thinkers like Qutb and Mawdoodi,58 and because of this influence their aims are 
an aberration from Salafee objectives and highly political (Green 2009). In addition, 
both political and historical factors influence the worldview of these groups and 
movements who at times may share common grievances, but the results of how to 
address those grievances are highly divergent. Shaikh Turkmani states about the 
evolution of the jihaadee movement, “A new interpretation of Islaam [sic] emerged, 
its summary is: Islaam [sic] is a materialistic civil movement intending to change the 
political economic and social face of the world; and the acts of worship and religious 
legislations are not the primary purpose of Islaam, rather they are mere avenues 
and not the intended objective itself" (madeenah.com 2017). Here Salafee 
objectives and the jihaadee worldview are contrasted by a Salafee scholar who 
claims it is not merely a matter of differing ends but also of means that separate 
Salafism from radical jihaadism. 																																																								
57 The reason for analysis and placing emphasis upon ISIS is because it has shown to be one of the 
most capable fighting groups with large territorial holdings and the most uncompromising in ideology 
from this researcher’s perspective. ISIS and its far-reaching caliphate includes the ideology and 
manhaj of other groups included in this study. 
58 Qutb and Mawdoodi both preceded many of the contemporary Takfeeree groups like Jamaat al-
takfeer wa al-Hijra, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, and many of the ideologues of those groups extensively 
quote from Qutb and Mawdoodi, especially their concepts of revolt, takfeer, and jihaad (al-Suhaimee 
2005).  
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Some researchers allege groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have strong secularist ties 
from their administration system and even ties to Secular Baathists movements. 
Michael Flynn, former National Security Advisor of the Trump administration, states 
about Zarqawi the former head of al-Qaeda in Iraq that’ “there was no love lost 
between Saddam and the Iranians, and Zarqawi 59was not an Iraqi instrument by 
any means, but both regimes helped him” (2016:100). Flynn suggests that ideology 
for the diverse radical groups and state sponsors of terrorist organizations is often 
subverted when confronting a mutual enemy. While it is difficult to substantiate 
Flynn’s claim that the Iranian regime helped Zarqawi travel to fight in Iraq, there is a 
plethora of evidence, which suggests that the Syrian regime released jihaadees 
from their prisons to fight in Iraq against American troops. Also, “most of ISIS’s 
leadership cadre consist of former Baath party military and intelligence officers that 
held high-ranking positions during Saddam Hussein’s regime…” (Clarke 2015:164). 
   
ISIS, although lambasted by Muslims of various orientations and even criticized as 
being contra Islamic in many ways by many think tanks is still associated with 
Salafism. Here Flynn, who openly articulates hostility towards traditional Islam 
admits, “German and Soviets had a lot in common, and radical Muslims freely 
picked elements from each in the creation of a jihaadee ideology and the structure 
of Islamist states, whether the Islamic Republic of Iran or the current Islamic State 
(2016:103). Groups like ISIS, who have long been condemned by Salafees, have 
been criticized for being extreme, deviant, and have been accused of appropriating 
and mixing foreign political ideologies with their vision of an Islamic state. Flynn 
also observes that after al-Qaeda as an organization sustained loses in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, “al-Qaeda leaders found haven in Iran. This meant that the world’s 
preeminent Sunni terrorist organization had an operational base within the world’s 
preeminent Shi’ite country” (2016:104). Aside from some of the contradictions 
inherent in actions of groups like ISIS, Salafee scholars focus their criticism on the 
brutality and mayhem resulting from their onslaught and accuse them of 																																																								
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establishing an illegitimate caliph, which is not recognized by Muslims. However, 
further exemplifying ISIS's allegedly deviant origin and dubious relationships is a 
recent statement by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon who affirmed reports 
that ISIS mistakenly attacked Israel and apologized for the action. He states, "They 
appreciate our military superiority… so we absorbed a single isolated attack 
executed by ISIS elements on the Syrian border. As we understand, it was done by 
mistake and it was only once" (middleeastmonitor.com 2017).  
  
Al-Fawzan described those groups and individuals who use suicide bombings in 
Saudi Arabia as being worse than the original Khawaarij because of their lack of 
concern for civilian causalities, mass killings, and bombings. These jihaadee groups 
laid the foundation for groups like ISIS who further developed their ideology and 
manhaj. 
 
Efforts of the Saudi State 
 
After the September 11th attacks on the Twin Towers the nature of counterterrorism 
fundamentally changed. In 2003, Saudi Arabia experienced a series of deadly 
attacks that forced Saudi Arabia to begin to deal with the increasingly violent 
takfeeree movements based in the kingdom. "Central to Saudi counterterrorism 
efforts has been the use of unconventional "soft" measures designed to combat the 
intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. The primary objective 
of this strategy is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government 
asserts is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam" (Carnegie 
Papers 2008:97/1). Because Saudi Arabia officially adheres to Salafism the 
approach they take towards religious extremism is one in which they engage the 
ideology of the extremists as they view deviant takfeeree hizbeeya as a main threat 
to their authority. "A central goal of the kingdom's efforts has been to solidify the 
legitimacy of the ruling order and to eliminate violent opposition to the state by 
reinforcing the traditional Saudi interpretation of Islam, which stresses obedience 
and loyalty to the state and its leadership"(Carnegie Papers 2008:97/3). As 
	 115	
previously mentioned, Salafism is in part built upon obedience to the Muslim 
authority, regardless of the ruler's piety, if they remain Muslim they are to be 
obeyed in acts of piety (Green 2009). Many critics of the Saudi state accuse the 
regime of abusing this authority to maintain legitimacy by labeling its domestic 
critics as terrorists or takfeerees who want to destabilize the state. However, 
Salafees are concerned less with the political motives of the state, but rather the 
religious legitimacy, justifications, and implications of its policies. In accordance with 
Salafee ideas, the Saudi state "views the struggle against violent extremism as a 
part of a "war of ideas" centered upon issues of legitimacy, authority, and what is 
permitted in Islam" (Carnegie Papers 2008:97/3-4). This framework for viewing 
extremism is exactly how Salafee clerics envision and frame the problem and 
expound upon it in their rhetoric. By focusing on takfeeree ideology and reforming 
its adherents "the state aspires to help misguided believers return to the correct 
understandings of Islam. This strategy melds nicely with the Saudi concept of 
da'wah [sic] (call to faith) as a government obligation" (Carnegie Papers 2008:97/4). 
The Saudi stratagem for countering extremism emphasizes reform and 
rehabilitation of terror suspects, which seems to be a major factor for its success 
and acceptance in the society. “The Saudi strategy aims to disrupt 'the ideological 
infrastructure that supports and nurtures political violence. As such, the Saudi 
campaign strives to prevent exposure to takfiri [sic] beliefs; to refute those ideas 
and encourage the rehabilitation of offenders; and to promote policies that prevent 
relapses" (Carnegie Papers 2008:97/4). The Saudi program integrates various 
agencies and the general society by encouraging participation and cooperation with 
the authorities all under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. This shows a 
commitment to societal change and the willingness of the government to commit 
enormous resources to the problem of extremism and terrorism. 
 
Some of the success of the Saudi model is based upon its multi-prong approach of 
tackling extremism. The Saudis even offer support for prisoners, and terror 
suspects’ families. The program focuses on prevention through campaigns in 
schools and social service agencies by spreading awareness of extremism and 
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takfeeree ideology. Also, the authorities attempt to discourage recruitment and 
provide alternative recreation to the takfeerees. Salafee scholars in Saudi Arabia 
have been denouncing for years the various programs the takfeeree and hizbee 
groups use to recruit Saudi youth. The counterterrorism programs implemented by 
the Saudis also have a counseling component. “The counseling program is based 
not on punishment or retribution but on a presumption of benevolence; that is, the 
state does not seek to exact revenge through this program. It begins from the 
assumption that the suspects were lied to and misled by extremists into straying 
from Islam” (Carnegie Papers 2008:97/11).  
 
The Saudi approach to extremism and radical ideology makes use of the religious 
establishment on which it depends upon for its legitimacy. In addition, to the 
multitude of programs which encourage dialogue between scholars and youth 
convicted of terrorism the state has a long history of discouraging internal rebellion 
and in more contemporary times protests which Salafee scholars view as a type of 
revolt and call to instability (Green 2009).  Bin Baz states, "I do not believe that men 
and women protesting is a cure (to societal grievances). Instead I see this as a 
means of causing tribulation, a means of evil, and oppression with some people 
usurping the rights of others. In contrast, the sharee'a means is through writing, 
advice, and calling to righteousness…" (al-Duweesh 2007:15/378). The Shaikh 
here is referring to some hadeeth which mention that advising the leader for 
mistakes, oppression, and sinfulness should be done in private by those that have 
access to the leaders and avoid openly criticizing from the pulpit which has the 
effect of encouraging instability or belittlement of the leader in the eyes of the 
common folk. Bin Baz states: 
           
          Then it is an obligation upon the preacher to be tolerant and use excellent,  
          gentle, kind means in his da’wa for both Muslims and non-Muslims.  
          Kindness is essential in dealing with everyone, also the leader.... This is  
          because the leaders, presidents, and dignitaries, require additional  
          gentleness and good manners in hope that they will accept the truth and  
          be affected by it" (binbaz.org 2017).   
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The Prophet (saw) stated, ""Whoever wants to advise a leader with a matter, do not 
do it outwardly but let him take him by the hand and go into seclusion with him. If he 
accepts it from him then that (is good) and if not, then he (the adviser) has fulfilled 
that which was upon him (to do)." (Ahmad 1972:3/403-404). The takfeeree groups 
often scrutinize this hadeeth, and those similar to it in meaning, and call into 
question its authenticity. Salafees respond by suggesting that because it disputes 
their manhaj of rebellion and takfeer they call into question its genuineness. Shaikh 
al-Fawzaan is of those scholars who hold the text to be legitimate and he states 
regarding the manhaj of addressing the leaders: 
 
          Infallibility is not for anyone except Allah’s Messenger. Rulers are humans  
          and they make errors... but do not make their errors a reason for you to  
          publicize them and remove yourself from obeying them, even if they may  
          be oppressive and unjust, and even if they may be sinful, so long as they  
          do not commit clear disbelief. This is what the Prophet commanded us (al- 
          Fawzaan 2012:50-51). 
 
Overall, The Saudi state and Salafee religious establishment has waged an 
aggressive counter-terrorism campaign since 2003 by activiely denouncing terror 
networks, cutting off funding to various international groups and organizations, 
which sponsor terrorism or advocate violence. Salafee clerics have actively 
published books and treatises expounding upon the Salafee positions regarding 
controversial issues like jihaad and al-wala’a wa al-bara’a and countering 
extremists’ narratives and ideology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that extremist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS differ with 
Salafee interpretations of Islam and core concepts such as jihaad, takfeer, and 
da’wa, and that those differences are both in elements of creed and manhaj. The 
chapter began by contrasting Salafee definitions of terrorism and extremism with 
those of the Global Terrorism Index. Then the chapter analyzes the manhaj of ISIS 
and al-Qaeda with intrigue into their brutal tactics and abuse of the principles of 
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takfeer to delegitimize their opponents. In contrast, Salafees categorize takfeer into 
two categories: general and specific and refrain from applying general rulings to 
specific individuals except with indisputable evidence and meeting the criterion for 
takfeer. Salafees consider the purport of such rulings claiming they should be 
sharee'a based and not whimsical. In addition, Salafees believe takfeer is not 
legislated due to disputes or differing between scholars or hizbeeya. Ibn Taimeeya 
states, "For this reason the scholars of Ahl al-Sunna did not pronounce takfeer 
upon those who differed with them" (2013:1/164).  
 
The chapter ends with an analysis of statements of Salafee scholars denouncing 
the takfeeree manhaj in general with a scrutiny of ISIS and al-Qaeda as specific 
case studies. In addition, the Saudi government's anti-terrorism efforts have been 
evaluated. Although the Saudi regie has been associated with numerous human 
rights violations and accussed of war crimes in places like Yemen, these 
accusations are not a reflection of Salafism, but rather Saudi government policy. 
 
In conclusion, it is difficult to quantify or completely qualify the effectiveness of the 
Salafee da’wa in combatting extremists; however, Salafees appear to be one of the 
more active Muslim groups in refuting takfeeree ideology and offering counter-
extremist discourse and narratives as will be explored further in chapter four.   
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Chapter Three: Critics of Salafism 
 
 Introduction 
 
Chapter one detailed the creed and manhaj of Salafism by illustrating the 
differences between Salafee thought and that of hizbee groups. In chapter two, 
terrorism and extremism were defined by surveying differing perceptions of the two 
concepts and contrasting the Salafee perspective with that of contemporary Islamic 
groups considered extremist. The chapter ended with an analysis of Jihaadee 
methodology, and a critique by Salafee scholars of hizbee ideologies with a brief 
synopsis of Salafees’ role in countering extremism.  
 
In this chapter, some of the main detractors of contemporary Salafism will be 
scrutinized by presenting an overview of their critiques of Salafism with an 
emphasis placed on their ideologies, to better comprehend their analyses and 
assessments. This chapter aims to present a contrast to Salafees’ 
conceptualizations of their role as an antidote to extremism. Also, the chapter will 
outline Wiktorowicz’s classification and offer detailed observations. Finally, the 
chapter will end with counterarguments to the critics. 
 
Salafism as Violent Ideology 
 
Most detractors of Salafism view it as an extremist dogma and the fundamentalist 
ideology of most contemporary Islamic political movements. Salafism is often 
scapegoated as the key factor in the rise of radical extremism. The association of 
Salafism with violence by policy pundits or claim that it is the ideology behind 
Islamic radicalism is widespread. This was shown by the plethora of quotes and 
claims surveyed in chapter one and two, which illustrated the vilification of Salafees 
and Salafism.  
 
	 120	
Contemporary Salafism, like the Salaf, have always had to contend with opposition 
to their da’wa efforts and their methodology in approaching the sacred texts.60 
However, contemporary Salafees since the inception of the Saudi state have had to 
contend with accusations of violence and extremism. Often the term Wahhaabee is 
used as an expression to denigrate Salafees. Critics of Salafism have coined the 
term Wahhaabee, which is used as a derogatory term, to describe proponents of 
takfeeree-Jihaadee ideals. Although the movement of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhaab is not without controversy, its proponents have exerted immense efforts 
to show its orthodoxy through arguments and evidences derived from the Qur’an 
and Sunna, and the manhaj of the Salaf, especially regarding those issues of 
controversy such as Jihaad and takfeer (Green 2009).  Still there are numerous 
detractors who view the movement to be the source of contemporary ‘Islamic’ 
terrorism and violent takfeeree ideology, Gold states: 
  
          That is why Wahhabism [sic] as it developed in Saudi Arabia is so  
          dangerous, why it demands the attention of America and its allies. This  
          radically intolerant form of Islam, has shaped public opinion toward the  
          west in Saudi Arabia and in key parts of the Islamic world; it has influenced  
          Osama bin Laden from his earliest years (2003:7). 
 
Gold further makes his case to link Wahhaabism (Salafism), which he claims is a 
violent ideology, to terrorism and suicide bombings when he poses the question, 
“How, then, has Saudi Wahhabism [sic] fostered the ideology of hatred that 
spawned suicidal terrorism? This question is inevitably linked to the question of how 
Wahhabism [sic] has treated the Islamic concept of jihad [sic]” (2003 p.7). There are 
numerous critics and skeptics of Salafism, and not all of those who criticize the 
movement use well-researched data. Gore’s assessment tends to be less relevant 
amongst academics as more contemporary analysis of the problem emerges. An 
evolving body of research suggests that the movement has non-violent strands, 
which actively denounce terror. Still others like Abdul Hakim Murad claim, “The 
movement for traditional Islam will, we hope, become enormously strengthened in 																																																								
60 Imam Karamaanee (died 280 Hijra) states, “Ahl al-Bid’a, people of desires, and sectarianism have 
all kinds of wicked slanderous names to describe Ahl al-Sunna. They do this because they want to 
belittle them, slander and backbite, and discredit them in front of the ignorant and stupid ones” 
(Aalee Hamdaan 2012:62).  
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the aftermath of the recent events, accompanied by a mass exodus from 
Wahhabism [sic], leaving behind only a merciless hardcore of well-financed 
zealots… only a radical amputation of this kind will save Islam’s name…” (cited in 
Lambert 2013:211). Murad, an Oxford professor and Sufi, has no reservations in 
deeming Salafism i.e. Wahhaabism, as an aberration in Islam. Salafees counter 
that the movement is misunderstood even though many takfeeree-Jihaadees quote 
from the core texts of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and describe their violent 
activities as extensions of his movement and ideals. Al-Madkhalee rebuts, “The 
people of misguidance from the detractors of Imaam Muhammad and the Salafee 
da’wa, tell a plethora of lies and from them are: he –may Allah have mercy upon 
him- declared the Muslims to be apostates, made it lawful to kill them, and that he 
detested the righteous saints…” (2015:44). These are common claims made 
against the movement, especially from Sufi cynics, because many of the more 
extreme practitioners advocate veneration of saints, for this reason, Salafees 
accuse them of polytheism, and they in turn accuse Salafees of extremism.61  
 
Common Criticisms of Salafism  
 
There are numerous critics of Salafism with a variety of perspectives and academic 
backgrounds. The researche will attempt to introduce some common criticisms of 
Salafism and the rebuttals of Salafees and their perspective regarding some of their 
critics. Some common criticisms made against Salafism are that Salafees are 
ineffective at addressing extremism; lack proper mannerisms, misconstrue core 
texts, and are ill trained to meet contemporary challenges. Several critics allege 
Salafees are not doing enough to engage extremists and either encourage 
extremism, or at best are passive. Bunzel contends, "With jihadis [sic] openly laying 
claim to the Saudi religious heritage, the Saudi religious establishment might be 
expected to engage this threat in serious intellectual combat. Yet nothing of the sort 
has taken place" (Bunzel 2016:19). Chapter two detailed some of the Saudi state’s 																																																								
61 Salafee literature distinguishes between those Sufis who have methodological and creedal differences from 
Salafees, and those that are on the fringe of Sufism who maintain that is is necessary to seek intercession from 
saints and adore them.  
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counterterrorism strategies and Salafee scholars’ repudiations of extremist 
discourse and violence. Bunzel fails to recognize these efforts and goes on to 
mention the example of Nogaidan, a liberal Saudi commentator, who in 2003 stated, 
“many [Saudi] religious leaders sympathize with the criminals” of al-Qaeda. He 
accused Saudi Arabia’s 'educational and religious institutions' of being 'breeding 
grounds for terrorists' and called for reforms to 'our extremist religious culture" 
(Bunzel 2016:19). In view of what has preceded, the researcher suggests that 
Bunzel’s critiques in this regard are outdated and much of the western world now 
acknowledges Saudi counter-terrorism efforts. In addition, Saudi authorities have 
exhibited willingness to counter extremist ideology.  
 
Another area of contention between Salafees and their critics is the role of manners 
in da’wa. Salafees’ mannerisms have also been identified as problematic, they are 
characterized as being harsh with critics and described as arrogant, especially in 
regard to how they interact with non-Salafees and tend to castigate them. Qadhi 
states: 
 
          This also explains the disproportionate focus on identifying deviants and 
          deviation, which has led to an absurd result of some Salafī [sic] laymen  
          knowing more about deviant beliefs than correct ones. The Madkhalīs  
          [sic]are the quintessential example of this: any recent convert to Islam from  
          amongst them will be able to recite a list of names of scholars ‘on’ or ‘off’  
          the Salafī manhaj [sic], but will be hard-pressed to mention as many  
          names of Companions; they will know the ‘ruling on greeting a deviant’ but  
          remain ignorant of the adhkār [sic] for the morning and evening (2014:14). 
 
Qadhi’s scathing indictment is a common claim made against Western Salafees, 
who are often not educated in Islam, and are usually not well positioned to 
communicate and receive the educative and moral reformation offered by being 
educated directly by Islamic scholars. In more recent times there has been an 
observable shift by some Salafee scholars to emphasize morals, manners, and 
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spiritual education to educate Muslim minorities about religious priorities and to 
counter the claims of their critics.62 
 
          Another issue is the treatment of a ‘person of deviation’. Salafīs [sic] take  
          statements of the Salaf regarding treatment of heretical groups as they  
          would the Qur’an and Sunnah [sic]. Yet, the treatment of innovators that  
          some of the Salaf exhibited is something that must be understood in light  
          of the Sacred Texts, and in the context of their times. The rights of Islamic  
          brotherhood, as outlined by our Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam),  
          trump the statement of any one particular scholar, and the treatment of  
          those opposed to the truth varies according to time, place, individual,  
          precise deviation, and context (Qadhi 2014:14). 
 
Qadhi raised some important issues such as the preservation of Islamic 
brotherhood, avoidance of being selective in choosing the statements of the Salaf 
to aid one’s methodology at the exclusion of other texts and decontextualizing the 
statements of the Salaf. However, he fails to mention the plethora of statements, 
which illustrate that refuting Ahl al-Bid’a was an important foundation of Ahl al-
Sunna that distinguished them from heretics, and a means of preserving the religion 
from heretical practices. The Prophet (saw) mentioned in Saheeh Muslim that 
wickedness should be changed physically also he declared that all bid’a is 
misguidance (al-Mundhiri 2000). These narrations as well as numerous others, for 
classical scholars like Imaam Nawawee, illustrate the importance of shunning bid’a 
and serving as a basis for refuting Ahl al-Bid’a to defend the faith, orthodoxy, and 
exposing heretical practices. The Salafee position, which seems more in 
accordance with the classical interpretations, states that a foundation principle 
should not be undermined for the sake of alleged general benefit or harmony of the 
community. In this case the foundation principle as understood by the Salaf is that 
refuting deviancy takes precedence over the general brotherhood. In other words, 
the commands to keep Islamic brotherhood are restricted and understood in light of 
the texts that repudiate bid’a and its proponents. Allah states, “As for those whose 
heart is deviated, they desire to follow the ambiguous verses seeking discord and a 
suitable interpretation (to support their whims)” (3:7). The Prophet (saw) states, “If 																																																								
62	Shaikh Rabeeá al-Madkhalee, who Qadhi refers to, has several fatwa and treatises on morality 
derived from the Qurán and the importance of Islamic mannerisms to observe (2005).		
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you see those who desire the ambiguous verses then they are those mentioned by 
Allah so beware them” (al-Bukharee 2001:5/121).  Imaam Ahmad stated, “The 
foundation of the Sunna to us is …the abandonment of innovations and every 
innovation is misguidance, also, avoiding controversies, and sitting with the people 
of desires” (2005:22). This statement of Imaam Ahmad bin Hanbal, also known as 
the Imaam of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a, illustrates that warning against 
innovation, heresy, and Ahl al-Bid’a are core principles to Ahl al-Sunna.63 Although 
it must be recognized the importance of contextualizing these narrations of the 
Salaf, refuting innovators is a well-known principle, which does not become deluded 
with time. Salafees argue that in contemporary times there is an even greater need 
to protect the faith from heresy and alien ideologies and that although Islamic 
brotherhood is an important part of faith, it does not mean that individuals and sects 
should not be warned against, reprimanded, or even boycotted if they threaten 
orthodoxy. For example, if scholars were to remain silent about the deviancy of 
takfeeree groups then they would remain unchallenged and allowed to spread their 
deviant violent ideology, thus sowing discord within the community and between 
other faith based communities. Ibn Taimeeya states that the role of Ahl al-Sunna is 
to correct herectics while illustrating mercy for the creation. Ahl al-Sunna “is 
merciful to the creation and wants good for them, guidance, and knowledge. They 
do not intend evil for them initially, rather they punish them by exposing their 
mistakes, ignorance, and oppression with the intention to clarify the truth, show 
mercy, command the good and forbid the evil, exalt the word of Allah, and make the 
religion pure for Him” (2000:3/203). Just as Islamic brotherhood is important, so is 
defending orthodoxy. From the science of hadeeth authentification comes the 
criticism of narrators. This is just one example illustrating that the concept of 
																																																								
63 Refer to al-Sunna (al-Khallaal 2011), Sharh Usool al-‘Itiqaad (al-Laalakaa’ee 2002), Sharh al-
Sunna (al- Barbahaaree 2009), al-Sunna (‘Aasim 1998), and countless other compilations of the 
Salaf that illustrate this central foundation principle of Islam according to the scholars of Ahl al-
Sunna. Ibn Taimeeya states, “Allah has commanded us to only speak the truth and only speak 
based upon knowledge. He has commanded us with justice and balance. Therefore, it is not 
permissible if a Jew or Christian, even moreso, a Rafidha Shi’a, speakd the truth for us to reject it or 
abandon the statement. Instead we reject what is false and accept the truth (2000: 2/342). This 
illustrates that truth and principle are prioritized over Islamic brotherhood, and mistakes and bid’a are 
rejected from anyone.  
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brotherhood is not absolute and that a Muslim’s trustworthiness, piety, and 
religiousity can be called into question, which is a principle all throughout Islamic 
law. Several academics in their critique of Salafism have suggested the need to 
contextualize the Qur’an, Sunna, and the narrations of the Salaf. For example, 
concepts like al-wala’a wa al-bara’a should be looked at in context and it appears 
that this is something that distinguishes the discourse of contemporary Salafees 
over the past fifty years from the discourse used by the Salaf until the time of the 
founding of the Saudi state. Due to advancement in science and technology as well 
as new world realities Salafees have had to contextualize narrations of the Salaf in 
order to maintain relevance by exercising ijtihaad. This is best illustrated by some of 
the religious fataawa issued by more contemporary Salafees in comparison to that 
of their more immediate predecessors. For example, there are two opposing views 
regarding the issue of seeking help from non-Muslims in fighting: a group of 
scholars allow this and another group views it as impermissible without exception. 
From the statements of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and his successors, prior to Bin Baz, 
it appears they hold the latter view and issued strong statements in this regard. The 
other view, was supported by a group of classical scholars who held seeking 
assistance from non-Muslims only “if there is necessity, and this was the mathhab 
of the Hanifeeya, the correct view of the Hanbalee school, and the Shaafi’ee 
school…” (al-Daalee 2013:1/99). The aforementioned mathhabs stipulated that only 
out of necessity could assistance be sought from non-Muslims. As with many 
issues explored in this research, we find that groups like ISIS do not offer or even 
begin to detail issues and show the alternative views supported by classicists, 
which further illustrates their rigid hizbeeya, and failure to acknowledge classical 
scholarship, counter to their claims. Another example of a fatwa that must be 
properly contextualized is that of Shaikh Abaabutain, who mentions regarding the 
issue of non-Muslims residing in Muslim states that, "the scholars of fiqh have 
mentioned his wealth and blood is protected with certain conditions; from them is 
paying jizya in a state of humility as the Almighty has mentioned. If they do not pay 
jizya or slander Islam or openly celebrate their holidays or violate other conditions 
mentioned: then their blood and wealth are lawful. Therefore, if a Muslim can take 
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their wealth in this case, then it is permissible for him to do so" (al-Tameemee 
2017:178).  The reason this fatwa needs to be detailed is because most of Islamic 
history until the demise of the Ottoman Empire could be divided into the categories 
used by classical Islamic jurists.64 The rise of the nation-state, industrialization, 
globalization, and numerous ideologies challenging traditional religious views have 
all radically impacted how states and religious communities view and interact with 
one another.  
 
           Islam is witnessing unprecedented ideological attacks from radical 
           secularism; these attacks seek to render Islam in particular - and  
           religiosity in general - anathema to modern society. New atheism and  
           scientism are increasingly in vogue amongst public intellectuals. Modern  
           culture reeks of materialism, hedonism, pornography, and sexual  
           exploitation. Extreme ideologies, including radical-feminism, abound.  
           Quite frankly, rare is it to find a Salafī [sic] scholar who is even qualified to  
           discuss these issues, much less refute them; and when one does find  
           such a scholar, it is not because of his Salafī [sic] training but in spite of  
           such training that he is able to take on such challenges (Qadhi 2014 p.15). 
 
Qadhi asserts that Salafee scholars are ill prepared to deal with contemporary 
challenges and changes in concepts of morality, that have been imposed upon 
societies across the globe. The Salafee response can be divided into two ways. 
First, that this global crisis of morality, although unprecedented, should be 
addressed similarly to how the Prophet (saw) addressed the challenges his society 
faced: alcoholism, adultery, infanticide, paganism, and homicide. The Prophet’s 
(saw) method of addressing these social ills was, of course, governed by revelation, 
which dealt with these problems in stages. Prohibitions were introduced gradually at 
the same time faith was being built and when Muslims were strong in faith they 
were expected to abandon sins. Salafees invoke this strategy: true understanding 
and practice of monotheistic principles and faith rectifies both the individual and 
society. The second way Salafees respond to Qadhi’s claims is by highlighting 																																																								
64 The most important characteristics of dar al-Islam that distinguish it from daar al-kufr are: that 
Muslims are firmly established in the land, the signs of Islam should be present: call to prayer etc.… 
Islamic rule should be apparent, safety for Muslims to practice and reside. The prime characteristics 
of daar al-kufr are: most residents are disbelievers, lack of Islamic signs and security for Muslims.  
Daar al-kufr can be further divided into daar al-ahd: land of treaty or daar al-harb: land of war (al-
Daalee 2013:1/99). 
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inherent communal dissonance. For Salafees, true substantial Muslim unity can 
only be achieved through a united creed, methodology, and cohesive goals. It is 
exactly these diverse ideologies and creeds that set Muslims apart and are the 
central reason for disharmony and discord in the community. Many Muslims have a 
false sense of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a, and their varying goals tend to maintain those 
schisms (hizbeeya) that Qadhi so urgently wants to heal. Many Muslim groups have 
divided due to various allegiances to Imaams, sects, and even transnational 
identities that keep them from a common methodology for approaching problems or 
striving for a collective cause. 
 
Skeptics and Inept Criticisms 
 
Because Salafism has been demonized, typified, and identified by so many in the 
media, policy pundits, and academics, it has resulted in a glut of literature which 
has allowed for the rise of many pseudo-academics and so-called experts to 
critique Salafees without proper review or even access to the sources of the 
movement. This inaccessibility has led to many skeptics of Salafism to cut and 
paste sources without any rigid academic scrutiny, resulting in weak analysis of the 
real issues at stake and the policy implications of their ineptitude. Erroneous 
statements such as, Salafees reject the four jurisprudent schools of thought 
“including the jurisprudence made on the basis of ijtihad [sic] (interpretation), (this) 
is the center of this doctrine, only lessons or extracts from pious ancestors being 
acceptable” (Ungureanu 2008:3). Ungureanu also states, “Searching the empirically 
quantifiable values of Islam, Wahhabism [sic] has become empty of spirituality and 
values such as human dignity, love or compassion, thus representing deterioration 
in its axiological horizon of the original Islam” (cited in Ungureanu 2008:4). Salafees 
counter that their creed and manhaj are complete and their call is based upon a 
return to those very esteemed virtues and principles contained in the sharee’a. 
Unfortunately, many ‘Islamic academics’ do not seem to distinguish between 
Islamic tenets and un-Islamic heresies. Determining what is a heresy requires rigid 
scholarship and analysis of the creed and methodology of Ahl al-Sunna from the 
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time of the Companions until contemporary times. The inability to distinguish core 
tenets of the faith, predominately a Western problem, only further obscures Islamic 
scholarship resulting in confusing Salafism with extremists’ beliefs and attributing 
unorthodox beliefs and erroneous claims to Salafees. For example, claims such as 
“Salafis [sic] consider that worshipping of the saint’s remains is fundamentally alien 
to Islam and therefore corrupting. As Wahhabism [sic], Salafist tradition rejects all 
four Sunni schools of law” (cited in Ungureanu 2008:6). This assertion is flawed on 
a number of levels; however, listing two errors should be sufficient for illustration. 
First, it assumes that Salafees reject the four Imaams in general, and their 
jurisprudence and creed specifically. Second, it also attributes saint worship as a 
common tenet of the four Imaams and their followers, which is clearly not the 
position of Salafee scholars, nor the positions of the four Imaams. These claims 
have been sufficiently addressed, expounded upon, and countered in chapter one 
and in the researcher’s research prior to this thesis (Green 2009).65    
 
Other critics of Salafism claim that the root of extremism is Islam and the Qur’an 
itself. This narrative posits Salafism and Islamism on the same spectrum. This claim 
is similar to Flynn’s assertion that returning to the sources of the religion is what 
fuels extremism. Glen Beck, a popular conservative radio host and author, 
epitomizes this negative stereotyping of Islam. “But the fact remains that the Quran 
and Islamic law contain ample justification for subjecting non-Muslims to Muslim 
power…the Quran itself often works against those who present a benevolent, 
tolerant, image of Islam” (Beck 2015:141). In this view, Islam and its sources are 
brutal and barbaric, thus the need for reform, and amongst their claims is that the 
goal of most Muslims is to impose the sharee’a on the rest of the world. Islam is 
seen as archaic, undemocratic, and the core of the ‘extremist problem’, and thus 
desperately in need of reform. Beck contends, “Too many Americans still take at 
face value the lies of our nation’s leaders that Islam is fundamentally ‘a religion of 																																																								
65 Supplicating to the dead, seeking intercession, or sacrificing to them, or directing any act of 
worship to the deceased is considered polytheism. However, Salafees regard visiting such shrines 
as bid’a, which does not invalidate one’s faith. Furthermore, contrary to what Ungurnea claims 
Salafees hold the four Imaams, as mentioned previously, as the Imaams of Ahl al-Sunna in creed 
and method (al-Khumees 2015).  
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peace’” (2015:206). From amongst Beck’s many claims is that Islamic extremists 
are always depicted as victims by leftist media and this fallacy of the left contributes 
to the problem of extremism. He states: 
 
          The subtext is almost always that these terrorists are angry because of  
           something America has done. Maybe their brother was killed by a drone  
           attack. Maybe they heard about a Quran being burned or flushed down  
           the toilet at Guantanamo. Maybe they saw images on Al Jazeera of  
           Palestinian refugees suffering at the hands of Israel’s blood thirsty  
           leaders- images that were probably not even taken in Gaza… or maybe  
           they suffer because of the cruel, cynical bargains Western nations have  
           made with Middle east dictators in a quest for oil (2015:148).  
 
Beck’s central claim is that Islam is the problem and that leftwing extremists and the 
power structure fail to acknowledge this, and this lack of awareness and vigilance 
will wreak havoc on America and its core values. Beck’s conception forms the 
underlying thesis of the new Trump administration. Although some of the well-
known Islamaphobes, like Steven Bannon and Michel Flynn, were recently 
dismissed from the administration due to their own personal scandals, their policies 
and influence will more than likely have longstanding consequences for Muslim 
minorities, rather minorities in general, in the United States.  Policies such as the 
‘Muslim travel ban’ targeting some Muslim countries, the laptop ban, the failure to 
mention the rise in attacks upon Muslims and minorities in the media, and even the 
failure of the Trump administration to acknowledge the many mosque attacks, 
sporadic killings, and brutality that is on the rise by primarily white extremists in the 
United States. A Huffington Post article cites, “More than 569 anti-Muslim attacks 
took place over a span of 512 days in America. Many global citizens are concerned 
Trump’s rhetoric has only made things worse for the Muslim population” (Buchanan 
2017:1). Beck’s book “It’s All About Islam” meticulously details the leading fallacies 
about Islam. In it he illustrates extreme bias by refusing to acknowledge other 
factors, aside from ideology, that contribute to extremism. He asserts, “They are 
attacking us because they are motivated by an ideology that urges them to kill in 
the name of God, that upholds martyrdom over life, that insists martyrdom will be 
rewarded by heavenly pleasures” (2015:151). While this narrative may be 
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appropriate in critiquing ISIS, this does not constitute the views of the vast majority 
of Muslims, moreover, the belief of Salafees. After the horrendous Charlie Hebdo 
attack in France he stated, “Islam apologists go to great lengths to disconnect these 
acts of violence from Islamic doctrine; to present them as something unrelated to 
the religion’s core tenets” (2015:193-194). These assertions not only affect 
Salafees and their da’wa, but it has implications for the greater Muslim community.  
Aside from poor scholarship, Beck’s analysis of the problem of extremism on the 
part of some Muslims, does not seem to acknowledge whatsoever the rise in anti-
Muslim extremism, or that it is even a legitimate issue. Furthermore, he does not 
seem to comprehend that most of the atrocities committed by ISIS, al-Qaeda, al-
Shabaab, and Boko Haram are against fellow Muslims as was demonstrated in 
chapter two. The claims made by Beck are insidious but must be analyzed as they 
form the views of a rising constituency of Americans and even some mainstream 
news outlets such as Fox News. 
 
Still other critics fail to investigate Salafism and extremism or even illustrate any 
serious scholarship by failing to research primary sources and the unproven link 
between Salafism and extremism. 66  Some detractors allege Salafees abhor 
classical scholarship and are violent. “Refusing the four law schools - Hanafism, 
Malekism, Shafeism and Hanabalism [sic]- removing ethics and morality that have 
developed independently of the Quran, Salafism, sometimes called neo-
fundamentalist Islamic ideology, has inspired most of the leaders of contemporary 
Islamist terrorist movements” (Ungureanu 2008:4).  These claims do not appear to 
be well thought out or backed by solid research, which contributes very little to the 
already saturated body of literature that is built on the same basic assumptions 
about Salafism. Most of these claims have been addressed in chapter two. 																																																								
66 One exception to this point is  Dr. Yasir Qadhi , who renounced Salafism and has studied the 
tradition with numerous scholars . Qadhi’s analysis will be utilized for this study because he has first 
hand accounts and  experience interpreting primary sources, whereas most of the critics utilized in 
this study do not have the same extensisve training in Salafism.  In this research a primary source 
refers to original first hand accounts dealing directly with factual documents and sources. Secondary 
sources are are primarily accounts and analysis of of what other researchers have produced. Often 
some of the secondary accounts used by some of the critics of Salafism in this study are lacking 
strong analysis of primary sources and therefore often biased in their criticisms.     
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However, regarding the assertion that they reject the four mathhabs and are 
proponents of extremism and takfeer, Shaikh ‘Abd al-Lateef Hassan, one of the 
successors of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, states, “To claim someone who openly 
illustrates Islam to be a disbeliever without any sharee’a basis or clear proof 
opposes the path of the Imaams of knowledge from Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa’a” 
(2011:1/533). Salafee scholars show a fair amount of consistency in their writings 
and religious verdicts regarding their position regarding extremism, takfeer, and 
respect for the Salaf, which includes the creed and manhaj of the four Imaams of 
the mathhabs. Still, Ungureanu posits, “From the Salafi’s [sic] strict conception of 
Islam, which is sometimes at odds with real life, evil interpretations are born, 
finishing in terrorist (activities)” (Ungureanu 2008:6). The critics of the Salafee 
manhaj are many; however, not all them pursue solid academic methods and offer 
sound conclusions based upon well-researched data. For example, a summary of a 
report, used by the New York City Police Department, to religiously profile the 
Muslim community, and justify widespread surveillance of community members 
reads: 
 
          The religious/political ideology responsible for driving this radicalization  
          process is called jihadist or jihadi-Salafi [sic] ideology and it has served as  
          the inspiration for all or nearly all of the homegrown groups including the  
          Madrid 2004 bombers, the Hofstad Group, London’s 7/7 bombers, the  
          Australians arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in 2005 and the  
          Toronto 18, arrested in June 2006 (Silber and Bhatt 2007:6).  
 
The policies that emanated from this report have had enormous implications for the 
Muslim community and contributed to the implementation of widespread 
surveillance practices and stereotyping of Muslims as potential terrorist suspects. 
Silber and Bhatt go on to claim: 
 
          Implementation of sharia law and replacement of the system of nation  
          states with a worldwide Caliphate are the ultimate political aims. While  
          other Salafi [sic]currents encourage non-violent missionary or political  
          activities to achieve these religious/political goals, jihadi-Salafis [sic] utilize  
          endorsements of respected scholars of Islam to show that their aims and   
          violent means are religiously justified (2007:17).  
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Silber and Bhatt do not appear to have made in-depth surveys of Salafee literature 
as they have summed the goals of all Salafees to be restoration of a caliphate, 
either through violent or non-violent means, but that does not reflect the ambitions 
of the movement as was demonstrated in chapter one. Others like Flynn illustrate 
open hostility towards Islam because of the extremist actions of a few. This deep-
seated hatred towards Islam has led some detractors to claim the sources of Islam 
itself are the cause of radicalism. Flynn posits that Islamic law is comparable to the 
brutality of Stalin and Mussolini. He states, “I firmly believe that Radical Islam is a 
tribal cult and must be crushed…. Sharia [sic] is violent law that is buried in barbaric 
convictions” (2016:110). Researchers like Silber and Bhatt attempt to justify Muslim 
profiling and surveillance policies based upon the assumptions of writers like Flynn, 
by claiming Salafee mosques are breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment. They 
even claim to have identified stages of recruitment that take place in Salafee 
centers. “Two key indicators within this self-identification stage that suggests 
progression along the radicalization continuum are: Progression or Gravitation 
Towards Salafi [sic] Islam and regular attendance at a Salafi [sic] mosque” 
(2007:31). Silber and Bhatt’s report fails to properly analyze or comprehend the 
creed and manhaj of the Salafee da’wa. “They equate it with a political ideology and 
as being the ideology of al-Qaeda, and this is a cataclysmic misinterpretation” 
(salafimanhaj.com 2007). Unfortunately, Silber and Bhatt do not attempt to 
reference Salafee sources and scholars. Instead they attempt to link thinkers like 
Syed Qutb or groups like Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen to the Salafee manhaj; however, 
on the contrary they have both been extensively refuted by Salafee scholars and 
declared as heretics due to their creedal and methodological differences with Ahl al-
Sunna (Green 2009).67 The main errors found in Silber and Bhatt’s report can be 																																																								
67 Syed Qutb was known for reviving the creed of takfeer and making numerous controversial 
statements percieved as being declarations of takfeer upon whole Muslim scoieties. There has been 
extrensive research linking Qutb’s thought and many contemporary takfeeree-jihaadee groups 
(Brachman, Felter and McCants 2006). In addition, the Qur’an, Sunna, and the viewpoint of majority 
of the Salaf illustrate that rebelling against a despotic Muslim ruler was considered impermissible. 
Most of the Salaf held the view that patience and preserving the unity of the Muslim community took 
precedence over the harm and bloodshed that would result from attempting to remove a tyrannical 
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summed up as follows: 
 
          All the mosques and individuals cited as Salafi [sic] were all vehemently  
          opposed to the Salafi [sic] manhaj and erroneously cited. As for the “dozen  
          examples” that Silber and Bhatt gave as evidence then the reality is not  
          only that those examples had nothing Salafi about them at all and  
          secondly, the overwhelming amount of people involved in such terrorist  
          actions are distinguished by ignorance of the religion of Islaam [sic]  
          generally, let alone the Salafi [sic] way particularly. Furthermore, they  
          neither bring Salafi scholars as justification for their desperate and extreme  
          terrorist actions nor do call themselves ‘Salafi’[sic] (salafimanhaj.com  
          2007). 
 
Orientation of Muslim Critics  
 
It is important to understand the creed of Muslim critics to contextualize and 
deconstruct their arguments. This assists in determining their biases to better 
evaluate their criticisms. A part of understanding the critique of academics like El 
Fadl must come from an understanding of his creedal orientation to help assess his 
critiques of Salafism. This is not to undermine the merits of his scholarship, but 
rather to further gain insight into his criterion for assessing the Salafee manhaj. In 
addition, he represents and articulates a contemporary strand 
(modernist/progressive) in Islam, which is diametrically opposed to the Salafee 
manhaj. The positions of El Fadl about contemporary politics, the role of women, 
and issues pertaining to Muslim minorities shows just how divergent his views are 
from Salafism, highlighting his more rationalist approach to understanding creed. 
Chapter four will explore some of these tensions and examine contemporary 
Salafees’ views regarding democracy and pluralism; however, for now it will suffice 
to detail some of the main arguments put forth by self-proclaimed progressives like 
El Fadl and their criticisms of Salafism.  																																																																																																																																																																										
leader (Green 2009). In contrast, Qutb held that jihaad is, “to establish God's authority in the earth; 
to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic 
forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others since all men are 
creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws 
for them” (Qutb 2006:81). 
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Critics of Salafism often lambast Salafees for their literalist approach to textual 
interpretation and inability to provide solutions to contemporary problems. El Fadl 
criticizes the very premise of the Salafee manhaj and his critique appears to include 
Ahl al-Hadeeth whom Salafees ascribe their methods to.68 El Fadl states: 
 
          The often-resulted tensions between the jurists and the literalist narrators  
          of traditions (ahl al-hadith) [sic] whose analytical process, for the most part,  
          consisted of the mechanical process of matching traditions with  
          problematic factual situations. This methodology basically, consisted of  
          restructuring all contemporaneous factual situations so that they would fit  
          into a mold that was literally addressed by an inherited Prophetic tradition.  
          This, of course, was fed by a myth that the Qur’an and Sunnah [sic]  
          already addressed every possible factual situation or problem that might  
          ever arise (2001:49). 
 
This sentiment expressed by El Fadl is reflected in other more contemporary critics 
of Salafism like Yasir Qadhi, a reformed ex-Salafee, who has earned the disdain of 
many Western Salafees for his scrutiny of the Salafee manhaj after being one of its 
proponents. Qadhi muses: 
  
           The understanding of the Salaf includes many fundamental issues that are  
           completely neglected or even contradicted by contemporary Salafī [sic]  
           groups. Additionally, there is a methodological flaw in attempting to  
           extrapolate a Salafī [sic] position (meaning: a position that the Salaf would  
           hold) about a modern issue that the Salaf never encountered. The ‘Salafī  
           [sic] position’ (meaning one that is held by some scholars of the modern  
           Salafī [sic] movement) with respect to questions on citizenship in nation- 
           states, democracy, the role of women in today’s society, the permissibility  
           of voting, and the issue of jihād [sic]in the modern world, etc., are merely  
           personal opinions (fatāwā) [sic] of the scholars who pronounce them and  
           cannot be representative of the views of the first three generations of  
           Islam (2014:121).  
 
Qadhi is correct in asserting that there are numerous contemporary issues that the 
Salaf never encountered, and this creates a tension for both Salafees and 
traditionalists on how to accommodate these tensions. However, there is a general 																																																								
68 Salafees essentially view the methodology of Ahl al-Hadeeth, literalism, and using synonymous 
terminology of the Qur’an and Sunna as the safest means for avoiding ambiguity and confusion 
regarding one’s faith. For Salafees, this lack of clarity in belief is a result of using rational deduction 
to affirm one’s creed, rather than the authority of the sacred texts. A common claim made by 
Salafees is that there is no ijtihaad when there is a definitive sacred text present.    
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methodology of analyzing evidences in making fatwa to deal with contemporary 
problems. When discussing contemporary issues or problems, it must first be 
determined if the issue requires a sharee’a ruling or not. Second, then the ruling 
should be derived by observing general sharee’a objectives if there is no clear 
solution from divine texts. Ibn Taimeeya states, “The scholar of usool al-fiqh looks 
at sharee’a evidences and its levels and distinguishes between what is sharee’a 
evidence and what is not and it requires analyzing the various levels of evidence 
until he can give preference to that which is strongest over that which has 
weakness if there is a contradiction between evidences” (al-Najjaar 2016:8). As has 
been mentioned previously, consensus of the Salaf is defined as what the Salaf 
agreed upon in creed, manhaj, jurisprudence, and other Islamic morays. 
Consensus, according to the working definition of this research refers to “the 
unanimity of the mujtahideen of the umma during a particular time regarding a 
religious issue after the death of the Messenger of Allah (saw). Therefore, whatever 
the Salaf agreed upon regarding understanding the Book and Sunna is obligatory to 
follow, because consensus is sharee’a evidence in and of itself” (al-Najjaar 2016:8). 
Imaam Abu Haneefa states, “If a fatwa of a Companion is given to me then I follow 
it, and I do not deem it permissible to disagree with it” (al-Najjaar 2016:15). Imaam 
al-Shaafi'ee states, “It is not permissible to have an opinion except from the 
foundation or an analogy of the foundation. The foundation is: the Book or Sunna, 
or an opinion of some of the Companions or the Messenger of Allah (saw), or 
consensus of the people” (al-Najjaar 2016:8). The relevance of mentioning these 
statements, which are known to Qadhi, is to show that a ‘Salafi [sic] position’ is one 
in which the scholars of Salafism determine based upon returning to fundamental 
principles derived from sharee’a evidence. From the objectives of the sharee’a is 
that it only brings benefit to the creation. Al-‘Iz bin ‘Abd al-Salaam states, “All things 
pertinent to the sharee’a are beneficial: avoiding evil or bringing benefit” (al-Najjaar 
2016:16). Salafees reason that the preservation of the sharee’a was entrusted to 
men, and refuting innovated practices, foreign ideologies, and Ahl al-Bid’a, are a 
part protecting the greater Muslim community and maintaining orthodoxy in the faith. 
Therefore, a Salafee position is one in which the Salafee scholars have reached a 
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consensus upon regarding a contemporary issue, and it is assumed that they use 
sharee’a based evidences sound reasoning and interpretation as a guide for issuing 
a fatwa. This process also involves general usool al-fiqh (principles of fiqh) and 
qawaa’id al-fiqheeya (fundamentals of fiqh) principles like: part of deriving a ruling 
on a particular practice requires accurate understanding of its circumstances. Al-
Shaibaan mentions four reasons that govern ijtihaad that Salafees invoke. First, the 
Qur’an and Sunna often provide general prescriptions; therefore, general principles 
are derived from those sacred texts to warrant and govern ijtihaad. Secondly, the 
sacred texts provide a multitude of examples that clarify the general aim behind the 
text, thus understanding the intent behind a given text; helps provide governing 
principles for deriving rulings. Third, ambiguous texts also encourage ijtihaad in 
deriving rulings; however, this is not applicable to creed. Fourth, the sacred texts 
are limited in quantity, but world events, inventions, and situations are always 
evolving, which require new ijtihaad from the scholars (2012:1/88).  The example of 
Mu’aadh, a Companion, when he was sent to Yemen best illustrates this 
methodology. The Prophet (saw) asked Mu’aadh about how he would arbitrate 
disputes if he did not find a direct solution in the Qur’an or Sunna. He replied saying 
he would strive in his opinion (al-Tirmidhee 1995). This illustrates that Salafees do 
not reject reason as long as it does not contradict clear unambiguous texts or give 
precedence to the rationalism of Ahl al-Kalaam. 
 
While Qadhi views Salafees and Salafism as restrictive and unable to address 
contemporary issues, Salafees deem Qadhi as being one who has abandoned and 
belittled many of the principles of the Salafee manhaj, he is often described as 
being tamyee’ or one who is ruinous toward the principles of the da’wa. One of the 
primary reasons Qadhi is often negatively depicted by Salafees is due to his 
criticism of the da’wa and his non-acceptance of Salafism as a divine path as 
espoused by Salafee scholars. He states, The fact that someone like myself, who 
was for a time associated with the movement, is  pointing out mistakes that these 
other groups verbalized will naturally cause them to rejoice” (2014:20). Al-
Madkhalee was asked about the term tamyee’ and its implications regarding 
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Salafism, he responded by saying, “It refers to people who, when it comes to the 
fundamentals of Islam, reduce, belittle, and weaken them, rather they aggressively 
oppose them” (al-A’naabee 2015:108). Many critics of the Salafee methodology 
considered it too rigid, without offering prescriptions to contemporary problems and 
void of any scriptural contextualization. El Fadl contrasts the modernist interpretive 
discourse with that of Salafees when he states: 
 
          The legal process, which I refer to above, involves a dialectical  
          engagement with God. God, in one form or another, speaks to human  
          beings, and human beings, engage God’s speech through interpretation  
          and praxis. The dialectic is experienced both at the level of abstract  
          interpretation and at the level of use and action. There is a thesis,  
          antithesis and eventual synthesis. Arguably, the synthesis is not final or  
          permanent but simply a temporary stage until such synthesis is challenged  
          by a new thesis and so on. The authoritarian interpretive process,  
          however, will either adopt a thesis that it transforms into a final truth or will  
          reach a synthesis that it will consider final and unchangeable. Put  
          differently, the authoritarian interpretive process believes that it hears God  
          loud and clear, does not struggle with much ambiguity, and if it engages in  
          the dialectical process at all, it will cut this process short (2001:7). 
 
El Fadl suggests that the authoritative process (Salafee model) is too rigid and fixed, 
whereas the moderates understanding is more pliable and evolutionary in keeping 
with contemporary times. In fact, he implies that the modernist/progressive way is 
more enlightening and intellectually vibrant, as a methodological premise as will be 
detailed shortly. The problem with this analysis is that this methodology seems 
more whimsical and without any parameters from the Salaf as a guide, and he 
infers their processes are irrelevant, outdated, and ill-equipped to confront 
contemporary issues and crises. It must be conceded that they did not face any of 
these current problems as was eluded to in chapter two; however, that does not 
mean that there does not exist parameters, and principles that should be used to 
deliberate judgments regarding contemporary crises. Still others like Wiktorowicz 
claim, “the Salafi [sic] creed outlines the rules for generating religious opinions to 
ensure that conclusions are methodologically sound and based on solid evidence… 
the expectation is that religious rulings represent the unadulterated and singular 
truth of God’s will because they rely on the original and pure sources of Islam” 
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(2005:8). It must be acknowledged, that some Salafees do display extreme 
confidence in the views of their scholars sometimes bordering on taqleed; however, 
it does not accurately reflect the entire movement. Moreover, most Salafees believe 
that by extrapolating a ruling from divine texts based upon proper contextualization 
gives religious verdicts there authenticity. 
 
To illustrate the contrast between moderates and Salafees in understanding core 
religious texts it is necessary to look at an example of how they differ regarding 
hadeeth interpretation, and why moderates scrutinize Salafee methodology.  El 
Fadl interprets the hadeeth that refers to the rewards of the mujtahid, by seemingly 
claiming it is for anyone who has a minimal level of knowledge. Simply applying 
original analysis and independent judgment to a legal issue merits reward from 
Allah even if the person is incorrect in judgment. The Prophet (saw) said, as 
collected in Muslim, “When a judge gives a decision, having tried his best to decide 
correctly and is right, there are two rewards for him; and if he gave a judgment after 
having tried his best (to arrive at a correct decision) but erred, there is one reward 
for him” (1999:1/132). Shaikh al-Mubaarakfooree, a Salafee scholar, explains this 
reward is for the one who has prerequisite knowledge to conduct ijtihaad and 
“possesses the tools for ijtihaad, understanding basic principles, and analogous 
comparisons. As for the one who has no right to make ijtihaad, then he will be held 
responsible, and is not excused for his mistake” (1999:3/158). El Fadl’s 
interpretation of this text, as many of his statements suggest, is that ijtihaad, 
interpretation and rulings are reserved for any ‘competent’ individual, whereas 
Salafees generally relegate and restrict these judgments to the scholars except for 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
Another area of contention between moderates and Salafees is their various 
stances regarding Islamic pluralism. Salafees equate Islamic pluralism in creed or 
method with hizbeeya, whereas moderates view it in a positive light as enriching 
and enhancing religious tradition allowing greater flexibility in textual interpretation. 
El Fadl states, “Consequently, it is this notion of individual and egalitarian 
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accessibility of the truth that results in a rich doctrinal diversity in Islam” (2001:9). El 
Fadl was discussing the diversity of jurisprudence; however, when looking at his 
methodology and statements regarding dogma it seems quite plausible that he 
holds these views regarding creed. This is best illustrated by scrutinizing 
statements he has made reflecting a consistent doctrine contrary to that of Ahl al-
Sunna’s (2007). The acceptance of a multitude of creeds is very entrenched in the 
Muslim communities of the West. Some of the reasons for this open embracing of 
various trends probably stems from the fact that many mainstream Muslim 
organizations in the US, were influenced by Muslim Brotherhood methods. Hassan 
al-Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood believed that “joining not separating” the 
community would achieve unity regardless of sectarian orientation, and that this 
principle was for the greater good of the overall Muslim community because to him 
every da’wa had both truth and falsehood. (2000:7).  	
El Fadl is a part of a social movement, which constitutes of a list of Muslim 
academics who refer to themselves as “Progressive Muslims.” These Muslim 
academics share a common ideology based upon reform and challenging existing 
textual interpretations, emanating from influences from rationalism and various 
modernist philosophies such as feminism. One unifying trend amongst the 
proponents of Progressivism is their disdain for Salafism. The relevance of citing 
some of their works is that it gives a fuller understanding of the orientation of some 
of the most vehement critics of Salafism within the Muslim community and 
illustrates the ongoing struggle between liberal rationalists and Salafee thought. El 
Fadl, Amina Wudud, a Muslim feminist who was the first woman in America to lead 
a mixed gender congregational prayer, and several other progressives coauthored 
a book of essays highlighting their ideology. Safi the editor of the collection states, 
“Progressive, in this usage refers to a relentless striving towards a universal notion 
of justice in which no single community’s prosperity, righteousness, and dignity 
comes at the expense of another” (2011:3). The progressives take a more 
humanistic approach to understanding Islam, which allows greater flexibility in 
engaging with other faith based communities by reinterpreting divine texts, 
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especially the Qur’an. Safi explains, “Central to this notion of a progressive Muslim 
identity are fundamental values that we hold to be essential to a vital, fresh, and 
urgently needed interpretation of Islam for the twenty-first century. These themes 
include social justice, gender justice, and pluralism” (2011:3). The pillars of their 
ideology are diametrically opposed to Salafee understandings of al-wala’a wa al-
bara’a.  “At the heart of a progressive Muslim interpretation is a simple yet radical 
idea: every human life, female and male, Muslim and non-Muslim, rich or poor… 
has the same intrinsic worth” (2011:3). Salafees argue that this undermines basic 
Islamic principles, citing verses that illustrate the distinction of the beleivers from the 
disbeleivers. On the otherhand, progressives cite texts that are specific in meaning 
that refer to Islamic brotherhood and broaden their scope to include humankind, 
which was not their intended meaning.  
 
Progressives are eclectic in their creed and adoption of various trends from Sufism 
to rationalism, which grants them the flexibility to engage with the texts without the 
more literalist approach of Salafism. Safi States, “Progressive Muslims insist on 
serious engagement with the full spectrum of Islamic thought and practices” 
(2011:7). This is not unlike the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-
Banna, who felt the various trends of Islamic thought all had something of benefit, 
which contrasts sharply with the arguments and exclusivism of Salafees. Safi also 
states, “Sufism has much to offer us…all Sufism is adab [sic]” (2011:11). In 
contemporary times there appears to be an amalgamation of Sufism and rationalist 
thought, especially in the West. This synthesis of ideologies is probably due to the 
freethinking spiritual nature of both trends, and progressives with their emphasis on 
resisting injustice, rethinking Islam for modern times, humanism, and critical 
thinking, find compatibility in both orientations. Safi states: 
 
          It is time to ‘translate’ the social ideals in the Qur’an and Islamic teachings in  
          a way that those committed to social justice today can relate to and  
          understand. We would do well to follow the lead of the Shi’i [sic] Muslims who  
          from the start have committed to standing up for the downtrodden and the  
          oppressed…yet how many people have also realized the Mu’tazilites [sic]   
          (who have greatly affected Shi’i [sic] understandings of Islam) so valued  
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          justice that they identified themselves as the folk of ‘Divine Unity and Justice’”  
          (2011:9). 
 
The quest for social justice and unity for progressives not only extends to the 
various Muslim sects, but also non-Muslims in their search for diversity. “Part of 
pluralism is measured by openness to engage sources of compassion and wisdom 
no matter where they originate” (Safi 2011:14). This shows the contrast between 
Salafism’s unwillingness to consider or include any other ideology that they view as 
alien to orthodoxy or Islam, whereas progressives are the polar opposites in that 
diversity and pluralistic thought are pillars of their ideology.  Safi exhorts, “Living in 
the twenty-first century, I urge Muslims to consider that it is no longer sufficient to 
study only the Qur’an and hadith. In addition to those essential founts of wisdom, 
we need to be conversant with Rumi and Ibn al-‘Arabi, Plato and Ibn Sina, Ghazzali 
and Hazrat ‘Ali, Chomsky…Bob Dylan and Bob Marley” (2011:15). 
 
Progressive views on Salafism are clear and their methodologies are probably the 
most antithetical to Salafism. Safi posits, “I view Wahhabism…as the single 
greatest source of the impoverishment of contemporary Islamic thought” (2011:8). 
The depiction of Salafism as a backward ideological trend is common for many of 
the sects that oppose them; however, progressives make it a part of their program 
to discredit Salafism. “It is imperative for progressive Muslims to resist the 
oppressive ideology of Wahhabism, but equally important to avoid the trap of 
dehumanizing the Wahhabi-oriented human beings” (2011:9). To illustrate the level 
of disdain progressives have for Salafism as a methodology, they prefer to 
cooperate and find more similarities in some of their concepts with non-Muslims 
than they do with Salafees. Safi asserts, “There have, of course, long been 
Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, agnostics, avowed atheists, and others 
involved in many social justice issues. Increasingly, they now find themselves 
standing shoulder to shoulder with new Muslim friends”  (2011:9). 
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Contrasts in Exegesis and Methodology 
 
The theological orientation of both progressives and moderates, differ drastically 
from the Salafee perspective due to differences in textual interpretation and 
methodology of scrutinizing core religious texts. An example which illustrates both 
El Fadl’s doctrine and methodology of scrutinizing hadeeth, is his negation of 
hadeeth that mention issues which appear incomprehensible such as the scales to 
be used on the Day of Judgment to weigh one’s good deeds and bad deeds. It is 
important to distinguish between hadeeth sciences that involve scrutinizing text 
authenticity and criticizing the narrators, from those contemporary ideologues who 
actually criticize the use of hadeeth as a source of Islam. The latter, in their most 
extreme form, question whether hadeeth are even valid as a divine source. El Fadl 
asserts, Salafees take a literal approach to these texts. In contrast, he states, 
“While moderates consider these traditions to be inconsistent with the Qur’an, and 
no more than historical fabrications, puritans accept the historical veracity of these 
traditions and read and understand them in a rigid and literal way” (2007:128). This 
statement highlights an important difference in the methodology of moderates, as 
they do not analyze the texts for there authenticity by using the traditional means of 
analysis of hadeeth scholars, but rather they take a more rationalist approach.69 
Allah states, “Then, those whose scales are heavy, they are the successful. And 
those whose scales are light, they are those who lose their own selves, in hell they 
will abide” (1996:23/103-104). Ibn Taimeeya claims, “Scales will be set up to weigh 
the deeds of people” (al-Ja’eed, al-Juhanee, and al-A’layaanee 2010:874). 
Amongst the Salaf, many scholars claimed there was consensus regarding the 
scale being a real substantive created thing. Imaams Abu Haatim and Abu Zura’, 
claimed, “We met scholars from all over: Hijaz, Iraq, Sham and Yemen and from 
their mathhab was…the scale is real” (al-Ja’eed, al-Juhanee, and al-A’layaanee 																																																								
69 Many modernists tend towards rationalism and straying from classical interpretation similar to 
progressives. Perhaps a distinguishing trait of moderates is that they tend to adapt text to allow for 
modernization, whereas  progressives are less bound by the texts themselves and more eclectic in 
approach. El Fadl notes, “Moderates argue that ‘ijma’ should not mean consensus or unanimity, but 
that it should mean existence of a simple majority. In addition, they assert that the views or vote of 
any citizen, Muslim or not, should count for the purposes of ascertaining the will of the majority” 
(2007:192).   
	 143	
2010:874). These texts illustrate that the Qur’an, Sunna and Salaf all support the 
belief that there is a scale to weigh deeds. Therefore, this belief is supported by the 
Qur’an; however, due to methodological differences it does not appear acceptable 
to rationalists. Ibn Taimeeya accurately summarizes the Salafee view when he 
states, 
 
          The intellect is not evidence in and of itself regarding Godly issues and the  
          Day of Judgment. Therefore, what may be intellectually palatable is not  
          accepted if it contradicts the sharee’a and does not conform to it. This is    
          because the sharee’a is the statement of one who is faultless, who does  
          not err, or deceive, and the narrations of the truthful one who speaks only  
          fact. As for the opinions of men, they contain many contradictions, and  
          frailties” (1997:1/108).  
 
El Fadl is critical of accepting hadeeth texts; however, he claims that he considers 
them authoritative. El Fadl contradicts himself by scrutinizing hadeeth that 
contradict his paradigm even if the scholars of hadeeth have consensus on their 
authenticity. While discussing Salafees’ reliance upon al-Bukhari he states, “The 
problem is that many of these traditions defy reason, or are offensively demeaning 
toward women and non-Muslims, or are blatantly inconsistent with the ethics and 
morality set out in the Qur’an” (2007: 153).  This single statement best illustrates 
the contrast between moderates' orientation and approach to creed and manhaj, 
and that of Salafees.70 El Fadl claims many hadeeth defy reason, further illustrating 
the methodological differences between moderates and Salafees. Whereas 
Salafees tend towards literalism moderates tend to affirm and authenticate hadeeth 
according to their intellect. Shaikh Sa’eed bin Halail, in an audio recording 
explaining the reform methods of rationalists like El Fadl, states: 
 
          The ‘Aqlaaneeya manhaj is built upon the intellect. Preference is given to  
          the intellect over the texts. Meaning the Qur’an and Sunna are judged by  
          the intellect, so whatever agrees with the intellect is accepted, and  
          whatever disagrees with the intellect is rejected. It is an evil and false  																																																								
70 Shaikh Sa’eed bin Halail states about the new liberalism being propagated by some ‘Muslim 
liberals,’ “They bring new ideologies, cause fear in the hearts, and ruin the sharee’a. The first thing 
they do in distorting the sharee’a is spoiling the creed, then manners, and then they destroy the 
sharee’a rulings. They build their religion on opinions, intentions, and intellect; they do not possess 
anything from the sharee’a of Allah or the Sunna of the Messenger of Allah (saw)” (Hijra 2017).  
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          methodology and it is derived from the way of the Mu’tazilla. For this  
          reason, some intellectuals and writers propagate this methodology, like  
          Ghazaalee and those who traverse his manhaj in contemporary times: they  
          deny some verses and the Sunnan of the Prophet (saw), with the claim  
          that they do not agree with the intellect (Hijra 2017). 71 
 
Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazaalee, was more oriented towards rationalism in his 
creed; although he gravitated towards Sufism in worship and rejected the literalism 
of Salafees. Some extreme rationalists reject hadeeth according to reason: 
whatever they do not comprehend or cannot accept cannot be considered as 
authentic.72 Imaam al-Shaatibee states, “All that I mentioned previously illustrates 
that voiding  (authenticated) hadeeth based upon opinion is sinful and there are 
many examples to show that it is bid’a” (2009:2/68). El Fadl's insistence that many 
hadeeth in al-Bukhari are inconsistent with Qur'anic values is countered by 
Salafees claim that the Prophet (saw) illustrated Qur'anic values and its practice, 
and that his Sunna explained the Qur'an and offered details for ambiguous verses. 
This is because Salafees like most Sunnis, regard al-Bukhari’s collection as the 
most authentic and important source in Islam, after the Qur’an, and traditions 
contained therein form the basis for creed, manhaj, jurisprudence, and the other 
religious sciences.  In contrast, El Fadl asserts: 
           
          In contrast to the puritans, moderates apply systematic principles of  
          historical criticism to the traditions attributed to the Prophet.  Unlike the  
          Qur’an, as mentioned earlier, these traditions were documented and  
          preserved a few centuries after the death of the Prophet. In addition, the  
          traditions clearly reflect historical circumstances, sectarian disputes, and  
          political conflicts that took place years after the Prophet’s death. Using  
          modern methods of critical analysis, moderates conclude that many of  
          these traditions are apocryphal or pure inventions (2007:154). 
 
In contrast, Salafees often claim that the Sunna is a form of revelation and this is 
why they seek so hard to associate with the traditions of Ahl al-Hadeeth, who held 
that to question authenticated hadeeth was to question Islam, and divine authority. 
Salafees refer to the Qur’anic verse in which Allah states about the Prophet (saw), 																																																								
71 Here the Shaikh seems to be alluding to the fact that some verses of the Qur’an were considered 
abrogated but were mentioned in hadeeth literature and remained as a form of legislation such as 
the verses mentioning stoning of the adulterer.    
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“Your companion has neither gone astray nor has erred. Nor does he speak of his 
own desires. It is only revelation revealed” (1996 53:2-4). Imaam al-Tha’labee (died 
427 hijra) explains that these verses indicate the Prophet (saw) did not speak from 
his whims, or the meaning is that he did not speak with desires, and that whatever 
he said is from the religion (2015:25/86).  Imaam al-Tabaree explicated the verses 
with a similar meaning (2012). Imaam al Baghawee stated, “It means Muhammad 
(saw) did not deviate from the path of guidance. He did not speak falsely through 
his desires; this is because they (pagan Arabs) claimed Muhammad (saw) related 
this Qur’an from himself. However, whatever he speaks about the religion is 
revelation” (1987:4/245). Imaam al-Sa’dee, a contemporary scholar of tafseer, 
explains, “He did not follow anything from himself or others, instead he followed 
what Allah revealed to him from guidance and God fearfulness. This is evidence 
that the Sunna is revelation from Allah to His Messenger (saw)… and that he is free 
from any error in delivery of the message about Allah and His sharee’a” (1998:965).  
El Fadl’s general approach to the divine texts further illustrates the methodological 
differences between Salafees and modernists regarding issues of faith. Regarding 
matters of faith El Fadl states about the Qur’an and Sunna that they “can inspire 
creative solutions to most problems, but this is a far cry from assuming that they 
can automatically yield solutions to life’s challenges” (2007:154). Similarly, Salafees 
believe the sharee’a offers solutions to contemporary problems but they recognize 
the need for ijtihaad to deal with contemporary issues. The Salafee methodology is 
best articulated by a statement of Imaam al-Shaafi'ee, who said, “Everything that 
happens to a Muslim has an applicable ruling, or he discerns the truth by using 
evidence which is contextual. Therefore, if there is a clear ruling: then he follows it, 
however, if there is not any exact ruling, then he strives to find evidence to attain 
the truth through ijtihaad” (cited in al-Shaibaan 2012:1/86). Al-Shaibaan, a 
contemporary academic, explains, “sharee’a and its basic principles are inclusive 
as a beginning point. As for those issues established which change, or are affected 
by different conditions, time, or place, then the sharee’a has general principles and 
has left the mujtahideen to derive a ruling using the principle and ruling appropriate 
to the situation” (2012:1/86).   
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Contrasts in Creed 
 
Because modernists and Salafees differ in fundamental methods of how to 
approach sacred texts, their various interpretations result in a divergence in creed. 
In contrast to the rationalists’ moderate methodology, the Salafee approach is that 
"the evidence used to support creed is three and there is no fourth category: the 
Qur'an, Sunna, and consensus" (al-Najjaar 2016:11). Al-Najjaar explains that the 
reason for misguidance and differing is due primarily to the use of alternative 
sources of evidence to support one's theology such as rationalism.73 This method of 
deducing creed is construed by looking at the intellectually tangible to rationalize 
and affirm the unseen. Considering El Fadl's statements it appears that he is highly 
influenced by Ahl al-Kalaam. However, Imaam Maalik, al-Shaafi'ee and Ahmad 
rejected this means of ascertaining creed. Imaam Maalik states, "If kalaam was 
knowledge, then the Companions, and Taabi’een would have spoken about it like 
they mentioned rulings and sharee'a; however, falsehood is evidence for falsehood" 
(Harowee 2012:72-73). Imaam al-Shaafi'ee best articulated the position of the Salaf 
when he said, "My judgment regarding Ahl al-Kalaam is they should be beaten with 
branches, displayed on camels around all the tribes and it should be announced: 
this is the reward for leaving the Book and the Sunna and delving into knowledge of 
kalaam" (Abu Na'eem 2009:9/116). The Salaf were vehement in rejecting analogy 
in areas of creed and especially if they perceived analogy or the use of logic to 
contradict divine scripture.  As was previously mentioned, Salafees do not outright 
reject logic and it may not be exactly accurate to describe them as pure literalists 
devoid of interpretive reasoning, as their detractors allege. For Salafees reason is a 																																																								
73 Rationalism, as practiced by Ahl al-Kalaam is understood as using one’s logic and reasoning to 
authenticate or make judgements arbitrarily about creed. This methodology can lead to a negation of 
the explicit meanings of divine texts. For instance, Salafees do not negate the use of logic in an 
absolute sense: the Salaf used logic for textual interpretation, to determine consensus, and to make 
sound analogy. However, the Salaf took exception to rationalism that was used to distort the 
intended meaning of the Divine texts or contradict them, which led to unorthodox practices. Al-
Taftaazaanee, an 'Asharee scholar states, "Kalaam is: knowledge of creed from evidence attained 
by certainty" (cited 2016:38). Imam al-Ghazaalee states, “The intended maxim of Knowledge of al-
Kalaam is to preserve the creed of Ahl al-Sunna and protect it from the distortions of Ahl al-Bid’a” 
(al-Shalaalee 2009:171). For discussions of the mathhab of Ahl al-Kalaam see chapter one. The 
statement of Ghazaalee’s illustrates the hostilities between Ahl al-Hadeeth and Ahl al-Kalaam and 
both groups viewed themselves as defenders of orthodoxy.  
	 147	
means to understanding divine scripture and at the same time scripture governs 
logic. The intellect is conditional for understanding knowledge and deeds can only 
be accepted from a peson who possesses rational thought, intellectual capacity, 
and maturity. Ibn Taimeeya wrote extensively about how to adapt logic in 
accordance to divine scripture to rectify any perceived conflict, and that precedence 
was always to be given to scripture. According to this methodology, creed can only 
be deduced from divine textual origin not rationalism. For example, belief in Allah’s 
divine names and attributes, or the angels is only understood and affirmed in light of 
the divine texts with reasoning being the force for explication. Ultimately, Salafees 
believe the intellect is used in ijtihaad, textual interpretation, and sound use of 
analogies, as long as they do not conflict with divine texts or scholarly consensus.     
   
Another area of contention between El Fadl and Salafees is regarding tawheed and 
the relationship people should strive to attain with Allah. Al Fadl states, “Submission 
to God through fear and obedience, for moderates, is considered primitive and 
vulgar” (2007:132). His reference to fear and obedience as being vulgar is quite in 
opposition to Salafee doctrine and even more importantly, the classical scholars of 
Ahl al-Sunna. Allah mentions in the Qur’an that, “Verily, those who fear Allah the 
most are the scholars” (1996 35:28). Fear and awe of Allah are positive traits in the 
sharee’a, which encourage the believer to be better and conscious of his or her 
deeds. In the aforementioned verse, Allah mentioned that those, seemingly the best 
of people, are those who possess knowledge and fear Him, which was stated in a 
positive sense. The Prophet (saw) states in al-Bukhari that “By Allah! I am the most 
knowledgeable about Allah and the most severe in fearing Him” (2009:1/68). To 
describe characteristics praised by Allah and His Prophet (saw) as ‘vulgar’ and 
‘primitive’ does not seem befitting, nor can these statements be considered, in light 
of the texts, as legitimate Islamic views. Fadhail bin ‘Ayaadh, a Taabi’ee states, “If it 
is said to you: do you fear Allah? Keep silent, because if you say no, then you have 
disbelieved. And if you reply yes, then you have lied” (Fareed 2011:181).  
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Islam, as defined by El Fadl is “surrender in which one is in complete tranquility and 
peace with that who is the object of surrender, the dynamics of this surrender is to 
know God and to seek godliness in oneself” (2007:133). This statement suggests 
that El Fadl holds a slightly alternative view to what the Salaf held, perhaps more in 
line with Sufi spiritualism; however, it remains unclear, as this researcher has not 
encountered clear statements, which illustrate his full concept of tawheed. He also, 
mentions that a part of loving Allah is to love and adore all of his creation; however, 
this appears to contradict the Qur’anic verses that highlight al-wala’a wa al-bara’a 
as discussed in chapter one. “To truly love God, one must love all human beings, 
whether Muslim or not, and love all living beings as well as all of God’s nature” 
(2007:134). In contrast, all throughout the Qur’an Allah distinguishes between the 
beleivers and disbeleivers and emphasis is placed on allegiance to believers and 
disavowal of disbelief. Allah states regarding Prophet Ibraheem (saw) and his 
disavowal of his people, “Verily, we are free from you and whatever you worship 
besides Allah, we have rejected you, and there has started between us and you , 
hostility and hatred forever until you believe in Allah alone” (60:4). This and 
numerous other verses in the Qur’an illustrate that at a minimum Islam 
distinguishes between beleivers and disbeleivers, calling for disavowal of unIslamic 
beleifs and practices, which challenge El Fadl’s premise that it is conditional to love 
all human beings to truly adore the Creator. Again, this highlights how different 
methods of interpretation of the divine texts create highly divergent views in creed. 
    
One of the harshest claims of El Fadl, which illustrates his rejection and biasness 
towards the movement, is his claim that Salafees engage in takfeer, scrutinize and 
make judgments upon other Muslims, which in turn makes them legitimate targets 
of violence. He states, “According to moderate Muslims, no person or institution is 
authorized to judge the piety of another or evaluate the closeness of any particular 
individual to God” (2007:137). El Fadl’s concepts undermine much of Islamic law 
and he challenges the very foundations of the traditional jurisprudence that he so 
favorably speaks of. How do we account for the science of criticizing the narrators 
and transmitters of hadeeth? Or what is the basis for the plethora of traditions of the 
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Salaf, which criticize individuals for impious behavior, bid’a, and misguidance? And 
how can the rights of individuals be protected if not through judgments and 
arbitration by an Islamic judge? It seems odd that one with such high educational 
background in the Islamic sciences would make such claims and attempt to pass 
them off as Islamic. Baker best sums up the problems associated with the analysis 
of many of the non-Salafee critics of Salafism who depend solely upon secondary 
sources. He states: 
 
          The ideological differences and unswerving adherence to different schools  
          of jurisprudence arguably influence non-Salafi [sic] academic findings. An  
          example of this can be witnessed in the increasing contributions of Muslim  
          academics from the Sufi tradition that have entered the arena to expound  
          upon Salafism, often providing inconclusive data based on secondary  
          sources of research without substantiation from primary evidence 
          (2009:9). 
 
The problem of academic bias is not unique to critics of Salafism; however, it is a 
challenge requiring academic honesty and diligence, to overcome partiality when 
reviewing sources and offering analysis. Also, a robust literature review dealing with 
primary sources can help to eliminate unbiased findings.  
 
Internal Dissention 
  
In contemporary Saudi Arabia, there appears to be a paradigm shift where 
leadership and more academics are calling into question Salafism as an approach. 
In Saudi Arabia, there has been a ‘war of ideas’, as Bin Baz coined it, raging for 
quite some time. This conflict of ideologies has led to changes within the society, a 
general reassessment of the educational system and a diminishing role of the 
clerical establishment. “In the last few years, the critique of Wahhabism [sic] has 
gained unprecedented momentum in Saudi Arabia. First formulated by a 
heterogeneous group of prominent liberal and Islamist intellectuals, it seems to 
have received the approval of at least part of the ruling elite who have taken a few 
official steps towards socio-religious reform” (Lacroix 2005:1). The recent decree of 
the King Salman to diminish the authority of the religious police and appoint his son 
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prince Muhammad bin Salman as his successor, is reason to believe many more 
reforms to the Kingdom and its religious authority are yet to come. From Analysts 
reports as early as 2005 there was tremendous speculation about the curtailing of 
religious authorities in the Kingdom and what that meant for the future da’wa efforts 
of the clerical establishment. “Huge changes have recently taken place in Saudi 
Arabia, especially within the local political-intellectual field. Significant among these 
is the rise to prominence of a group of "islamo-liberals," who are "made up of former 
Islamists and liberals, Sunnis and Shiites, calling for a democratic change within an 
Islamic framework through a revision of the official Wahhabi [sic] religious doctrine" 
(Lacroix 2005:1). Lacroix believes these so-called ‘Islamo-liberals’ are within the 
greater Salafee trend and place pressure on the clerical establishment to liberalize 
and reform. Interestingly enough, “some Islamic thinkers have, since the mid-1990s, 
formulated a Salafi [sic] critique of Wahhabism [sic]. Hasan Al- Maliki, the most 
prominent among these, castigates the doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism and its 
tendency to imitate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya [sic] rather than to 
innovate as, he believes, genuine Salafism commands" (Lacroix 2005:2). Al-Maliki, 
has been written about extensively by numerous Salafee scholars in Saudi Arabia, 
many of al-Maliki’s critics defend the Salafee creed as propagated in the school 
curriculum and they actively oppose his claims made against the scholars in the 
kingdom. One such critic, Shaikh Ibraaheem al-Rehailee devotes a whole treatise 
to refuting al-Maliki’s claims. Amongst his criticisms are that al-Malaki vilifies the 
creed of Ahl al-Sunna, degrades the Companions, and claims the Hanbalee 
scholars are extremists including Imaam Ahmad. In addition, al-Rehailee refutes the 
claims made against Ibn Taimeeya, and Ibn al-Qayyim, the contemporary Saudi 
state and its scholars (2008). “Maliki called Saudi Arabia’s official religious class 
extremists (ghulat) and blamed them for fostering a religious culture conducive to 
jihadi [sic] violence. It was futile for the religious establishment to counter al-
Qaeda’s jihadi [sic] ideology, he wrote, for the jihadis [sic] were merely doing what 
the religious establishment had taught them" (Bunzel 2016 p.19). After examining 
the claims of al-Maliki it seems a misnomer to include him amongst Salafees, rather 
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he is a staunch detractor of its principles and manhaj and his critiques of Salafism 
have been countered extensively by Salafee scholars.  
 
Problems with Typology 
 
Agreeing upon a common typology that accurately depicts Salafees has proven a 
daunting task for its critics. Many Salafees consider their methodology and 
orientation as simply another ideology infused with violence. “The problem begins 
when certain religious beliefs lend to claims that entire groups of people have no 
right to live and deserve to be slaughtered” (Gore 2003 p.15). With so many 
detractors who associate the movement with violence it becomes commonplace to 
classify Salafism as inherently violent. During the tumultuous time of Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and the early expansion of the Saudi state, there was 
significant sectarian violence and calls to fight the Shia and this was considered 
Jihaad by Salafee clerics. However, al-Madkhalee responds to opponents of the 
movement by claiming, “It is well-known that Imaam Muhammad did not fight until 
he was fought against: in defense of himself or the religion…sometimes he would 
fight those whose polytheism was clear, but he provided them with the evidence of 
their errors (first)” (2015 p.106). 74 This has led some observers to make 
comparisons between ISIS extremists and the Salafee movement and criticize the 
propaganda and da’wa activities of the Saudi state. According to Silber and Bhatt: 
 
          This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate.  
          The Internet, certain Salafi-based [sic] NGO’s (non-governmental  
          organizations), extremist sermons/study groups, Salafi [sic] literature, jihadi  
          [sic] videotapes, extremist - sponsored trips to radical madrassas and  
          militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for  
          young, susceptible Muslims – especially ones living in diaspora  
          communities in the West (2007:8). 
 
This critique of extremists like ISIS, who they label as Salafees, and their 
recruitment efforts, is a blanket indictment of Salafee scholars as well. They report, 																																																								
74 To Salafees ths concept of polytheism constitiutes an act of worship directed to other than Allah or 
worshipping a partner alongside Allah. Actions such as supplication, prayer, sacrificing animals are 
all considered acts of worship (Bin Baz 2001 1/130).  
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“Contemporary Saudi (Wahhabi) [sic] scholars have provided the religious 
legitimacy for many of the arguments promoted by the jihadists [sic]” (Silber and 
Bhatt 2007:17). This is a common claim made by skeptics of the Salafee da’wa: 
scholars provide the legality to commit violence through their religious verdicts and 
that these practices are sanctioned by the Saudi state. 
 
The tendency to blame Salafism for every violent incident or act of terror is 
overwhelming, primarily due to media propaganda, inaccuracies in scholarship and 
zealousness of policy pundits. A common criticism of many political pundits is that 
Salafees are Jihaadees whose number one goal is to establish a state through a 
means of perennial Jihaad. Much of the controversy comes from the differences in 
definition. Some modernists claim, “The Prophet Muhammad repeatedly taught that 
the greatest form of jihad [sic] is to struggle against one’s own base desires or to 
speak the truth before an oppressive power and to suffer as a consequence of 
speaking out. By the same logic, striving or working hard in war, provided that the 
war is just and good, is also jihad [sic]” (El Fadl 2007:221). While this definition still 
highlights the centrality of Jihaad, it does slightly differ to the Salafee emphasis on 
Jihaad as an institution. In contrast, Salafees believe that although Jihaad as a term 
is inclusive of all those meanings, as they can be referenced from hadeeth, the 
primary definition and usage, as mentioned in the Qur’an, Sunna, and as espoused 
by the Salaf, is fighting (Malooh and bin Humaid 2004 vol 4). However, 
contemporary Salafees, as has been alluded to in the previous chapter, are quite 
restrained with regards to issuing verdicts of Jihaad and participating in global 
conflicts with few exceptions, but still many Western academics group Salafees with 
Jihaadees. In addition, it cannot be overstressed that the concept, tactics, and 
centrality of Jihaad differs between the two groups as well. However, Turner states: 
 
         Salafi-jihadism[sic] is a religio-political ideology based on a fundamentalist  
         conceptualization of Islam that informs the actions of organizations like al- 
         Qaeda. It contains a broadly defined format for a political order that unifies  
         the Islamic peoples and governs them by a legitimate religious authority. It  
         promotes violence in all its forms as a means for achieving this objective”  
         (2014:11). 
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Turner, like many contemporary skeptics of Salafism, accepts Wiktorowicz’s 
classification of Salafism and posits that there are various strands of Salafism with 
Jihaadism being the most violent variant. Another academic known, for his strong 
stance against Salafism and calls for a reformation of its core principles, is El Fadl. 
In his exposition of Jihaadism, which he also contends is a trend in Salafism, he 
states: 
 
          Puritans believe that they are engaging in a defensive war at the current  
          time, not an offensive war. This has a rather odd result, because if it were  
          an aggressive war (or what is called, in Islamic law, a preemptive war), at  
          least the puritans could not commit violence unless they first gave  
          Westerners the option of becoming Muslim. Since, however, puritans  
          believe that they are waging a defensive war, the need for such notice  
          does not exist nor restrain them (2007:232). 
 
By failing to distinguish between Salafees and Jihaadees, and their differing 
methodological approaches to Jihaad by classifying them together, El Fadl 
denigrates Salafees, whose primary focus is da’wa. Also, the very method he 
advocates as the appropriate approach as a precedent to inevitable conflict, da’wa, 
is in compliance with the Salafee manhaj. Even Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhaab, 
whose Jihaad is full of controversy, was known according to some sources to begin 
with propagation. If communities were resistant to the message due to ignorance or 
arrogance “he taught that the appropriate response to such a situation was to read 
to the erring individual the Quranic [sic] verses appropriate to the situation, to 
provide concrete evidence as to why the behavior was wrong. Only if the person 
then refused to behave appropriately did fighting become appropriate” (Delong-Bas 
2010:201). In another illustration of his failure to discern the Salafee manhaj from 
that of takfeerees and Jihaadees, El Fadl states: 
 
          The disagreements between puritans and moderates are very deep and  
          profound in all matters related to warfare, jihad [sic], and terrorism. The  
          disagreements relate to the sanctity and value placed on life and to what  
          kind of example God wants Muslims to set before humanity. They relate to  
          whether there is an open, never-ending state of war between Islam and  
          non-Muslims, and at what cost this war may be fought (2007:233-234). 
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El Fadl classifies puritans (i.e. Salafees and Jihaadee-takfeerees) into the same 
category, however, he rightly suggests that there is a fundamental difference in how 
moderates and puritans read and interpret the Qur’an.75 He states, “Basically, the 
difference in attitude between moderates and puritans has to do with the 
relationship of Islam to power. Puritans believe that for Islam to be victorious, 
Muslims need to conquer and subjugate others” (2007:245).  As was noted in 
chapter two that Salafees, as the evidence alludes to, do not harbor aspirations to 
vanquish the world; therefore, their da’wa activities differ drastically from the global 
Jihaadists, whom El Fadl’s assessment more accurately characterizes. El Fadl’s 
statement highlights the problem of overgeneralized typology. Furthermore, other 
academics like Hegghammer expound: 
 
          Many of the theological descriptors commonly used in literature on  
          Islamism, such as Salafi, wahhabi, jihadi Salafi, and takfiri [sic], do not  
          correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behavior among  
          Islamists…it makes no sense to speak of a ‘Salafi [sic] social movement’,  
          for the simple reason that actors labeled Salafi [sic] have widely different,  
          often diametrically opposing, political agendas (Hegghammer 2011:5).  
 
Hegghammer believes these categorizations (Salafee, takfeeree) are useful as 
classifications, which denote theological orientations, rather than political 
alignments, which suggests that manhaj and political objectives, do differ between 
the various groups, and this is one of the main reasons Salafees take exception to 
these externally typified classifications. According to Seth Jones, “a group is 
defined as Salafi-jihadist [sic] based on two criteria. First, the group emphasizes the 
importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. 
Second, the group believes that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn [sic] (a personal religious 
duty)” (Jones 2014:21).  
 																																																								
75 El Fadl’s characterization of Puritans differs with that of Wiktorowicz, who defines tham as being 
essentially apolitical and concerned primarily with matters of worship. He states, “The bonding of the 
theologies of Wahhabism [sic] and Salafism produced a contemporary trend that is anchored in 
profound feelings of defeatism, alienation… not only from the institutions of power of the modern 
world, but also from the Islamic heritage and tradition” (2007:95). He also defines modernists as a 
particular group (that) deals with the challenges of modernity while others are reactionary-living in 
the past or seeking to return to the past” “(2007:16). 
	 155	
ISIS and the Saudi State 
 
Another factor that contributes to the improper categorization of Salafism, is the 
frequent comparison, by both critics and extremists, between the movement of 
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and ISIS’s declaration of an Islamic state. Some 
critics like Bunzel compare between ISIS’s acquisition of territory and the 
establishment of the first Saudi state. “In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the 
Wahhabi [sic] heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis [sic] advanced an 
exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a 
state that waged expansionary jihad [sic] against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed 
Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters” (Bunzel 2016:1). This 
association between the establishment of the Saudi state and groups like ISIS and 
al-Qaeda has infuriated the Salafee clerical establishment in Saudi Arabia, which 
have reacted by authoring a plethora of books and treatises defending the manhaj 
of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and his movement. In addition, they dedicate 
numerous books and issue verdicts distancing the Salafee da’wa from the 
murderous ideology of takfeeree groups as was elucidated in chapter two. 
Furthermore, even some non-Muslim academics find the claims made by 
academics like Bunzel dubious and lacking solid factual data. “Although historical 
and contemporary discussions of Wahhabis [sic] and the Wahhabi [sic] movement 
tend to assume that whatever violence Wahhabis have engaged or currently 
engage in is due to an interpretation of Islam that emphasizes jihad [sic] as holy war, 
this vision is inconsistent with both the historical record and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
writings” (Delong-Bass 2010:201). This statement emphasizes the importance of 
reviewing and analyzing the writings of Salafee scholars before making general 
assertions to disparage the movement.  
  
Bunzel alleges that ISIS attempts to replicate the establishment of the original 
Saudi state, “an example of an Islamic state that spread tawhid [sic] via military 
conquest, killed the heretics standing in its way, and posited no boundaries to its 
expansion. The Islamic State is not wrong to see much of itself in the historical first 
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Saudi-Wahhabi [sic] state, a radical, expansionary state whose interpretation of 
Islam was condemned as fanatical” (Bunzel 2016:6). Assertions like this have found 
their way into the academic mainstream, which makes it very difficult for Salafees to 
untarnish their da’wa. According to Bunzel, ISIS has listed in its online publications 
numerous detailed comparisons between the two movements; one such publication 
concludes, “the Islamic State is an extension of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
mission [dawa] [sic] and state [dawla] [sic] —the first Saudi state” (2016:9). ISIS 
and other takfeeree groups are quick to denounce the Saudi regime as apostates, 
while at the same time claiming they are the flag bearers of the message. “The 
mainstay of the resemblance, according to the pseudonymous author, is both states’ 
determination “to fight shirk in all its forms” and to “implement Islamic law 
immediately upon seizing territory" (Bunzel 2016:9). ISIS claims to draw on ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhaab’s movement and writings as inspiration and justification for their 
massacres, which according to Salafee scholars, is an inaccurate assertion. “Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab [sic] engaged in a more positive and inclusive approach of dialogue 
and discussion geared toward reconciliation and cooperation whenever possible. 
Fighting became an option only if the enemy refused both conversion and a treaty 
relationship with the Muslims” (Delong-Bas 2010:201). While acknowledging that 
this claim of Delong-Bas’s, might be considered by some as being embellished, it 
shows that the complexity of ascertaining historical data is not without its 
challenges. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, after speaking about some polytheistic practices 
that had become prevalent during his time, states, “This is what we call people to 
and fight them about. After we supply them with evidence from the Book of Allah 
and Sunna of His Messenger (saw), and the consensus of the Salaf” (al-‘Aasimee 
2012:1/58). Even Bunzel admittedly concludes that there are manhaj and creedal 
differences between the current Saudi state and that of ISIS. Bunzel, a vehement 
critic of Salafism, says, “Other features of the Islamic State’s ideology—from the 
declaration of a caliphate to the use of extraordinary violence to the group’s 
apocalyptic fervor—do not find a mainstream Wahhabi [sic] precedent” (Bunzel 
2016:1). While ISIS in particular refers back to many Salafee sources, as well as 
takfeeree manifestos its da’wa and methodology are highly politicized and oriented 
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towards uncompromisingly violent distortions of Salafee concepts. For example, 
The Salafee da’wa rests on a vastly different premisis to that of ISIS and many 
other jihaadee groups regarding leadership. Salafees believe that righteous 
leadership is established by learning, preaching, and implementing monotheistic 
concepts, with the inevitable result of reforming society, establishing sharee’a and 
guided Muslim leadership. Essentially Salafees take a more pacifist bottom up 
approach to establishing calipha or what they deem as acceptable Muslim 
leadership. They also hold that all Muslim leadership should be obeyed in 
righteousnous, even if the system is not completely sharee’a compliant, as was 
illustrated previously. Another important observation regarding Salafees’ differing 
approach distinguishing it from ISIS and other groups that aspire to have calipha is 
that Salafees view leadership as a means to establishing Islamic law and order, and 
that it is an important goal, but not the overall objective of da’wa. Al-Albanee states: 
 
          Those callers want to reach the ultimate aim, which is to implement 
          the rule of Allah on earth, renew the righteous calipha after the former  
          one, and all Muslims agree that it is an obligation to establish. However, 
          they differ over the means. Us Salafees, agree with their goal; however,  
          we disagree with their means. Our means is that it requires beneficial  
          knowledge, and righteous deeds. Beneficial knowledge is that which stems  
          from the book of Allah and the hadeeth of the Messenger of Allah (saw)  
          (2010:2/221). 
 
To further illustrate how Salafees’ tactics differ form ISIS’s violent methods al-
Shanqeetee states regarding the Qur’an verse 24:55, “’We shall grant them 
succession (leadership) in the earth’, that these verses show that obedience to 
Allah by beleiiving in Him, and doing righteous deeds are reasons for strength, 
succession, and authority on earth” (2005:5/553). This verse along with many other 
Qur’anic verses illustrates that the means for establishing leadership is proactive; 
however, it is based upon following the commands of Allah and worship, which in 
turn is rewarded by Allah through establishment and authority. Salafee 
interpretation and methodology often contradict the manhaj of violence and fear 
groups like ISIS uses to achieve its goals. Overall, Salafees prioritize da’wa, 
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knowledge, and worship as being intrinsic to their call with jihaad and calipha being 
means to establishing monotheism. 
 
ISIS’s tactics are not only distinct from Salafees and the movement of Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab, they are often regarded as even being more radical then al-
Qaeda. As chapter two illustrates one of the criticisms leveled by ISIS against al-
Qaeda is that they did not implement sharee’a when occupying territory and did not 
wage an aggressive enough campaign against the Shia. However, contemporary 
Saudi Arabia and the Salafee clerical establishment are far less hostile toward Shia 
in their rhetoric. To illustrate, Bin Baz mentions that although some of the Shia 
commit major disbelief by claiming to have knowledge of the unseen, and 
excommunicating most of the Companions “this does not prevent calling them to 
Allah, guiding them to the correct path, and warning them from their false beleifs” 
(2001:4/439). This shows that Salafees prefer to prosetylize rather than the 
violence so commonly associated with groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.  
 
Anti-Shiism 
 
Skeptics of Salafism, especially critics of the Saudi state, claim that Salafees and 
ISIS extremists both vilify Shi’a and incite violence against them. "Indeed, it is 
common practice for the Islamic State and its supporters to assert that their actions 
against the Shia [sic] are in accord with Wahhabi theology. They even maintain that 
their actions find sanction in the official teachings of the Saudi religious 
establishment" (Bunzel 2016:14). An example of the strong sentiment of the 
immediate successors to ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab is that of Shaikh Abaabutain (died 
1282 hijra). The Shaikh was asked if the Raafida Shi’a should be considered 
apostates or disbelievers by origin. He replied, “We have judged with disbelief those 
who prostrate to Hussain or supplicate to him or similar to this and were raised 
upon that (belief) then … the ruling of those people is they are original disbelievers, 
so their blood and wealth are lawful” (al-Tameemee 2017:179). These types of 
fataawaa illustrate the anti-Shia rhetoric prevalent during the early formation of the 
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Saudi state, and in more contemporary times due to a variety of factors, the rhetoric 
of the clerical establishment has toned down considerably; however, the economic 
and political factors which influence this change is outside the scope of this 
research. "The intrinsic anti-Shiism of Wahhabism [sic] poses a problem for Saudi 
religious scholars when it comes to condemning the Islamic State’s attacks in the 
kingdom. The group and its online supporters accuse these Saudi scholars, 
sometimes rightly, of backsliding and hypocrisy." (Bunzel 2016:14). The softening of 
rhetoric by Salafee scholars, especially in Saudi Arabia, does not come without a 
price: further loss of credibility before their detractors. Bunzel states: 
 
           These accusations can be rhetorically powerful. For example, a lengthy 
           Islamic State video from July 2015 features Saudi fighters in Aleppo  
           Pointing out contradictions in the scholars’ statements. “A short time ago,”  
           one of the Saudis in the video says, “the scholars of the Al Salul [sic] were  
           excommunicating the Rejectionists, indeed excommunicating the  
           generality of them.... They excommunicated them, but when the caliphate  
           fought them . . . they issued condemnations (Bunzel 2016:14). 
 
So, the question could be posited: is ISIS’s ultra-literal readings of the texts and 
fataawaa of the Imaams of da’wa appropriate for understanding the contexts of 
those texts, or have contemporary Salafees not remained true to the message of 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab and his condemnation of the Shia? It appears that the former 
is more consistent with the data presented thus far, and that ISIS is an extreme 
aberration of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhaab’s da’wa. ISIS is extreme, and their methodology 
of interpretation decontextualizes core texts, thus distorting Islam as a faith in 
general, and more specifically the Salafee da’wa.  
 
Internal Polemics  
 
Salafees have also experienced internal splits due to differences over how to 
respond to the Houthi Shia coup in Yemen. The recent rebellion of the Houthi 
militias in Yemen has exacerbated tensions between some Yemeni Salafee 
scholars and some of the well-known scholars in Medina, Saudi Arabia. Some of 
the major successors of Shaikh Muqbil bin Haadee like Shaikh Muhammad al-
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Imaam, Shaikh Muhammad al-Wasaabee, and Shaikh ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mar’ee 
supported a truce and cessation in hostilities with the Houthis citing the harm that 
would come to the Salafee da’wa if they fought or resisted the Houthis. In addition, 
Shaikh al-Imaam was forced in a publicized declaration to acknowledge the Houthis 
as ‘Muslim brothers’, which infuriated scholars like al-Jaabiree in Medina. Shaikh al-
Jaabiree’s position was that the Houthi aggression necessitated Jihaad, and Shaikh 
al-Imaam had compromised the da’wa, and he even went as far as questioning his 
Islam, which has caused a major rift between the majority of Salafee scholars in 
Yemen and a few well-respected scholars in Medina. However, this researcher has 
been in contact with many students in Yemen and recently one returning from 
Yemen to Saudi Arabia, who stated that Salafees can teach and continue regular 
activities and are largely left alone by Houthis in the capital city where they focus 
their enmity towards institutes and mosques hosted by Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen. This 
illustrates the maslaha (benefit) and preservation of the da’wa that the Yemeni 
scholars were attempting to achieve. However, some of the most vocal critics of the 
truce comes from individuals like Shaikh Arafat al-Muhammadee who stated: 
 
          Previously I was asked about the Brotherhood and Living Together Pact,  
          which was concluded between Shaikh Muhammad al-Imaam and the  
          Hoothi Rawaafidh (Shi'a). So I responded with what Ahlus Sunnah, the  
          Salafis [sic], believe after consulting with the People of Knowledge. Then,  
          while Ahlus Sunnah were waiting for Shaikh Muhammad to return (to the  
          truth) and publicly declare it, he (instead) affirmed (the pact) …And he was  
          guiding the people to it! And he was enumerating its benefits! And he was  
          praising the advantages of it.... (al-sughayyirah.files.wordpress.com  
          2015:5). 
 
Shaikh Rabee’a al-Madkhalee claims, while acknowledging al-Imaam’s cognizance 
of the implications of the pact: 
 
          And he knows much about their deviance. And I believe that he knows the  
          falsehood of this agreement – which does a disservice to the Sunna and  
          its people and by which they are offended to the highest level, and which  
          they reject with the greatest rejection, and which their enemies are pleased  
          with and use it as a jumping off point to slander the Salafis [sic] in general  
          and their aqeedah [sic] and manhaj so that they have begun to accuse  
          them of having brotherhood with the shi'a. And they have declared  
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          Muhammad al Imaam a disbeliever due to this pact and they have started  
          to insinuate takfeer [sic] of the Salafis [sic] due to it (al- 
          sughayyirah.files.wordpress.com 2015:3). 
 
Shaikh al-Jaabiree states, “So the question here is: how could the brother 
Muhammad sign this oppressive, sinful pact while this pact maintains that the 
Houthis are Muslims, believers, as they have published in their pact the statement 
of the Most High, ‘Only the Believers are brothers’” (al-
Sughayyirah.files.wordpress.com 2015:5). 
 
All of these scholars are aware of the concept of being forced as a principle that 
prohibits making takfeer of an individual (Green 2009). Allah states, “Whoever 
disbelieved in Allah after his belief, except him who is forced thereto and whose 
heart is at rest with faith; but such as open their breasts to disbelief, on them is 
wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a great torment” (1996 16:106). Ibn Katheer 
explains, “The scholars agree that it is permissible to display love for disbelief while 
the heart remains upon (faith)” (cited in al-Rehailee 2008:261). Also, Ibn ‘Arabee 
(explainer of Qur’an), states, “As for disbelief in Allah, then this is permissible for 
him: one who is forced to utter disbelief and there is no disagreement about this, 
with the condition that his heart is firm in faith” (cited in Sinaanee 2016:211). It 
appears that al-Imaam was not given the benefit of the doubt for sharing the 
Salafee manhaj, and previously authoring books that refuted the Shia creed and 
Houthi movement. Perhaps a greater appreciation and critical analysis of the 
circumstances he was faced with may have allowed his critics to envision the 
greater benefit achieved by signing the pact. Even his critics admitted they are 
aware that he knows the falsehood of the pact, but instead they do not evaluate this 
perceived error considering his general well-known established position regarding 
the Houthis. Some of the major Salafee scholars have acknowledged that the 
scholars of Yemen know best their situation and view the fatwa, and language 
contained therein in light of this fact. These differences over practical application of 
a rudimentary Salafee position illustrates how ijtihaad over contemporary issues 
differs from scholar to scholar, but it does not always have to result in divisions, but 
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unfortunately this sometimes is the case.76  
 
Wiktorowicz’s Typology 
 
Although divisions do occur between groups of Salafees, like in the case of the 
Yemeni scholars, Salafees can never acquiesce to the idea that Salafism is multi-
stranded, instead they see themselves and their movement as unified and that one 
is either a Salafee or non-Salafee. The primary reason why the concept of a 
Salafee typology is unacceptable to Salafees is because fragmentation calls into 
question Salafee claims of orthodoxy, legitimacy, and authenticity. To Salafees the 
diverse political discourse and outcomes of that discourse, between groups that are 
classified as Salafee by their critics does not translate to a common manhaj as was 
demonstrated in chapter one. 
 
Nevertheless, one of the most renowned academic proponents of this view is 
Quintan Wiktorowicz whose classification of Salafism has been cited by numerous 
academics since its publication. When referring to the methodology of Salafees, 
Wiktorowicz states, “Salafis [sic] like to approach the process of applying religious 
principles to contemporary issues and problems as though it is a scientific 
enterprise governed by the hard laws of nature (in this case divinity)” (2005:8).  
 
One of the main criticisms of Wiktorowicz’s view is that it does not accurately 
describe Salafism as a movement and is an overgeneralization that includes 
political trends universally rejected by Salafees because of contradictions in 
methodology and key core principles. The criterion and conditions for determining 
whether one is Salafee or not, are detailed extensively in Salafee literature; 
however, many academics seem to associate diverse actors with the Salafee 
manhaj as a result of being unaware of these criterion. Wiktorowicz’s work is often 																																																								
76 Ijtihaad refers to the rigorous effort of a scholar of jurisprudence to obtain a sharee’a ruling based 
upon conviction or certainty. This should not be confused with the concept of bid’a, which often 
contradicts an establishd text by innovating a belief or action of worship. Ijtihaad is in areas that were 
not explicit in the divine texts.   
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referenced due to its early analysis of Salafism after the September 11th terrorist 
attack on the Twin Towers in New York. After that event, academics, governments, 
and intelligence agencies began to research and scrutinize groups like al-Qaeda, 
and the broad consensus amongst Western academics pointed to Salafism as the 
ideology behind this new strain of radicalism. A synopsis of Wiktorowicz’s argument 
is that Salafees make up a diverse community of political and apolitical actors who 
hold various views regarding issues such as takfeer, jihaad, issues regarding 
jurisprudence, and that they are incredibly fragmented with issues of 
intercommunity and intracommunity conflict. Wiktorowicz like many of his 
successors holds that what separates violent political actors from apolitical ones 
has more to do with interpretive discourse and contextualization of the core Islamic 
texts, than belief and manhaj.  
 
As was previously mentioned, according to Wiktorowicz’s classification, Salafees 
can be divided into three branches: purists, politicos, and Jihaadees. This 
observation made by Wiktorowicz has been used by many academics to describe 
Salafism and its apparent schisms. “Salafism has one of the closest ideological 
resemblances to ‘jihadi’ [sic] discourses; hence the reason behind extremists’ 
alleged subscription to the former” (Baker 2009:133). For the purpose of this 
research a comparison of the various theories of Jihaad has been discussed in 
chapters one and two and the concept of takfeer will now be looked at in 
accordance with Wiktorowicz’s observations to analyze his evaluation of how some 
of the key strands apply the principles of takfeer according to his typology. 
Wiktorowicz mentions, “If all Salafis [sic] agreed that the Saudi rulers have replaced 
the sharia [sic], are not coerced, understand that they are being un-Islamic, and 
implement non-Islamic law because they no longer believe in Islam, they would 
unite in condemning them as apostates (although some would still weigh the 
consequences for Muslims and whether takfir [sic] would create a lesser or greater 
evil” (2005:25). 
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From Wictorowicz’s critiques two main issues become apparent: diversity in 
Salafism and differences in applicability of takfeer. According to Wiktorowicz 
Salafees are a diverse community divided into three categories: purists, politicos, 
and jihaadists. As been stated previously, this typology does not exist according to 
Salafee claims. Wiktorowicz’s argument confirms that there is broad diversity on a 
wide range of issues between the groups he has designated as Salafee. Keeping 
that in mind, this divergence should be sufficient to recognize that these different 
approaches are in fact manhaj issues, making it implausible to classify these 
strands, as he asserts, in one category due to the many policy implications of doing 
so. Divergent tactics, and application of the principles of Jihaad, for instance, show 
that these groups even contain differing goals.  
 
The second issue worth highlighting is Wiktorowicz’s mention of principles of 
takfeer. There are two main observations that need scrutiny here: if the principles of 
takfeer were really the same then there should be similar outcomes, also, as a 
matter of methodology, takfeerees do not actually excuse those who misapply the 
sharee’a nor do they apply the same principles as Salafees, instead their 
understanding is that all governments are illegitimate except for the territories they 
govern. Baker, a Salafee academic, is critical of Wiktorowicz’s typology questioning 
it’s a validity as an instrument to categorize Salafism. He states, “To generally 
categorize them as belonging to one and the same group, each being situated at 
different ends of an imaginary spectrum is to obfuscate parameters between 
movements that have been polemical in their opposition to violent extremism and 
those seeking to justify it” (2009:138-139). 
 
In Defense of the Salafee Manhaj 
 
Salafees have found themselves on the defensive due to their numerous detractors 
and the association of Salafism with ‘radical Islam’. Some of the more 
contemporary scholarship calls into question the previous assumptions made by 
many academics and the media that posits a direct link between Salafism and 
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extremist thought. Even some scholars and researchers have begun to counter 
those assumptions and offer different narratives and this research aims to be a part 
of that growing body of literature. Some of the more research-based approaches 
based on real world case studies show that Salafism can be a counter force to 
extremism. Baker concludes, “that the continuing usage of inaccurate terminologies 
and typologies to define and categorize Salafis [sic] and takfeeris [sic] as one and 
the same entity, serve only to isolate and stigmatize the former movement who 
have, thus far, proved among the more effective in countering the takfeeri [sic] 
ideology” (2009:17). Other studies suggest, like that of Lambert’s, that Salafees can 
be effective partners in combatting extremism. Contrary to the claims of critics 
“MCU offices assessed it to be misleading and counterproductive to endorse the 
stereotyping, profiling, and conflating of Salafis [sic] with al-Qaeda terrorism. The 
fact that al-Qaeda terrorists adapt and distort Salafi [sic] approaches to Islam does 
not mean that Salafis [sic] are implicitly linked to terrorism or extremism, still less 
that individual Salafis [sic] are likely to be terrorists or extremists” (Lambert 
2013:32). Lambert chronicles the experience of the Muslim Contact Unit, a police 
initiative to establish partnerships with the Muslim community in London to deal with 
extremists in the UK. He concludes after numerous encounters with both 
Takfeerees and Salafees that Salafism is not a part of the problem, but rather can 
counter the extremist groups in both rhetoric and direct confrontation. Lambert’s 
practical experience in counter-terrorism shows that convoluting Salafees with 
extremists does very little to assist in counter-terrorism efforts, instead it can be 
counter-productive hampering efforts to build relationships with those best suited to 
challenge extremist ideology. After being posed the question, is Quietist Salafism 
the antidote to ISIS, Mubin Shaikh responded by mentioning moderates have little 
influence of legitimacy in the eyes of radicalized youth, so Salafees, who speak the 
language of the Jihaadists, can better counter them and provide them with more 
constructive alternatives to extremism (McCants and Shaikh 2015). Another 
academic, Farid Senzai, concurs with Shaikh’s analysis; however, he adds that 
intervention strategies by Western governments, especially, to modernize or 
secularize Salafees can play into the hands of extremists either serving to radicalize 
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Salafees or undermine their credibility (McCants and Senzai 2015). These 
approaches to counter-terrorism and extremism will be explored further in chapter 
four. Still others like Bokhari argue Salafism is fragmented and accepts 
Wiktorowcz’s classification. He believes the Jihaadists like ISIS and al-Qaeda are 
outgrowths of un-Islamic behavior of the Saudi regime. He argues that basically the 
regimes actions have caused a split in Salafism with some Quietist’s remaining 
loyal to the regime and the other major trend is the Jihaadists who choose to revolt 
and oppose the regime violently. In this synopsis, he argues that the electoral or 
politicos are best suited to counter Jihaadists if more democratically viable 
conditions become present in Arab states (McCants and Bokhari 2015).   
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the most damning criticism of Salafism, according to its modernist critics, is 
that it is built upon a myth of the glory of the past, fails to address the needs of the 
greater Muslim community, and looks to the past to solve contemporary problems 
and issues. These detractors of Salafism criticize Salafees for methodological 
reasons claiming that their methodology is antiquated and inept in addressing 
contemporary issues and the problems of modernism. According to these critics, 
this ineptitude results in stagnancy and a stifling of Muslim progress. Salafees 
counter argue that by looking to the past, Muslims can gain insight into the future 
and make use of past wisdom. Also, that by adhering to the past they are taking a 
more faith-based approach to the future: showing faith in Allah and the sacred texts, 
which provide evidence for their success. Salafees often cite the hadeeth in which 
the Prophet (saw) said, "There won't cease to be a group from my nation who 
remains on the truth until the hour is established" (Muslim 1999: 7/184). In addition, 
this methodology of approaching the future preserves the religion, manhaj, and 
principles of the Salaf from corruption and deviation from orthodoxy. There are 
stern warnings in both the Qur’an and Sunna admonishing the believers for 
following the way of the Jews and Christians, who according to the Qur'an, went 
astray and choose to follow their whims over orthodoxy (al-Tha’labee 2015:2/467).  
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 Another argument advanced by critics of Salafism is that Salafism is the root of 
extremist takfeeree ideology, which exhorts its adherents to violence spawning 
groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Shabaab. From the Salafee perspective, the 
critics have no merits as Salafees reject takfeeree-jihaadee ideology and differ in 
both manhaj and objectives. In addition, authentic Salafee communities do not 
produce, encourage, or recruit these types of individuals. Lambert’s experience 
offers empirical evidence showing that Salafees can not only be a force to counter 
extremists, but also, in some cases be partners in counter terrorism efforts (2013). 
 
Finally, this chapter surveyed some of the critics of Salafism and the arguments 
they advanced. This chapter also contained an analysis of Wiktorowicz’s 
classification of Salafism into three categories and some of the implications of this 
categorization and observations regarding it. This was done to challenge existing 
conventions and models that constrain discourse around Salafism its exclusivity 
and propensity for violence. The chapter ended by chronicling some of the counter 
arguments of Salafees and found that their arguments generally addressed their 
critics’ censures.  
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Chapter Four: Salafee Perceptions of Western Societies 
 
Introduction 
 
Democracy as a political system is highly contested by both Muslim and non-
Muslim proponents. Salafees, to say the least, are highly suspicious of democracy 
and any political system that they perceive to be in contradiction to Islam. In 
addition, they are highly skeptical of the integrity of an electoral system. Al-
‘Uthaimeen states: 
 
          Those who call to democracy in the West and around the world do not  
           implement it. They are liars! Even their elections involve rigging and      
           deception. They only consider their whims important. In Islam, when  
           the informed decision makers agree upon allegiance to an Imaam, then  
           he becomes Imaam regardless of whether the laypersons agree or not  
           (1998:2/148).  
 
He further claims that by allowing mass participation people will always differ 
leading to discord, and that most people are neither duly informed nor capable of 
participating in the process of governance. Another argument advanced by Salafee 
scholars is that voting and democratic processes have no precedence in Islamic 
history. They claim voting contradicts the means of choosing a leader and Islamic 
governance. Salafees, as a rule, contest democracy citing that as a political system 
it is ruling by other than divine law, thus a gross violation of Allah’s sovereignty, 
which in turn constitutes a type of disbelief (Green 2009). Al- ‘Uthaimeen’s criticism 
of democracy is not simply a critique of the perceived corruption of democracy or its 
inadequate implementation, but rather an attack on its core tenets.  
 
In this chapter Salafees’ perception of democracy, pluralism, and how they perceive 
their role as Muslim minorities in Western countries will be explored. An often-cited 
characteristic of extremist ideology is that it is severely critical of democratic ideas 
and pluralism, which can cause academics and policy pundits to link Salafees with 
extremist thought and violent behavior. However, by examining Salafee critiques of 
these concepts and assessing their behavior in light of this premise, it is hoped to 
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highlight that despite Salafees’ disdain for democracy as a system this does not 
translate into violent extremism or the increased propensity to commit violence. 
Democracy, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, is a terminology that 
denotes both an ideology and system, referring to a  
 
          universally recognized ideal as well as a goal, which is based on  
          common values shared by peoples throughout the world community  
          irrespective of…differences. It is thus a basic right of citizenship to be  
          exercised under conditions of freedom, equality, transparency and  
          responsibility, with due respect for the plurality of views, and in the  
          interest of the polity (1998:8). 
  
Democracy as a political system refers to a system that is responsive to the general 
will of the people. Some of the main characteristics or tenets of democracy being 
free and fair elections with the ability to choose and replace government, active 
participation of citizenry, human rights, and rule of law with individual protections 
(1998). It is believed that through the implementation of democracy and the 
reinforcement of its institutions that certain liberties will be protected resulting in the 
consent of the governed, responsive leaders, and minorities being protected equally 
under the law. In addition, the citizenry of a democratic state should be allowed free 
thought, religious freedom, and freedom of the press. Beetham observes in the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union report, that “what justifies our calling these institutions 
democratic is not merely a matter of convention, but of the contribution they make 
to the realization of these underlying principles” (1998:33).  Based upon these 
principles it is easy to see why Salafee scholars might reject democracy due to their 
literalist conservative approach to the divine texts and rejection of any ideas that 
they perceive as un-Islamic. The United Nations Economic Social Council states 
that democracy: 
 
          in its ideal sense is the notion that ‘the people’ should have control of  
          the government ruling over them. This ideal is pursued by implementing  
          a system of voting such that the majority of people rule, either directly  
          or indirectly through elected representatives. Democracies may be  
          ‘liberal’, where fundamental rights of individuals in the minority are  
          protected by law, or they may be ‘illiberal’ where they are not.  
          Democracy is often implemented as a form of government in which  
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          policy is decided by the preference of the real majority (as opposed to a  
          partial or relative majority of the demos/citizens) in a decision-making  
          process, usually elections or referenda, open to all” (2006:1).  
 
The rationale for analyzing the concept of a liberal democracy in this research as 
opposed to the variant models of democratic states is because the parameters of 
this research primarily deal with the experiences of Muslim minorities in Western 
democracies, more specifically Muslims in the UK and United States.   
  
Islam and Democracy  
 
Muslim proponents of democracy cite a variety of different arguments to 
substantiate democracy, from shuraa (consultation), to broad principles of justice 
and respect for human dignity as espoused in the Qur’an.  However, many Muslim 
proponents of democracy do acknowledge that there are inherent tensions within 
the merger of these two systems. El Fadl details the conundrum posed by 
democracy as a system in contrast to the sharee’a system by stating:  
 
          For Islam, democracy poses a formidable challenge. Muslim jurists  
          have argued that law made by a sovereign monarch is illegitimate  
          because it substitutes human authority for God’s sovereignty. But law  
          made by sovereign citizens faces the same problem of legitimacy. In  
          Islam, God is the only sovereign and the ultimate source of legitimate  
          law. How, then, can a democratic conception of the people’s authority  
          be reconciled with an Islamic understanding of God’s authority?  
          (2004:4). 
 
El Fadl believes that reconciling these fundamental tensions requires vision, and 
the will power of Muslims moral commitment to reexamine the texts for 
contemporary solutions. These assertions of El Fadl are built upon the less 
restrictive interpretive discourse used by moderates and progressives, and their 
efforts to contextualize and deconstruct the divine texts to open the possibility of 
democracy or a democratic system within Islamic constructs. He states, “But 
Muslims, for whom Islam is the authoritative frame of reference, can arrive at the 
conviction that democracy is an ethical good, and that the pursuit of this good does 
not require abandoning Islam” (2004:5). This highlights the acknowledged tension 
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between the two systems. Furthermore, it suggests El Fadl’s very liberal approach 
to the Qur’an, which as a method is much more accommodating than the literalist 
interpretation; however, in this researcher’s view, as a methodology it departs from 
orthodoxy and the intended meaning of the divine texts. Esposito and Voll also 
acknowledge the tensions of Islamic heritage and democracy. “The two processes 
are contradictory and competitive only if ‘democracy’ is defined in a highly restricted 
way and is viewed as possible only if specific Western European or American 
institutions are adopted, or if important Islamic principles are defined in a rigid and 
traditional manner” (1996:21). Essentially, Esposito and Voll are claiming that due 
to underlying contradictions between an Islamic state and a democratic one it 
requires altering Islamic interpretive discourse to accommodate democratic tenets. 
Even the most ardent Muslim proponents of democracy acknowledge this tension to 
some degree. El Fadl states in his endorsement for democracy: 
 
          Although Muslim jurists debated political systems, the Qur’an itself does  
          not specify a particular form of government. But it does identify a set of  
          social and political values that are central to a Muslim polity. Three  
          values are of particular importance: pursuing justice through social  
          cooperation, and mutual assistance (49:13, 11:119); establishing non- 
          autocratic consultative method of governance; and institutionalizing  
          mercy and compassion in social interactions (6:12, 6:54, 21:107, 27:77,  
          29:77, 29:51, 45:20). So all else being equal, Muslims today ought to  
          endorse the form of government that is most effective in helping them  
          promote these values (2004:5). 
 
Most modernists approach Islam and the sacred texts with very broad-based 
analysis highlighting general precepts and moral values from the Qur’an. One 
problem with this approach is it ignores many specific texts in preference to general 
tenets, thus ignoring the real intent and definitions detailed by those specific texts. 
For example, under the guise of pursuing justice through social cooperation some 
modernists justify interfaith worship services and mutual proselytizing. Others 
believe that cooperation with non-Muslims does not require compromising religious 
tenets, but rather emphasizing commonalities (El Fadl 2005). Salafees, on the other 
hand, consider this to be an unequivocal violation of al-wala’a wa al-bara’a, a 
prerequisite of tawheed, thus denoting disbelief. This is just one illustration of the 
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extreme dichotomy in interpretive discourse and methodological dissimilarities 
between Salafees and modernists showing how varying paradigms lead to vastly 
different understandings of Islam. El Fadl in his attempt to reconcile Islam and 
democracy states:  
 
          the values that emerge from the classical tradition, such as dignity,  
          liberty, the five protected interests, and the discourse against  
          subjugation and oppression, can be translated into a coherent set of  
          human rights for the modern age that emerge as natural extensions of  
          the Islamic heritage. These rights would bolster the principle of  
          democracy in Islam (2007:190). 
 
Even in the realm of fiqh modernists “search for lenient decisions that 
accommodate the challenges Muslim minorities face, as well as the elevation of 
individual needs to the rank of necessities and the broadening of the list of primary 
objectives of the shari’a [sic], which made it possible for wasitis [sic] to formulate 
lenient decisions with a shari’ [sic] framework” (Shavit 2015:8).77 This is not to 
suggest that Salafees do not seek to accommodate the needs of Muslim minorities; 
however, their approach is very restricted due to the constraints of literalism and 
maintaining what they perceive to be orthodoxy. The position taken by Salafees and 
more conservative adherents to Islam is one of general hostility towards democracy 
especially when it is imposed upon Muslim societies. In sum, Salafees see 
democracy as a post-colonial tool used to subjugate Muslims and change the 
Islamic creed by introducing secularism.   
 
          Within the Muslim world, conservative Muslim thinkers argued that  
          Islam and democracy were incompatible, because of first, the Islamic  
          concept of the absolute sovereignty of God – they believed that ideas of  
          the sovereignty of the people in a democracy contradicted this  
          fundamental principle; second, in Islam the law was defined and  
          promulgated by God and that God's law, the shari'a [sic], could not be  
          altered by elected parliaments; and third, the concept of parliaments as  
          sources of law was seen as blasphemous (Voll 2007:3). 
 
																																																								
77 The term wasiti is used by Shavit to reference a modernist as opposed to a literalist. 
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Another argument advanced by critics of ‘Islamic democracy’ and the use of 
general texts to accommodate new ideologies and systems is that of Muhammad 
Qutb, the brother of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Syed Qutb. Qutb states: 
 
          The Muslims understood from the first moment that the revelation was  
          cut off at the death of the Prophet (peace be upon him)-that they must  
          strive in order to face new forthcoming circumstances in which no  
          specific text from the Qur’an and Sunnah [sic] was sent down for. And that  
          did not make them restless nor did they stand confused in front of those  
          realities and at the same time they did not follow their desires  
          uncontrolled in search of what they deem-simply based upon desires-to  
          be maslaha (interest) in which through good is achieved. That is  
          because they firstly believed that the religion of Allah represented in the  
          Book of Allah and the Sunnah [sic] of the Prophet (peace be upon him)  
          is the absolute truth, and that is justice, and that it is the true maslaha in  
          this world and in the hereafter, and that in it solely guidance is found.  
          Either through an explicit text or through a principle drawn from it (Qutb  
          1994:160).  
 
 
Qutb alludes to the fact that compromise of core Islamic principles under the guise 
of attaining general benefit is unacceptable. In addition, by abstracting broad 
principles that are espoused in the Qur’an, even universally accepted ones, should 
not contradict core Islamic ethics. For example, many modernists use concepts like 
justice, cooperation, and freedom, all universally admirable principles, to support 
the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy. However, in the view of more 
traditional Muslims these values are defined and contextualized in the sharee’a by 
returning to the Qur’an, Sunna, and classical interpretations. Although Qutb was not 
Salafee, Salafee scholars share his concerns and arguments for rejecting 
democracy.  
 
In contrast, some moderates even claim that Islamic consensus is synonymous with 
democracy and that Islam demands a constitutional form of government based 
upon sharee’a. Other so-called moderates even call for full democracy without 
sharee’a constraints.  They claim, “God has delegated total authority to human 
beings to conduct their affairs according to their free will. God retains the right to 
reward or punish…” (2007:194). Much of El Fadl’s argument relies upon rationalism 
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and philosophical discourse, a radical departure from the Salafee view of literalism. 
According to El Fadl, some modernists argue “God is sovereign as far as the 
eternal law is concerned. Since the duty of human beings is to manage human law, 
and not external law, human beings are free to legislate as long as the legislation 
attempts to fulfill the eternal law” (2007:194). The proponents of this view concern 
themselves with overall general tenets of the sharee’a; however, this approach 
appears to neglect much of the specific texts that challenge, and even contradict 
their narrative. 
 
After analyzing various approaches to sharee’a implementation as advocated by 
moderates, El Fadl concludes, “that they all reject theocratic forms of government, 
and to various extents, they reject a model in which the state exists to enforce a 
Divine code of laws that is beyond human accountability of change… (moderates) 
believe that God speaks to the hearts of people, not their institutions” (2007:196). 
Institutions cannot represent the will of Allah according to those secularists; rather 
His will is articulated by the practice of the individual.  On the contrary, Salafees 
emphasize that those institutions are a part of Allah’s will and are there to support 
and strengthen both individual and society in accordance with sharee’a objectives. 
 
 To illustrate the differences in approach between the modernists and Salafees we 
look at the modernists’ presumptions. Modernists presume that all human beings 
have a right to dignity, liberty and that oppression is offensive to Allah. Salafees, on 
the other hand, argue that those precepts are to be defined and outlined within the 
context of the sharee’a.  For example, Salafees assert that true dignity emanates 
from faith, and liberty is not an absolute concept. Therefore, Islamic law and 
institutions restrict freedoms. Moreover, moderates and Salafees both concur that 
the Qur’an denounces oppression in the strongest terms; however, what Allah 
deems oppressive may not always coincide with man’s view. Due to an absence of 
a common definition of what constitutes oppression and tyranny Salafees and 
moderates arrive at divergent concepts of justice. El Fadl condemns theocracy as 
tyrannous, he states, “Importantly, the Qur’an soundly condemns this kind of 
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despotism and whimsical exercise of power and advises Muslims either to resist it, 
or if they are incapable of doing so, to desert such oppressive lands by migrating to 
countries that are more just and equitable” (2007:184). El Fadl’s statement 
suggests that modernists are not bound by the methodology of the Salaf, because 
after the Qur’an their main source of reference is their logic. Secondly, they use 
contemporary understandings of justice, and liberty instead of Qur’anic precepts.  
Thirdly, they interpret the divine texts in an unorthodox manner by justifying 
rebellion to change tyranny opposing the specific divine texts, hadeeth, and the 
narrations of the Salaf. They also justify hijra to non-Muslim lands under the guise 
of fleeing oppression correlating the experience of refugees and asylum seekers to 
the first hijra to Ethiopia, a Christian kingdom.  Some evidence suggests that a 
number of Muslim migrants to the West tend to be economically stable and well 
educated in their home country simply looking to forge new opportunities in the 
West (cis.org). 
 
In contrast, moderates contend that the Salafee approach to statehood is not in 
accordance with Allah’s will, but rather a man-made system usurping Allah’s 
sovereignty by enforcing a purist vision without spiritual substance.  This is their 
response to literalist conceptions of statehood that criticize democracy. “Importantly, 
moderates believe that Godliness cannot be achieved by a state commanding it to 
be so. Thus, when the state plays the role of an enforcer for God, the state ends up 
replacing God altogether, and this is an absolute absence of Godliness” (2007:196).  
This rather bold claim by El Fadl does not really give the correct synopsis of the 
Salafee approach to the state. For instance, Salafees make the argument that the 
state and its institutions are in place to strengthen the overall society and the 
individual in their quest for God fearfulness. Moreover, Salafees hold that those 
institutions serve both as the means to carry out Allah’s will and are mandated by 
revelation. For example, the establishment of prayer is mentioned as reported in 
Muslim, as one of the criterion for preventing revolution against a tyrannical leader 
(2000). This means that there is Islamic precedence for institutionalizing the 
enforcement of prayer, which falls upon both the individual and the state.   
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There are immense differences between Salafees and moderates regarding issues 
ranging from creed, manhaj, politics, and subsidiary issues, all giving rise to 
hostilities between them. Shaikh A’aidh al-Shamree states about Saudi liberals and 
moderates: 
 
          It is impossible for them to credit Salafees in their books, even though  
          they know Salafees are the ones who oppose takfeerees and terrorists,  
          and counter anyone who poses a threat to security in their country, and  
          they call people to preserve the oath of allegiance… However, they  
          never praise the Salafees because they oppose them in politics, creed,  
          and legislation (2016:28). 
 
The liberals Shaikh al-Shamree referred to were predominantly those who were 
oriented towards Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen in manhaj, and liberal socially, not pure 
secularists whom Salafees view as apostates. This highlights how individuals and 
groups both vary with regards to their understanding and practice. Therefore, a 
person or groups can have an ecclective manhaj making it difficult to ascribe them 
to one group or another. The Shaikh is pointing out how these divergent trends 
share some foundational principles of the Muslim Brotherhood in methodology, but 
tend to be more liberal on social issues. 
 
Paradigm shift: 
 
The contemporary rhetoric and current political climate has challenged many 
leaders across the ideological spectrum creating a push from regimes normally 
associated with authoritarianism to consider reforms more in line with democracy.  
There has been a noticeable shift in the rhetoric of many regimes that normally 
allow limited if any representation of their political constituencies, or do not tolerate 
opposition. Some have even responded by moving towards limited reforms offering 
more participation in the public sphere. Esposito and Voll observe, “The demand 
and desire for democracy is widespread in contemporary global affairs. Few major 
political leaders or movements describe themselves as ‘anti-democratic’” (1996:11). 
Due to this paradigm shift and push towards Western democratization, politically it 
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becomes unacceptable for some regimes not to recognize the demand for political 
reforms and pushes for more empowerment in this post-digital age. An example of 
pressures put on existing political systems and regimes is the ‘Arab Spring’ and the 
demand for more political space and reform. Much of the protest and call for 
democratization was organized through social media platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter.  Whole regimes were changed in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,  
Yemen, and now Sudan, as a result, in part, due to mass mobilization demanding 
political reform. “Democratization is the demand for empowerment in government 
and politics made by a growing portion of populations around the world” (Esposito 
and Voll 1996:13).  The push for socio-political change is even felt in countries like 
Saudi Arabia. The new leadership has taken a variety of steps to channel the 
pressures of the burgeoning youth crisis and placate potential political upheaval. By 
introducing several controversial reforms like the introduction of women into the 
Shura council, lifting the ban on women driving, and various proposals to open 
entertainment and tourist facilities it appears to some observers that there is a 
deliberate move to liberalize the society driven by new economic realities. In 
addition, there is a new challenge to the clerical establishment and a move away 
from traditional morays and a weakening of institutions Salafee clerics have for so 
long depended upon. These changes have not gone unchallenged, as some well-
known Salafee scholars have openly expressed in writings their opposition to some 
of these initiatives, while at the same time maintaining respect and allegiance to the 
Saudi government.  
 
Salafee Perspective 
 
To illustrate the Salafee disdain for democracy it is imperative to analyze some of 
their sermons and statements. Shaikh Saalih bin al-Fawzaan was asked about the 
Buddhist genocide of Rohingya Muslims currently taking place in Myanmar. He 
replied by saying not only is this war being waged against Muslims there, but in fact 
all over the world. He then proceeded to lambast democracy stating, “They call this 
democracy, when they enforce this ideology and system of disbelief upon us. This 
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is democracy and secularism” (www.alfawzan.net). It is not entirely clear why al-
Fawzaan answered by referencing democracy when asked about the Rohingya, but 
his statement demonstrates that leading Salafee clerics view democracy as 
imposing and hostile towards Islam. Democracy is seen as a foreign imperialistic 
system that is often forcibly administered against Muslim governments and 
populations with the aim of secularizing Muslim societies and rendering Islam 
impotent as a global power. The Shaikh’s response further indicates that Salafees, 
in general, are unwilling to engage democratic ideas and principles as they view 
them only in conspiratorial terms. In a high percentage of the Salafee lectures 
surveyed for this study the researcher found that lectures mentioning democracy, 
mostly referred to democracy as an ideology that simply refers to majority rule and 
connotes a threat to Allah’s sovereignty (Green 2009).  This evidence suggests 
Salafee scholars have a very univocal view of democracy and do not deem it 
necessary to engage its tenets through analysis as they view it as unequivocally 
heresy. Shaikh al-Waadi’ee mentions that voting specifically is an idolatrous 
practice that allows the informed and uniformed equal voice in determining the 
leader. He states, “Obtaining a leader is through God fearfulness, knowledge, good 
deeds, and da’wa to Allah, and preparation as much as possible” (1994:17).  
Shaikh al- ‘Abbaad states, “Obtaining a leader in a so-called democratic system is 
built on political partisanship… and those who obtain the most votes are put forward. 
This institution contradicts Islam and is imported by some Muslims from the 
enemies of Islam” (2004:87). Salafees criticize the authenticity of democracy and 
highlight the fact that many democratic societies in the West exalt values such as 
freedom and equality, but in fact have an abhorrent track record when it comes to 
minority rights and institutionalized racism.  In accordance with Salafees’ disdain for 
hizbeeya and blind partisanship it is no wonder that they detest democracy or any 
political system, which encourages rivalry, or competing political interests that may 
oppose Islamic objectives. 
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Pluralism 
 
Pluralism as a term denotes different meanings depending on the context it refers 
to. Essentially classical pluralism refers to the political process of competing interest 
groups ability to influence a given society’s policies and its allocation of resources, 
which are important components of a democratic system. In principle, Muslim 
minorities living in democratic societies benefit from the freedoms in such a system 
and are largely left alone to practice and propagate their faith and take a more 
political role in society if they so choose. Therefore, in a democratic society, due to 
its pluralistic nature, Muslims both Salafees and non-Salafees benefit from the 
liberties afforded them, even if some groups in principle do not support such a 
system. Under these circumstances, Salafees are more concerned with religious 
purity and the concept of religious pluralism as it relates within the Islamic faith: 
diverse groups competing for influence and defining the nature and priorities of the 
da’wa. Therefore, pluralism as it relates to religion refers to how diverse religions or 
denominations interact and coexist with one another in society. Some definitions 
include that this requires more than tolerance of other faiths, but even the 
acknowledgement of other truths.  As was stated previously, Salafees have little 
tolerance for intra-religious pluralism. For them this type of pluralism challenges 
orthodoxy and core religious texts, which clearly reject the plurality of belief, so for 
Salafees, religious pluralism constitutes a violation of the core religious objective of 
unity, because in their view, unity can only be substantiated if it is based upon a 
common creed and methodology. Nevertheless, others make the argument that: 
           
         intra-religious pluralism is certainly consistent with Islam and the Qu'ran  
         – at least in principle. No Muslim sects are defined in the Qur'an  
         because, as is well known, the division into Sunni and Shia sects came  
         about roughly 25 years after the death of the Holy Prophet and was  
         occasioned by the issue of succession to the caliphate. Muslims can  
         therefore legitimately argue that there is no room for sectarian conflict in  
         pristine Islam (Hoodbhoy 2011:3).  
 
In view of what has preceded, the researcher suggests that Salafees reject religious 
pluralism within the Islamic faith as they equate it with hizbeeya and conclude that it 
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is harmful to the purity of Islam. Moreover, Salafees see pluralism as a threat to a 
unified creed, a challenge to their narrative, and an overall aberration in the religion. 
Nevertheless, critics of Salafism like El Fadl claim, “the Qur’an does not completely 
exclude the possibility that there might be other paths to salvation. One component 
of this issue has to do with who might be entitled to God’s mercy.... In fact, the 
Qur’an expresses indignation at those who attempt to limit or apportion God’s 
mercy according to their wills or desires” (El Fadl 2007:216).78 The modernist 
perspective is that pluralism challenges stagnant ideas, encourages communal 
growth in keeping with the times, by illustrating the inherent fluidity of Islam. 
Salafees counter by demonstrating that Allah has made this distinction of who is 
deserving of His mercy and wrath. All throughout the Qur’an and Sunna there are 
verses and texts that unequivocally state that salvation comes through being a 
believer in Islam and that no other faith after the advent of the Prophet Muhammad 
(saw) would be acceptable to Allah.  However, with that being the case there is no 
suggestion that Salafees’ intolerance for intra-religious sectarianism leads to 
violence or violent behaviors, rather they restrict their resistance to partisanship to 
polemical debates. Furthermore, as the literature suggests there are ample 
examples in hadeeth literature that illustrate that sectarianism would be a challenge 
to orthodoxy after the death of the Prophet (saw). On the other hand, “moderates 
argue that the Qur’an not only accepts, but even expects, the reality of difference 
and diversity within human society” (Al Fadl 2007:207).  This claim seems to be 
inconsistent with the specific texts that Salafees often quote and the plethora of 
classical texts, which denounce sectarianism and religious heresy. El Fadl counters 
by stating, “Another intriguing aspect of the Qur’anic discourse is that it recognizes 
that plural religious convictions and laws might be legitimate” (2007:216).  
Recognizing the differences in textual analysis and interpretation is critical to 
understanding the vast array of opinions and rulings the various groups extrapolate 
																																																								
78 As mentioned previously, statements like these by progressives undescores their willingness to 
engage or even accept that there are potentially other paths to salvation, or spiritual inspiration, 
whether it be from Rastafarians like Bob Marley or entertainers like Bob Dylan (Safi 2003). This is 
the antithesis to the Salafee paradigm, and in fact most Muslims, and for Salafees these notions 
constitute heresy.  
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from the divine texts. The varying stances to pluralism taken by Salafees and 
moderates further illustrate how dissimilar their paradigms are. 
 
Secularism 
 
Aside from pluralism, another challenge posed by Western democracies for Muslim 
minorities is secularism. Western democracies differ with regards to their policies 
towards religion, tolerance, and multiculturalism. One example of a Western 
democratic country that enforces an aggressive policy of assimilation is France.  
Assimilation is a key pillar of French democracy and political culture as well as a 
part of its colonial legacy. France is also staunchly secular, tolerating religion only in 
the private sphere citing national cohesion as a more important objective than 
maintaining individual and religious identities.  “Outside France, this very offensive 
and militant laïcité is perceived as excessive, and even undemocratic since it 
violates individual freedom” (Roy 2007: xiii).  Although the US and many Western 
countries critique the French model, evidence suggests many of the same countries 
are discarding the model of multiculturalism and see it as a failure. These same 
democracies are reassessing their immigration policies, rolling back freedoms, and 
reanalyzing the French approach (Roy 2007).  The rise in Islamaphobia and relative 
inaction by some Western governments to debunk or pacify these trends has made 
Muslim minorities the target of violent hate crimes in many Western countries. The 
lack of willingness for many to challenge these ideas has also led to the 
scapegoating of Salafees (Roy 2007).   
 
Secularism is the belief that religion should have no role in the public domain and 
should be relegated to the personal sphere.  Most Muslims believe that secularism 
is fundamentally incompatible with Islam and that Islam is a complete way of life 
that governs the public and private sphere.79 Salafees believe secularism is the 																																																								
79 In accordance with the findings of this research modernists seek to reform Islamic institutions to fit 
contemporary times and circumstances, whereas secularists regulate religion to the private sphere. 
According to this premise most secularists are modernist; however, modernists may not necessarily 
be secular. 
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antithesis to Islam. Salafee scholars often lecture about the importance of Islamic 
law and values being implemented throughout all aspects of society, whereas 
secularism seeks to divorce religion from the public sphere. Salafees view 
secularism as one of the most dangerous modern ideologies to confront Islam and 
a logical extension of democracy. As was mentioned previously, Salafees believe 
the system of democracy, and in fact any non-Islamic system, is an affront to 
Allah’s sovereignty undermining the function of Islamic institutions by relegating 
religion to the private sphere. This, however, is not unique to Salafees.  Many other 
Islamic movements that contain a political orientation also view democracy as a 
threat and usurpation of Allah’s judgment and authority. In contrast, there are 
Muslims who advocate for a more secularist approach to Islam and for assimilation 
into Western society. Bernard asserts that the modernists approach to 
comprehending and interpreting Islam is much more compatible with Western 
democratic values and the West’s experience. “Modernism, not traditionalism, is 
what worked for the West. This included the necessity to depart from, modify, and 
selectively ignore elements of the original religious doctrine” (2003:37). From a 
Salafee perspective to neglect core aspects and tenets of the faith is tantamount to 
disbelief and heresy at the least. 
Bernard insists: 
 
           The Old Testament is not different from the Qur’an in endorsing  
           conduct and containing a number of rules and values that are literally  
           unthinkable, not to mention illegal, in today’s society. This does not  
           pose a problem because few people would today insist that we should  
           all be living in the exact literal manner of the Biblical patriarchs.  
           Instead, we allow our vision of Judaism’s or Christianity’s true message  
           to dominate over the literal text, which we regard as history and  
           legend. That is exactly the approach that Islamic modernists also  
           propose” (2003:37).  
 
Muslim Minorities 
 
Salafees as Muslim minorities face a whole series of different problems and 
challenges as compared to their counterparts living in a Muslim country. “The 
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experience of everyday life as a minority brings Muslims to develop practices, 
compromises, and considerations meant to cope with secularism that imposes itself 
on them” (Roy 2007: ix). Some examples of common challenges faced by Muslims 
in the West are social decadence, non-Muslim relatives that can exert pressures 
upon converts to revert from Islam, and un-Islamic environments that at times may 
pose challenges or even become hostile toward Islam.   
 
An additional challenge for Muslims in the West is that many Western societies 
have shifted towards a policy of promoting a “moderate Islam” which is an 
externally imposed reconstruction of the Islamic faith. These same governments, 
and those who advocate such policies, define what is considered extremist, 
fundamentalist, and what practices are considered unacceptable, and in turn control 
the debate about Islam and its place in Western society. 
  
          The denunciation of Muslim fundamentalism thus masks other targets  
          and other stakes. The label of ‘fundamentalism’, which is very useful for  
          polemics, is applied from the outside. When Muslims are called on to  
          adopt a reformed and liberal Islam, they are expected to situate  
          themselves in relation to analytical framework that has been prepared  
          for them without asking questions about the meaning of their practices  
          and the nature of choices involving their identity (Roy 2007:4). 
 
By framing Islamic activism or strict adherents of the faith as fundamentalists or 
extremists the media and policy pundits control the narrative and limit both the 
spectrum and religious activities of Muslim minorities. Some examples might be the 
imposition or restriction of certain dress like the hijaab in the public sphere or the 
condemnation of polygamy. Both practices and the practitioners of such rituals then 
move from being ostracized to becoming symbols of oppression and backwardness 
and labeled as extremist, thus furthering their move to being banned altogether with 
the state moving into the private religious sphere.  Some in the West even advocate 
an aggressive policy of divide and conquer to antagonize and oppose the 
fundamentalists while at the same time supporting direct policies to encourage and 
assist secularists. Bernard advocates discrimination between the various groups by 
encouraging "those with a greater affinity to modernism, such as the Hanafi [sic] law 
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school, versus others. Encourage them to issue religious opinions and popularize 
these to weaken the authority of backward Wahhabi-inspired [sic] religious rulings… 
(also) encourage the popularity and acceptance of Sufism" (Benard 2003: xii). 
Bernard supports aggressively promoting a more secularized Islam, discrediting 
those who are perceived as extremists, and exacerbating internal sectarian rivalries 
to advance a more democratic Islam that is supportive of Western interests. Even 
though there is a push to secularize Muslims in the West.  Most Muslims residing 
there already find it more expedient to assimilate to a greater or lesser extent to 
Western norms. Roy concludes: 
 
          That even fundamentalism has at bottom incorporated the religious  
          space of the West (individualism, separation between politics and  
          religion) and is striving to promote its conservative, indeed reactionary,  
          values in a discourse and practice that mirror those of Christian and  
          Jewish conservatives (2007:102). 
 
Salafees view themselves as an insular community within the broader society. They 
define themselves and their culture independently of the West, while at the same 
time functioning within the society’s parameters. Roy observes: 
 
          But the problem lies precisely there: detached from any territory, devoid  
          of cultural identity, and global, neo-fundamentalism is outside the arena  
          of the state… (They) ask for nothing positive from the state, except  
          abstention: let us wear the veil, eat hallal [sic], not shake hands, and so on.  
          They are absent from the great debates about society because they  
          legitimate for themselves, not for society” (2007:76). 
 
While Roy’s analysis speaks true of some Muslim minorities in the West, especially 
Salafees and other groups that take a more literalist approach, it also resonates 
with the experience of Salafees in more pluralistic Muslim societies. For instance, 
Salafees in Yemen also willfully detach themselves from the rest of society and see 
their role as predominately reforming the society’s social ills and beliefs, with 
minimal concern given to issues of governance in the society, especially with 
regards to pursuing leadership roles or coups. Shaikh al-Waadi’ee explicates the 
da’wa of the Salafees in Yemen when he states, “We do not believe in rebelling 
	 185	
against the Muslim rulers as long as they are Muslims, and we do not consider 
revolutions as means of reform, but rather societal havoc” (2005:65-66). Due to the 
pluralistic nature of these societies, Salafees find that they must adapt their 
positions without compromising their manhaj, they recognize that they must 
evaluate the various levels of deterring harmful sinful practices in the society by 
encouraging the good practices through da’wa activities and preaching, again 
Shaikh al-Waadi’ee states: 
 
          The position of Ahl al-Sunna regarding the government is that whatever  
          disagrees with the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Messenger of  
          Allah (saw) we reject it. Some of the things, but not restricted to, are  
          women’s nakedness, mixing in society and the university, banks dealing  
          in interest, taxation and custom duties. However, we believe in  
          obedience to the government” (2014:28).  
 
What is of interest here is that although al-Waadi’ee acknowledged that sinfulness 
and practices inconsistent with Islam had become rampant in the society he did not 
call for rebellion, excommunication of the leaders, nor attempting to violently 
enforce the Salafee morays upon society, rather his view held that societal 
rectification would come about through da’wa. In a society where Muslims are in the 
minority “they recognize the secularization of the public square, but they want to 
take their place in it as religious beings. Rather than a conquest of society, this is a 
form of privatization of public space” (Roy 2007:81). This analysis captures the 
relationship of Salafees to a secular society: they remain within the legal framework 
of the society and reformulate their orientation to fit the Western framework. Many 
Salafees will argue that although they may have to reformulate their positions that 
they do not have to compromise their manhaj. They argue Salafism is resilient and 
so long as foundation principles of creed and manhaj are not threatened and forced 
to compromise they can function in a society that does not limit their ability to 
propagate Islam.  Obviously, this is not the ideal situation for Salafees and as 
chapter one demonstrated tension can arise due to conflicts promulgating from the 
premises of al-wala'a wa al-bara'a. Salafees claim that Salafism is orthodox Islam, 
so that no matter the circumstances that arise Salafism offers a solution and is 
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adaptable to any circumstances. For example, principles of selecting the greater of 
two evils or weighing the harms and benefits can be applied under all 
circumstances and this general claim is similar to what the modernists believe.80 
However, many modernists are willing to assimilate and compromise Islamic tenets 
to integrate into Western societies under the guise of general sharee’a objectives. 
Salafees on the other hand believe the specific texts contained within the Qur’an 
and Sunna impede and restrict those same principles. Classical scholars 
understood the divine texts, there maxims, and formulated their foundation 
principles from the Qur’an and Sunna, while abstracting inclusive sharee’a based 
objectives from those core texts. Progressives, on the other hand, make those 
sharee’a based objectives their foundation, which they use to judge, and at times 
disregard specific texts, in order to implement their reformist agenda. 
 
Fiqh For Muslim Minorities  
 
With more and more Muslims residing in non-Muslim societies a whole new body of 
literature has arisen attempting to address the diverse needs and situations that 
Muslims face. Modernists have probably been the most attentive to these new 
challenges as many of them reside in the West. Shavit states, “the wasatiyya [sic] 
approach calls for adapting religious laws to changing times and circumstance in a 
way that would make the lives of Muslims easier and Islam more attractive” 
(2015:18). The modernist or wasati approach can be summarized as being 
gradualists, reform minded, by using general Qur’anic principles and minimal usage 
of primary hadeeth texts. Their emphasis is upon the spirit and objectives of Islam 
with consideration of what they perceive as the harms and benefits (Shavit 2015). 
Modernists and other reform minded Muslims tend to emphasize general sharee’a 
based objectives to legitimize democracy, unlimited freedom, pluralism, and 
accommodating new juristic challenges in the West under the guise of fiqh al-																																																								
80 “Wasatiyya [sic] is a continuation of the modernist-apologetic school established by Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani (1839-7), Mohammaed ‘Abduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), 
particularly in its quest to provide an Islamic context to modern concepts and institutions and allow 
their conditional, mitigated interpretation into Muslim societies… it is a continuation of the Islamist 
project led by Hassan al-Banna” (Shavit 2015:17).  
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muwazanat (balanced jurisprudence). Salafees, on the other hand, claim that this 
methodology is too broad and accommodating allowing for implementation of un-
Islamic legislation by sacrificing established sharee’a norms and sanctioning 
specifically prohibited practices under the guise of obtaining some general benefit. 
For Salafees “removing difficulties and ease within Islam … are not goals within 
themselves. Instead they are means to fulfill the commands of Allah” (Hameed 
2016:12).  This approach to removing difficulties does not allow for compromising 
specific tenets or texts to achieve overall aims, especially if those objectives have 
been detailed and defined in accordance with the sharee’a. For instance, 
modernists might claim that because the Qur’an exhorts believers to be just and 
justice is one of the divine attributes of Allah, that any system or law that upholds, 
what they perceive as, justice is therefore Islamic or at least compatible with Islam. 
To further illustrate just how different moderates perceive divine will and sharee’a 
objectives El Fadl states:  
           
          The fact that God has willed that people remain different, the moderates  
          argue, illustrates god’s respect for human free will and also mandates  
          that human beings recognize the virtue of tolerance, since diversity is a  
          part of the Divine Will… (2005:206). 
  
In contrast, Salafees view true justice as being a purely Islamic concept and that it 
emanates and is defined by Islamic concepts: the Qur’an and Sunna define morality. 
Modernists focus on overall sharee’a based objectives that give them the means to 
legitimize otherwise prohibited practices, also because they depart from the literal 
reading of the divine texts they are more amenable to change and flexible in 
interpretation. Shavit observes, “Fiqh al-muwazanat [sic] gives jurists the discretion 
to legitimize otherwise prohibited actions if they have reason to believe that doing 
so would result in a lesser mufsada (harm) or greater maslaha (benefit). It suggests 
that relying on specific evidence does not suffice in issuing decisions” (2015:38). 
The implications of this methodological approach, according to some, is that it tends 
to reduce the religiosity of many of the Muslims in the West allowing them to freely 
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flaunt important juristic rulings such as the prohibition of interest on loans and other 
restrictions.  
 
Through the issuance of what Salafees might term as lax verdicts by moderates, lay 
persons tend to become less vigilant in their worship by indulging in normally 
prohibited practices. Salafees on the other hand, are far less accommodating in 
their issuance of verdicts and often cite the principle closing the door to evil. Tariq 
Ramadan observes that the vast majority of Muslims in the West “do not practice 
their religion regularly and experience no specific ‘religious’ problems in their daily 
lives” (Shavit 2015:5). A logical result of such broadly interpreted sharee’a 
objectives and rulings is a waning of religiosity. In sum, the modernist approach to 
living as a Muslim minority is based upon asserting an assimilated identity, worship 
is perceived as a personal choice and migration to the West is seen as a positive to 
exercise Western freedoms that many feel they were denied in their home countries. 
In contrast, Salafees tend to assert their Islamic identity and practices more 
outwardly, emphasize migration to Muslim countries, and generally withdraw from 
socio-cultural practices seen as un-Islamic.81  
 
As was previously mentioned, moderates, unlike Salafees, emphasize the overall 
sharee’a objectives and the intrinsic spirit of the texts sideling literalism and at times 
specific texts. Many moderates are a product of contemporary times as well as 
highly influenced by the rationalist school of thought. On the one hand, this 
synthesis of beliefs and methodologies appears to have evolved in the West due to 
the secularization of Muslims living in these societies; however, there are increasing 
calls for democratization and secularization in many Muslim societies. This call for 
opening political space is often a result of extensive exposure to Western ideals 
and a desire to imitate Western values and institutions. 
 																																																								
81 Shavit notes that modernist or wasatis “…hold that salafis (of all factions) must relinquish ther frozen, 
literalist understanding of Islam and should pay attention to the spirit and objectives of Islamic law rather than 
focus on its form and partialities. They also demand that salafis stop being arrogant and dismissive of Muslims 
who do not share their misled opinions” (2015:26-27).  
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By embracing Western values, modernists overall approach to fiqh in the West is 
influenced. The liberalization of fiqh in order meet the needs of Muslim communities 
in the West has immense implications for the day-to-day practice of Muslim 
minorities.82 One example of the variant approaches of textual interpretation and 
fiqh is the issue of bank interest-based loans. Some moderates justify taking 
interest-based loans (a clear prohibition) as a necessity for Muslims in the West. 
“The principle that individual needs can be regarded as necessities, the idea that in 
Europe da’wa is a maslaha that justifies the suspension of the prohibited, and the 
concept of searching within the schools of law for the most pragmatic decision” is 
an attempt by moderates to ease the burden of the prohibition of interest to facilitate 
homeownership (Shavit 2015:142). Some of the arguments given for this 
justification are that Muslims can be seen as respectable homeowners and that 
through the absence of the burden of paying rent, Muslims can divert more energy 
and resources to da’wa to non-Muslims. Other arguments often cited are that 
according to the Hanafee mathhab otherwise prohibited transactions in daar al-harb 
become allowable, therefore some modernists cite this precedence for legitimizing 
interest in the West. A third more compelling argument used by moderates is that 
homeownership is seen as a maslaha safeguarding life, honor, property, which are 
all core sharee’a objectives. Proponents of this view claim that shelter is a necessity 
and owning a home is a need. They argue that by fulfilling the need of 
homeownership one can provide safety for his or her family, which apartment living 
cannot provide, at the same time allowing one to reside close to a place of worship 
and Muslim neighbors. 
 
Perspectives on Hijra 
 
Another highly contested issue between modernists and Salafees is the hijra.  																																																								
82The liberalization of fiqh should not be confused with contextualizing fiqh rulings. Liberalization 
entails conceding foundation principles whereas contextualizing is adapting without contradicting 
core precepts. For example, attempting to modrate the prohibition of usury or relaxing the 
requirements of hijaab. The liberalization of fiqh usually is achieved in one of four ways: broadening 
the scope of what is consider a necessity, broadening the concept of maslaha, capitalizing on 
capricious verdicts, or reinterpreting sharee’a principles according to their linguistic meanings. 
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Modernists essentially allow for, and even encourage, hijra to non-Muslim states if 
they believe those states are democratic, or as means to escape oppressive 
regimes.83 
 
          Salafis, in contrast, consider residence in non-Muslim lands to be at  
          best tolerable and justifiable almost exclusively as a means for  
          proselytization they stress the universality of Islamic laws and thus  
          reject, in principle though not always in practice, the accommodation of  
          decisions to the unique conditions of Muslim minorities or the issuance  
          of concessions as a means to enhance proselytization. Their decisions  
          reject the wasati [sic] approach to maslaha and emphasize the  
          impermissibility of friendly relations with non-Muslims based on a broad  
          understanding of loyalty and disavowal. Nevertheless, they demand  
          that Muslim minorities abide by the laws of the infidel states in which they  
          reside” (Shavit 2015:78-79).   
 
While Shavit’s analysis of Salafees is consistent with the evidence presented here, 
there has been a noticeable permutation of ideals and priorities of Western 
Salafees. In part, these changes are a result of experience gathered while being 
abroad in various Muslim countries and new geo-political realities. Within the 
Salafee communities in the West there has been a paradigm shift with many 
Salafees no longer emphasizing migration from non-Muslim countries to Muslim 
countries. Baker observes: 
            
          I remember when I was new on the deen as a Salafee there was a lot of  
          talk about hijra to the land of the Muslims to study, to work and stuff like  
          that. I think with the generation that has been here, that now knows and  
          has actualized their deen in a more comprehensive way... theoretical  
          learning and then abstract (enhances their insight). (By) seeing the  
          deen, being more experienced and mature on the deen (gives them  
          new perspectives). I think that that has happened with many who came  
          out and lived in the Middle East. The actualizing has not only showed  
          us how to live a more Islamic life, but that we were being a more  
          ‘religious than thou’ beforehand, being overzealous” (personal  																																																								
83The first Muslim migration was essentially to escape persecution in order to openly practice their faith. 
However, it must be observed that at that time there was no Muslim society and the migration was from a 
polytheistic society to a Christian society where they sought refuge. This researcher is unaware of any classical 
verdicts advocating or legitimizing migration from an oppressive Muslim land to a non-Muslim land, which 
tends to be the norm in contemporary times. In fact, from the Salafee perspective, it is usually argued against 
migrating to non-Muslim lands for fear of compromising one’s faith or outright losing one’s Islamic identity 
especially in successive generations.  
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          communication 10/1/17). 
 
Baker highlights the frustration many Western Salafees experience while residing in 
a Muslim country, which is not welcoming or accommodating to their needs. Many 
who left the West to reside in these lands have become disenchanted due to poor 
treatment, barriers to obtaining residency, lack of acceptance for themselves and 
their families, and sometimes open hostility. These challenges and the feeling of a 
lack of permanency have caused many to become disillusioned and moved some to 
become more assertive in their Western identity. Baker observes, “Those who have 
moved to the Muslim lands see how it has been implemented, how it works, they 
have matured in their reflective stages of looking at the deen… also they have 
realized this cannot be a permanent home moving back to their societies” (personal 
communication 10/1/17). He also mentions that many who attempted hijra 
experienced what he referred to as a reflective phase after being absent from their 
societies. At this stage they became more aware of their national identity and 
reflective of their position in their host Muslim societies. Many of those attempting 
hijra realized that some of the rights and freedoms they valued were being 
protected more so in their countries of origin.    
 
In contrast, Shakir Mcgill, a Canadian national and well-known student of Shaikh 
Muqbil al-Waadi’ee, is a long-term advocate of hijra and has resided in Yemen for 
over twenty years throughout several wars. Mcgill believes hijra is an obligation; 
however, those who reside in the West should be diligent in practicing Islam without 
compromising core tenets. During an interview conducted 11 October 2017, Mcgill 
stated: 
 
           As we know Islamic beliefs are unchanging but our application of Islam  
           can change and there are numerous examples of this in the history of  
           the Prophet. We have the Meccan period, the Medina period, times of  
           war, times of peace, we have times of strength and unity, we have  
           times of weakness and division. We have places where we are under  
           Islamic rule and government and places where Muslims are not in that  
           situation, so these are all different contexts which demand different  
           approaches, practices all based upon the Book and the Sunna  
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           (personal communication 2017). 
 
Mcgill’s analysis is indicative of the Salafee approach, which is more literalist and 
adherent to core texts, especially in creedal matters. For Salafees, the core texts 
are never to be exceeded, although contemporary issues, time, and place all have 
a role in contextualizing their practices. Fundamental fiqh principles are applied 
considering the core texts, which through ijtihaad are applied in the contemporary 
setting. Salafees view their methodology as comprehensive: by adhering to core 
principles and texts they believe they can deduce a solution for any issue that 
arises. Mcgill states: 
 
           A Muslim wherever he may be, is (obliged) to follow the commands of  
           Allah according to his ability whether he is in the Muslim land or the  
           non-Muslim land. The fact remains being in the Muslim land in that  
           context if we are applying Islam according to our ability are we still  
           making compromises? I do not know collectively if the Salafees in the  
           West are practicing what Allah the Almighty has commanded not  
           making compromises in their religion… In general, and collectively I do  
           not know if the Salafees are upon this… Is it to be taken into  
           consideration and recognized that Muslims operate within the legal  
           framework of a non-Muslim society? I understand that we follow and  
           obey Allah the Almighty irrespective of whether that is within the  
           framework of the legal framework of that society or not without  
           making concessions (personal communication: 10/11/2017). 
 
Mcgill raises two very important questions: are Muslims obliged to respect the laws 
of their host country? If so, should they obey non-Muslim authorities if it involves 
compromise of their core beliefs? Shaikh Muhammad bin Ibraheem, the former 
muftee prior to bin Baz, states, “The rule of Allah and his Messenger (saw) does not 
differ in and of itself pertaining to the time, changing circumstances, and new 
events. Therefore, there is no issue whatsoever that is not contained in the Book of 
Allah and the Sunna of His Messenger (saw)” (1979:12/300). For Salafees, the 
fundamentals of sharee’a are immutable; however, at the same time they do 
recognize that contemporary challenges require ijtihaad. To answer Mcgill’s query it 
has been well documented from a variety of sources that many Salafee scholars 
have long advocated that there should be respect for law and order, regardless of 
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whether one resides in a Muslim or non-Muslim state. Some scholars declare that 
obedience is a religious obligation, so long as the laws one is obeying are not in 
contradiction to divine law. For example, laws which are not explicitly mentioned, or 
issues that are not detailed in the Qur’an and Sunna, and do not contradict divine 
law should be respected.  To illustrate, laws, which are for the public good and 
general welfare of the society should be followed: traffic and public safety laws. 
Salafees exercise limited civil disobedience by refraining from un-Islamic mandates: 
those directives that unequivocally contradict established Islamic law; however, this 
does not equate to violent resistance. Salafee scholars on numerous occasions 
have denounced as un-Islamic all kinds of violence and terrorist attacks that 
individual Muslim minorities have engaged in as was demonstrated in chapter two 
and three.  
 
According to Salafee scholars like al-Dhafeeree obedience to a non-Muslim leader 
can in fact warrant the five fundamental fiqh rulings depending upon the particular 
scenario. Sometimes it can be an obligation or recommendation to execute the law 
of a non-Muslim ruler “if the command emanates from the order to follow Allah and 
His Messenger (saw), but not because the leader commanded it” (2009:1/249). This 
means that obedience is not in and of itself to the non-Muslim leader, but rather to 
fulfill the Islamic obligation because in this case the leader’s command is 
commensurate with Islam. This is due to the scholarly consensus that non-Muslims 
should not have authority over Muslims. Furthermore, al-Qaadhee I’yaadh (died 
554 Hijra) states, “There is no difference between the scholars that there should be 
no choosing a non-Muslim leader and he cannot remain a leader as long as he 
exhibits the traits of disbelief” (2009:1/247). While explicating the creed of Ahl al-
Hadeeth ibn Taimeeya states Ahl al-Sunna: 
 
          does not believe it is obligatory to obey the leader in every issue.   
          Instead it is not obligatory except for sharee’a issues. Even if the leader  
          is just one cannot disobey Allah. If he commands to obedience to Allah  
          obey him… as one only obeys Allah. If a tyrant or disbeliever  
          commands one to be obedient to Allah it is not permissible to disobey  
          Allah or nullify His command because of the tyrant’s order. Similarly, if  
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          he speaks truthfully it is impermissible to disbelieve him (1986:3/387). 
 
According to Salafees, sovereignty rests with Allah and that commands that are in 
accordance with Islamic dictates must be obeyed regardless of who issued them. 
Also, this statement illustrates that tyranny does not justify rebellion against a 
Muslim ruler and that anyone who speaks the truth should be listened to and 
statements are accepted in accordance with their authenticity.  
 
Salafees justify following a non-Muslim authority based upon four basic principles 
although they do not deem it obligatory in and of itself. First, Salafees consider it 
necessary to fulfill the overall objective of da’wa. Being mindfulness of the law and 
projecting themselves as law-abiding citizens helps to portray the message of Islam 
in a positive manner. Second, Salafees deem obedience to non-Muslim authorities 
as part of the fulfillment of trusts, contractual agreements and covenants. This is 
especially relevant for Muslim minorities. Third, they argue that obeying the non-
Muslim authority under these circumstances achieves the sharee’a objective of 
protecting oneself. For instance, obeying traffic laws are both for general societal 
benefit and the protection of individuals. Fourth, Salafees contend that respect for 
non-Muslim authorities also can prevent harm to Muslims. For example, if Muslims 
display disobedience to authorities they will incur punishment: fees, fines, and 
possible imprisonment thus violating the sharee’a objectives of protecting one’s 
wealth and persons (Baazmool 2017). 	
 
Salafees and the Propensity for Violence  
 
As was suggested in chapter two of this research most critics of Salafism conflate it 
with violent extremism or an ideological off shoot of takfeeree ideology. However, 
the aim of this research, and an emerging body of research suggests that there are 
clear distinctions between the takfeeree-jihaadee manhaj and that of Salafees. 
Moreover, Salafees in their discourse and practice appeared to be consistent in 
eschewing violence. Baker states: 
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          There is an array of empirical evidence attached to the various Salafee  
          communities in the West, which will show an abundance of refutations,  
          clarifications, and the like, which is indicative of those communities  
          positions regarding extremism, which I don’t think you will see with any  
          other community or school of thought (personal communication   
         10/1/2017). 
 
Graph 2: Sample of English Salafee Websites refuting extremism 
 
 
 
 
Consistent with Baker’s findings this research found, for instance, that the website 
salafipublications.com bookstore had dedicated 20% of their published books to 
countering extremism, terrorism, and jihaadist ideology, while seventeen percent of 
their published pamphlets were dedicated to counter-terrorism comprising of about 
37% of their total material. In addition, the website troid.org, another longstanding 
Salafee affiliated organization, had dedicated 24% of their publications to anti-
extremist literature and 15% of their video lectures to counter-extremism and 
repudiating terrorism.  The website salafimanhaj.com, a rival Salafee organization 
seemed to have the highest number of articles ranging from counter-extremism 
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narratives to rebutting jihaadist violence, with about 25% of their articles posted 
dealing with those topics. Although they had the lowest percentage of their overall 
material oriented towards these topics they had the highest number of articles 
allocated to presenting counter-narratives. This data suggests that some of the 
reknown Salafee websites in the West allocate about 25%-30% of their materials to 
providing counter-narratives and alternative strategies to violence and extremist 
ideologies. This is significant because it illustrates the willingness of leading 
proponents of Salafism to address controversial topics like extremism and engage 
with and counter the messaging of radical ideologies. Also, it shows that Salafees 
focus more attention to countering violent extremists than most other groups that 
oppose their manhaj illustrating their recognition of the dangers imposed  by 
extremist groups. 
 
Some critics seem to suggest that Salafees have an overlapping ideology with 
many of the extremist groups mentioned in this research. Furthermore, they claim 
the world should be concerned about the latent violence inherent to Salafism. Baker 
responds to this claim by stating: 
 
          Had it been the case that Salafees are dormant waiting to enact  
          violence we would have evidence to suggest that. Some of the known  
          individuals who later became radicalized that were present in Salafee  
          communities had been ostracized and expelled from those  
          communities. In addition, all known established communities have an  
          abundance of counter-extremist literature and well documented counter  
          radicalization efforts (personal communication 10/1/2017). 
 
Baker’s research suggests there is a process of radicalization, that is not particular 
to the Salafee community, where converts experience phases of religious 
development and oscillate between different levels of religiosity. Communities and 
individuals that are the most marginalized in their host societies tend to be the most 
vulnerable to extremist rhetoric and more prone to violence (Baker 2009). In 
addition, Baker’s findings imply that it is a series of factors and a variety of 
indicators, which contribute to the process of radicalization, in conjunction with 
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ideology. Baker’s conclusions concur with the findings of this research, which show 
that ideology is a central factor, thus making it essential to discern violent takfeeree 
ideology and jihaadist belief from Salafism. As this research suggests, there is a 
great chasm between Salafism and violent extremist ideology, which is apparent by 
analyzing both core creedal tenets and manhaj of the various groups. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter surveyed several definitions of a liberal democratic system with the 
aim of providing a framework to analyze Salafees’ behavior and paradigm with 
regards to such a system. This is done primarily due to the commonly held 
assumption that those critical of a democratic system have a tendency towards 
violence, which has not been the case as this research has shown with Salafees. 
Salafees are known for being exclusivist, in which they have no problem 
acknowledging; however, they take exception to the claim they are violent, and as 
much of the evidence presented in the previous chapters illustrate, they 
disassociate their manhaj from violent extremism as well as actively denounce it. 
Furthermore, as Baker’s research showed, there is very little evidence linking 
Salafee mosques, especially in the West, with violent extremists. In fact, research 
suggests they are an antidote to violent extremism as some community policing   
programs in the UK, such as STREET, show. This will be explored further in the 
next chapter.  
 
Also, this chapter has analyzed and contrasted the Salafee view of democracy with 
that of modernists within the Islamic community to highlight some of the core 
arguments for and against a democratic system. After presenting the numerous 
claims it was concluded that methodological approaches to the divine texts and 
their interpretation determined the various stances of proponents for democracy 
and its detractors.  
 
In addition, this chapter explored concepts like secularism and pluralism and how 
the Salafee approach radically departed from modernists. Again, the primary factor 
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that distinguishes the two approaches and their arguments was textual 
interpretation and literalism, which also impacted their views regarding residence in 
non-Muslim societies. Finally, this chapter analyzed whether Salafees abide by 
laws and institutions in a non-Muslim society, and surveyed three English Salafee 
websites to assist in assessing Salafism and its propensity for violence. These 
website samples were introduced to show evidence that mainstream Salafism has 
an active role in challenging violent extremists in the Muslim community. The 
evidence suggests that Salafees do not pose a violent threat to non-Muslim 
societies and this claim is substantiated by both Muslim and non-Muslim 
academics. The subsequent chapter will include additonal sampling of Salafee 
websites with the hope of assesing the effectiveness of Salafee efforts in contesting 
violent extremist ideology. 
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Chapter Five: Assessing Salafism  
 
Introduction 
 
Having argued in the last chapter that Salafees contempt for democracy is not a 
precursor to violence, this research will now investigate whether Salafees are 
effective as an antidote to extremism. This research calls into question the labels 
“extremist” or “radical” being used as descriptors to designate all groups and 
individuals that do not hold democracy as the basis for their political system or 
ideology. Further, this research questions the assumption that those who do not 
believe in a democratic system (Salafees) are predisposed to violence. In fact, the 
research indicates that groups that do not endorse democracy are not necessarily 
proponents of violence. Other significant issues explored in this chapter are the 
process of radicalization, how counter-narratives are used to disrupt radicalization, 
and the contribution of Salafees to that process.  
This chapter hopes to show how extremists recruit to gain a glimpse of the 
magnitude of the radicalization process and what causes individuals to transition to 
extremism. Also, it is hoped that this chapter will provide an accurate assessment of 
Salafees’ effectiveness in counter extremism by examining the arguments of both 
proponents and cynics of Salafism. Finally, several case studies of Salafee efforts 
from Arabic language webistes will be assessed to appraise the effectiveness in 
challenging violent extremist narratives.  
Radicalization is an immensely complicated process and pinpointing its causes is 
extremely arduous. There are a variety of definitions used to describe radicalization 
and its stages. Veldhuis and Staun state: 
           
          Definitions of radicalisation most often centre around two different foci: 1)  
          on violent radicalisation, where emphasis is put on the active pursuit or  
          acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal; 2) on a broader  
          sense of radicalization [sic], where emphasis is placed on the active  
          pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or  
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          may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the  
          threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals (2009:4).  
 
The absence of a universal definition and the imposition of a single norm, system 
(democracy as opposed to sharee’a), or set of values further complicates the efforts 
to challenge extremism as was alluded to in the discussion around terrorism in 
chapter four. Also, this chapter will analyze whether Salafees’ counter-narratives 
are effective in countering extremist ideology by assessing their arguments and 
efforts in countering radicalization. Finally, the claims of various academics will be 
analyzed and contrasted regarding Salafees’ effectiveness. 
 
How Extremists Recruit and Their Da’wa 
 
Extremist jihaadee groups use a variety of means to recruit and radicalize their 
target audiences. The Internet has been used to develop an intricate web of social 
media platforms and forums to recruit foreign fighters to participate in conflict zones 
around the world. “The professional and sophisticated use of social media by ISIL in 
particular has been a game-changer. Extremists are also populating the spaces 
where young people consume and share information, socialize and are 
socialized…Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, Instagram, WhatsApp, Reddit, Snapchat, 
Ask fm and Kik.3” (Ran 2015:3). The jihaadee community has created a vast 
techno infrastructure to disseminate propaganda to create a universal identity 
based upon takfeeree ideology. “Popular extremist propaganda often includes: high 
production value, the use of fast-paced editing, music and a charismatic narrator, 
and a call to action” (RAN 2015:2). Many of the groups have been extremely 
effective in producing propaganda and media that conveys their messaging and 
narrative regarding contemporary affairs. Extremists, like al-Qaeda and ISIS, use 
mainstream social media platforms to recruit, inspire, and incite violence. The 
advent of the Internet has substantially increased the means of dispensing 
information in ways unimaginable in the past.   
          
         This allows extremist groups to continue to reach, inspire and radicalize  
         [sic] their traditional constituencies, while continuing to grow their tacit base  
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          of sympathisers [sic]. They are also drawing audiences into events in real  
          time, as was evidenced by the way the May 2013 Woolwich attackers     
          encouraged onlookers to film and upload the murder of Lee Rigby and how  
          al-Shabaab offered real-time battlefield updates throughout the Westgate  
          attacks in Nairobi in September 2013 (Briggs and Feve 2014:6).   
 
Briggs and Feve identify several tactics that extremists use to appeal to their target 
audience with four, according to this researcher, being core tactics. Extremists 
create a sense of duty, victimhood, extoll the religious rewards of jihaad, and help 
create a sense of identity (2014). The way in which they carry this out is by first 
arguing that there is an urgent sense of duty to protect Islam and Muslims from 
foreign aggression. By portraying the conflict as being between good and evil, 
monotheism and polytheism, faith and disbelief, extremist groups create a sense of 
exigency and duty amongst their constituents. This allows recruiters to present their 
message as a call of duty that portrays their fighters as brave mujaahideen who 
heed their religious duty. The formation of micro-communities linked together by 
violent media images helps to foster the narrative that the West is waging a violent 
struggle against Islam. Second, extremists appeal to the sensitivities of their 
audience by pointing to history: the loss of Muslim prestige and empire, as well as 
the lasting effects of colonial domination. A common characteristic of extremists is 
that they manipulate their target audiences by creating a sense of victimhood and 
the need for revenge for both real and perceived grievances. For instance, 
jihaadees tend to exploit contemporary conflicts involving the persecution of 
Muslims to create a sense of urgency to reciprocate violence. Third, extremists use 
core religious texts to inspire and instill a sense of obligation in their target audience. 
Brutal imagery of carnage, intricate computerized graphics, and video footage 
glorifying violence bolstered by arguments deduced from core religious texts are 
used to substantiate jihaadee violent behavior, which serves to inspire and 
legitimize their cause and propagate their narrative. Last, extremists create an 
identity of the glorified Jihaadee that defends the umma from persecution and 
advances the Islamic call. “Identity fusion -a visceral sense of oneness with the 
group- results from feelings of a shared essence, forged through the sharing of 
emotional, life-shaping experiences. A construct developed by social psychologist 
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Bill Swann at the University of Texas, it is a more powerful motivator of self-sacrifice 
than merely identifying with a group” (ox.ac.uk 2018:1). These tactics are used 
simultaneously to produce their desired effect. The variant tactics used by 
extremists to convey their message, as some suggest, is mainly effective because it 
exploits the emotions of the target audience by instilling a sense of duty and 
urgency to join the jihaadist struggle. Egerton states in his critique of Salafism that 
“(t)he leap from non-militant Westerner to militant Salafist is made possible by the 
exercise of the political imagination which produces an imagined world of ummah 
[sic]verses West” (2011:4). Others like Whitehouse argue that a variety of factors 
contribute to fostering a sort of psychological community, which makes the path to 
violent extremism and self-sacrifice easier (Oxford 2018). Egerton, like many other 
academics assumes Salafism is a multi-tiered movement with both pacifist and 
violent strands, where individuals can easily transition from pacifism to violent 
extremism. However, as Baker suggests: 
 
          the Salafist position is considered antithetical to the takfeeri [sic]  
          understanding of Jihad [sic]. The latter’s emphasis on both political and  
          apparently knowledge-based principles of Islam, although misrepresented  
          by them, appeal to susceptible young Muslims who are disgruntled by a  
          perceived over emphasis on politics from the Islamist/iqwani [sic]  
          constituencies on the one hand. On the other, the youth, while attracted to  
          the ideological and knowledge-based focus of Salafism, are disillusioned     
          by the movement’s apparent political disengagement. Violent extremists  
          are thus successful in attracting youth due to their ability to amalgamate  
          Islamist politicisation [sic] with Salafist ideological underpinnings. These  
          two powerful components provide the impetus behind the attraction for  
          violent extremist propaganda (2009:345-346). 
 
Many Muslim critics of Salafism feel frustrated by the apparent inaction and political 
stagnancy of Salafees. They often lament that their manhaj offers no solution to the 
tyranny and conflicts that afflict the umma. An oft-cited appraisal of Salafees is that 
they are unreasonably obedient to Muslim leaders and discount their flagrant 
violations of Islamic law. Furthermore, they accuse Salafees of deriding jihaad. This 
negative perception of Salafees only further serves the takfeerees’ recruitment 
efforts. Another problem is the fact that Salafees do not often address 
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contemporary politics leaving them at odds with their potential constituents who 
may be looking for a practical solution to deal with current problems. This is where 
the extremists play a role by using social media, offering action, and filling a void. 
ISIS’s social media presence is unparalleled and makes them highly effective at 
recruiting foreign fighters and promoting their narrative. The large number of foreign 
fighters inspired by their message best illustrates the effectiveness of ISIS’s social 
media campaign. 
          
          ISIS recruits on a 24/7 basis in over 21 languages over the Internet using  
          videos, memes, tweets and other social media postings and swarming in  
          on anyone that retweets, likes or endorses their materials to try to seduce    
          them into the group. Their unprecedented social media drive has resulted    
          in over 30,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries migrating to  
          Syria and Iraq” (McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, and Yayla 2017:50). 
 
 ISIS’s propaganda is powerful and appeals to the emotions of its audience, which 
makes it both deadly effective and severely challenging to mitigate. Another 
challenge is the nature in which they recruit and inspire, which departs from 
traditional terrorist recruitment efforts. ISIS along with al-Qaeda, have morphed 
from being direct managers of terrorist attacks and face to face recruiters, to being 
travel agents to conflict zones as well as encouraging lone-wolf attacks.  
 
ISIS has been active in both disseminating information, with over 46,000 Twitter 
accounts being used by their supporters from September to December in 2014, and 
rebuking those who condemn them (McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, and Yayla 
2017:50). Extremist groups that are decentralized have the advantage of inspiring 
other technologically savvy individuals to convert to their cause and become active 
disseminators of their message. Many of the contemporary extremist movements 
permit a franchise of their movement and ideology, which allows them to reach 
those individuals that may have remained marginalized, inactive, or even normally 
resistant to extremist messaging. 
 
The process of radicalization is complex, and it is often the result of a variety of 
factors. Charles Allen states about the phenomena of radicalization that it is “the 
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process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, 
support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change” (2007:4). The 
view that radicalism is the result of a multitude of factors is commonly 
acknowledged by many academics. Vidino suggests that it is a complex 
individualized process often where individuals are not groomed at all, and they 
transition from a personal radicalization phase to a mobilization phase in which they 
become active terrorists. Therefore, due to the complexity of radicalization, 
detecting its various stages while simultaneously countering extremist messaging is 
increasingly difficult (2011).   
 
 Counter-narrative and De-radicalization  
 
The efforts to counter extremism and disrupt radicalization primarily consist of three 
broad based approaches: counter-narratives, alternative narratives, and 
government strategic communications (RAN 2015). These approaches are built 
upon the assumption that the most effective means for dealing with extremist 
narratives is by presenting counter-narratives and preventative narratives. Counter-
narratives include attempts to disrupt and turn extremists by presenting an 
alternative message challenging the espousers of radicalism and their violent 
tactics. Individuals, groups, and government initiatives that usually fall under 
counter-radicalization programs can all present counter-narratives. El-Said states, 
“Counter-radicalization refers to a package of policies and measures designed and 
implemented by a country to prevent youth or most vulnerable groups and 
communities from becoming radicalized in their home countries” (2015:4). These 
preventative narratives involve stopping radicalism and recruitment. Furthermore, 
government sponsored efforts to combat radicalism and extremism according to El-
Said are two pronged: counter-radicalization and counterterrorism approaches. In 
highlighting the difference between counter-radicalism policies and counter-terrorist 
strategies El-Said states, “Instead of targeting terrorists, which is the focus of the 
counterterrorism policy, counter-radicalization targets communities instead that are 
themselves targeted by violent extremists for recruitment, sympathy or any form of 
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support” (El-Said 2015:10). There is a variety of counter-narrative approaches all 
focusing on different tactics to counter the messaging, contest the messenger, or 
influence the target audience of the message. According to RAN Centre the primary 
narratives and forms of outreach can be characterized as:  counter-narratives that 
seek to directly or indirectly challenge extremist narratives either through ideology, 
logic, fact or humor. They further claim that these efforts should tailor their 
messages to appeal to the youth through social media and popular culture, in 
addition to, using defectors to counter and discredit extremist narratives. A critical 
part of counter extremism is challenging the narrative of jihaadee groups and 
discrediting their ideologues by “revealing incongruities and contradictions in the 
terrorist narratives and how terrorists act, disrupting analogies between the target 
narrative and real-world events, disrupting binary themes of the group’s ideology, 
and advocating an alternative view of the terrorist narrative’s target” (Braddock and 
Horgan 2015:397). Narratives have shown to play a significant role in influencing 
ideology and intent, therefore counter-narratives can best be effective if they also 
are comprised of a consistent set of beliefs that can provide a positive alternative. 
This is in part why Salafist messaging, for some, appears so effective. 
 
The second approach to counter extremism, according to the RAN Centre, is based 
upon supplying alternative narratives. Alternative narratives seek to counter the 
radicalization process and the progression towards violence by putting forward a 
positive story about social values, such as tolerance, openness, freedom and 
democracy (2015). Jacobson suggests affirming positive messaging rather than 
negating false ones to counter extremists’ messages. He further claims that in the 
past the Internet was a facilitator to the radicalization process not the driver 
(Jacobson 2010). Salafees are also active in supplying positive alternative 
messages that they use to discredit extremists’ paradigm. Although their messaging 
does not include democracy, it does supply a replacement vision that is non-violent. 
 
The final approach entails using government strategic communications: actions to 
get the message out about what government is doing, refuting misinformation, and 
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seeking to forge relationships with key constituencies and audiences (McDowell-
Smith, Speckhard, and Yayla 2017). Both government and civil society have a role 
in combating extremism and radicalization. Increasingly, they are becoming more 
cognizant that fighting extremism and terror requires much more than just military 
strategies and that more broad-based approaches are necessary to counter 
extremists and their efforts to radicalize. 
Other methods often used by governments as a tool in counter extremism policy 
are based upon efforts to de-radicalize extremists or get them to disengage from 
participation in violence. “Disengagement refers to a behavioral change, such as 
leaving a group or changing one’s role within it. It does not necessitate a change in 
values or ideals but requires relinquishing the objective of achieving change 
through violence” (Fink and Hearne 2008:3). Although programs seeking to 
disengage individuals from using violence are generally considered the role of 
government, strong alternative narratives offered by Salafees that focus on non-
violence and da’wa probably also play a role in convincing some extremists to 
disengage; however, this is often difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, it will be 
observed that some Salafee scholars have had success in disengaging extremists 
through compelling counter-narratives, as the forthcoming case studies will show. 
The other strategy often used in counter extremist policy involves efforts to de-
radicalize violent offenders or those predisposed to violence. This process, 
“however, implies a cognitive shift, a fundamental change in understanding. It is 
often triggered by a traumatic experience, which “challenges the coherence of the 
individual’s worldview” and can engender “post-traumatic growth.” A “cognitive 
opening” which makes an individual receptive to new ideas, is then created” (Fink 
and Hearne 2008:3). The case of Morten Storm who became uneasy with violent 
extremism after becoming disillusioned with violence, and subsequently leading him 
to renounce Islam is an example of how an event can trigger and challenge a 
person’s worldview leading them to disengage (Storm, Cruickshank, and Lister 
2014). Storm states, “The whole construction of my faith was a house of cards built 
on one layer upon the next. Remove one, and all the others would collapse. It had 
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relied on a sense of momentum – a journey from finding Islam to becoming a Salafi 
[sic] to take up jihad [sic] in spirit and action” (2014:118). Storm, according to 
Baker's model, went from the preliminary stage where he was receptive to new 
beliefs and remained in this unstable transitional phase of development whilst 
amongst Salafees in Yemen. Although Storm resided in an environment in which it 
was easy to actualize Salafist practices his comprehension remained limited, which 
may have been a cause for his dissatisfaction and continual search. As this 
researcher was close to Storm at this phase it was observed that he did not 
continue his studies and quickly began to mix with other groups, and even his 
discourse began to become more politicized. Eventually he gravitated to the 
takfeeree-jihaadee constituency, which appeared to combine the politicization of the 
Islamists and the theological framework of the Salafees.  For many, the process of 
radicalization or disengagement is often incremental and many variables such as 
incarceration, disillusionment, and trauma can all be a part of triggering this 
progression. Storm claims, “I also began to reconsider some of the justifications 
made for the murder and maiming of civilians. I had accepted such prescriptions in 
my obedience to the Salafist creed” (2014:118).  Although Storm should be well-
aware that Salafism and the ideology he embraced are antithetical and he 
expressed enmity in his later writings towards Salafism, he still claimed it was the 
Salafist creed that inspired him to radicalize and at the same time cause him to de-
radicalize, question and later abandon his faith. De-radicalization, as was illustrated 
in the Saudi case study, is usually a more comprehensive set  
          of policies and measures designed and implemented by authorities in  
          order to normalize and convince groups and individuals who have already  
          become radicalized or violent extremists to repent and disengage from  
          violence. The process can include a cognitive change (change in ideology  
          and attitudes), simple disengagement (behavioral change to abandon  
          violence while remaining radical), or both” (El-Said 2015:11).  
 
Most Salafees are more grassroots in nature, therefore they lack in resources and 
the will to focus all their energy and da’wa efforts on counter-radicalization 
approaches. However, as the evidence suggests, they are effective in providing 
alternative narratives and refuting extremist ideologies. Although Salafees tend to 
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be focused upon engaging the ideology of extremists they do have some isolated 
initiatives in the West where they have engaged in counter-radicalization efforts. 
One such example was the UK based initiative STREET: Strategy to Reach, 
Empower and Educate Teenagers. STREET was a Salafee run organization 
created for guiding “at-risk youth to divert them from involvement in antisocial 
behavior, gang violence, and violent extremism, and toward leading more 
productive and positive lives” (Barclay 2011:1).  STREET was also a partner with 
the UK government and local police. Reports indicate STREET was autonomous 
and that the organization was a successful model of community partnership 
operating under the guidelines of the UK government’s PREVENT counter-terrorism 
program. STREET’s success can in part be attributed to the shared cultural 
background and experience of its staff, as well as their Salafee identity, which 
enabled them to counter takfeeree-jihaadee narratives (Barclay 2011:1-5).  Lambert 
states about the takfeeree manhaj that “(t)hey aren’t distorting Sufism, they’re not 
distorting Deobandi or Barelvi [sic] ideology. They’re distorting Salafism…[so] when 
well-meaning Muslims of other sects try to influence that sort of audience-they’re 
absolute outsiders” (cited in Barclay 2011:5).  Lambert’s comment affirms two 
primary observations made over the course of this research. First, that although 
jihaadist and takfeeree groups claim Salafism, their manhaj is a distortion of 
Salafee core principles and the overall outcome of their da’wa efforts. Second, that 
Salafees are generally more capable, and credible to counter extremists’ narratives, 
because they generally have a deeper understanding of their positions and ideology. 
Barclay observes that Salafees in STREET are generally lauded by a variety of law 
enforcement officials and social service providers, as being effective counter-
radicalization partners. He claims: 
 
           They also have the credibility among the target audience that other  
           members of Muslim communities sometimes lack. None of those  
           interviewed for this study, STREET included, believed the STREET model  
           was the only solution, acknowledging that individuals and groups from  
           other Muslim communities and those of other ideological orientations had  
           also proven to be effective partners in many circumstances. Nevertheless,  
           all agreed Street represented a highly effective contribution to countering  
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           violent Islamist Radicalization (Barclay 2011:14).      
 
There are other studies that suggest the disengagement of violent groups and their 
transitioning away from violence can have a positive effect upon their peers and 
other extremist groups to renounce violence. This also demonstrates that it is 
possible that Salafee counter-narratives can be effective in causing some 
individuals to disengage because they are consistent in their methods and counter 
extremist messaging. “In Egypt…the decision of one violent group had a direct 
impact on the choice of another to “disengage” from violent tactics. Until they 
disengaged, the groups Gama’a al-Islamiyah and “the Jihad” [sic] were together 
responsible for 95 percent of terrorism carried out in Egypt” (Fink and Hearne 
2008:7). In addition to state coercion, the Egyptian case seemed to show that 
groups could influence one another by depicting the fragmentation of a movement, 
showing discontent by highlighting their weariness of using violence against the 
state. Also, groups that shun violence after conflict can illustrate that such tactics 
have no real achievable objectives. Some Salafees that have been a part of violent 
groups prior to their embracing Salafism can be effective in showing incongruities in 
their former partisanship. In fact, Salafees often expose the inconsistencies of 
violent extremists in their speeches while denouncing their approach. Also, as was 
discussed prior in the research, Saudi Arabia has engaged in and invested 
extensively in de-radicalization programs, and their efforts are largely seen as 
successful. These are indications that Salafees do have effective, both grassroots 
and government, approaches in combatting extremism and disrupting radicalization. 
As was alluded to previously, many counter-terrorism experts conclude that 
radicalization is a process not a single event. This is a very important observation 
that lends insight into how to approach radicalization as a problem and attend to it 
with sound academic solutions. In a report issued by the RAN Centre the authors 
argue “exposure to extremist propaganda-both online and offline- is critical to the 
process of radicalization. Extremist narratives are effective because of their 
simplicity, their use of scapegoating, and their emotional appeals to fear, anger, 
shame, and honour. Their messages are crafted to exploit identity issues that many 
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young people may be experiencing” (2015:2). Extremists appeal to the emotion by 
using vivid imagery to recruit for their cause and reach their target audience, which 
allows their messaging to be effective in the overall process of radicalization.   
          Treating radicalization as a process requires a completely different  
          approach, one where the overriding objective is to win the ‘hearts and  
          minds ‘of communities most vulnerable to radicalization…this approach  
          should both understand and refute ideology of VEm (violent extremists) to  
          successfully deal with conditions conducive to radicalization and  
          extremism that lead to terrorism” (El-Said 2015:4).  
 
Evaluating Counter-narratives 
Much of the literature suggests that effective counter-narratives are important to 
disrupt the message of extremists in hopes of curtailing recruitment of radicals. 
However, there is a need for evaluating effectiveness of those counter-narratives. 
According to the Ran Centre there are several factors in evaluating the success of 
counter-narratives including:  
• the credibility of the messenger delivering the narrative,  
• how engaging the counter-narrative material is,  
• an in-depth understanding of the audience targeted,  
• how focused the goals and objectives of the campaign are (2015).  
Objectives of counter-extremist narratives should be specific, measurable, and 
realistic instead of vague goals, which contain little value for those assessing their 
effectiveness (Reynolds and Tuck 2016:15). According to the RAN Centre some of 
the intended outcomes for measuring effectiveness of counter-narrative campaigns 
is fewer people espousing extremist ideals, which can be assessed by measuring 
popularity of sharing content, searches, and the number of likes.  Also, looking for 
an increase in individuals rebuking extremist ideas online and becoming critical of 
violent ideologies and groups. 
Jacobson lists 4 means for crafting a successful counter-narrative to extremism. 
First, he suggests that there should be a strong effort to undermine extremist 
leadership by developing messages that undermine their authority and call into 
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question their credibility. Second, he emphasizes the importance of highlighting 
Muslim civilian suffering because of terror attacks to demonstrate the hypocrisy of 
the extremist narrative. Third, Jacobson recommends portraying terrorists as 
criminals and highlighting their links to criminal organizations. Fourth, he advocates 
focusing on the terrorist lifestyle by exploiting the fact that new recruits are treated 
badly, and that reality contradicts their propaganda (2010:4). “Most experts agree 
that the most effective tool to discredit both ISIS and their militant jihadi [sic] 
ideology is using the voices of disillusioned ISIS cadres themselves [sic]” 
(McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, and Yayla 2017:51). The importance of discrediting 
extremist ideologues and their narratives cannot be overstated, and Salafees have 
made numerous strides in debunking extremist narratives and engaging their ideas. 
In one such lecture, Shaikh al-Rehailee mentions a story of an individual that 
allegedly traveled to Syria and became disillusioned when he found that ISIS spent 
considerable efforts attempting to discredit Saudi Salafee scholars and spread 
takfeeree propaganda. Furthermore, he found that the jihaadee lifestyle they 
promoted contradicted the reality on the ground (2016).  “There are often a number 
of other elements that can strengthen the resolve of a militant to disengage or 
withdraw from violent activism. Cumulatively, it has been argued, such processes 
can have a positive impact on global counterterrorism efforts by promoting the 
internal fragmentation of violent radical groups and by delegitimizing their rhetoric 
and tactics in the eyes of the broader public” (Fink and Hearne 2008:1). If counter-
narratives and alternative messages are weak and ineffective then the results can 
be damaging to the credibility of the messenger. There are many potential 
unintended side effects of failed counter-narratives. Some of the negative outcomes 
and risks associated with an unsuccessful counter-narrative are messages can 
serve to alienate communities and at-risk individuals. Another potential unintended 
outcome is that counter extremist messages may be viewed as unbelievable and 
weak serving to empower the extremists’ narratives. Lastly, if counter-narratives are 
not focused they run the risk of being too broad, thus wasteful of resources (RAN 
2015). In the UK for instance, government has allotted many resources and funded 
numerous counter-radicalization efforts with many of those efforts being ineffective 
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when considering more than 800 fighters have left to conflict zones in Syria and 
Iraq, one of the largest contingencies from Western countries. This indicates that 
the intended target audience may not accept the counter-narratives presented. “For 
instance, during the last fifteen years the UK Home Office commissioned websites 
and groups to argue against al-Qaeda’s use of “Martyrdom” and calls to militant 
jihad [sic] using Islamic scriptures and logical arguments and also presenting 
moderate views of Islam” (McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, and Yayla 2017:50). 
According to a 2015 House of Commons report the UK efforts were to focus on four 
primary objectives: preventing terrorist apologists from traveling to the UK, guiding 
local authorities and institutions to understand and use statutory powers for 
challenging extremists, removing online extremist content, and supporting 
community-based approaches to deal with radical propaganda (2015:9). The UK 
also focused on supporting at risk individuals through programs that countered 
extremist ideology, sought to support mainstream voices in civil society and 
aggressively pursued extremist recruiters and personalities. In addition, the UK 
initiative sought to integrate isolated communities and pinpoint potential radicals. 
Even with the large amount of resources dedicated to counter extremism. These 
efforts were largely unsuccessful in the face of the graphic images, techno savvy 
videos, and strong narratives of al-Qaeda supporters. Also, the messages and 
messengers of the counter-narratives put forth did not seem credible to extremists. 
However, this is where Salafees have been more effective as their arguments are 
more rooted in divine scripture and traditional sources. Also, Salafees appear more 
credible to extremists and the target audience they are trying to influence and are 
often referenced in both negative and positive ways. 
 
Transition to Radicalism 
 
Understanding the root causes of radicalism and how individuals transition to 
violent action is an extremely complex phenomenon. The reasons for transitioning 
to violent extremism and its relationship to radical ideals are many and quite 
perplexing, and generally lie outside the scope of this study. However, by perusing 
some of the numerous academic theories attempting to explain this process, some 
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consistent trends can be observed. Many of the models surveyed show that most 
academics believe it is a process with variant stages. Some theories advocate that 
radicalism is a top down process in which recruiters or ideologues recruit individuals 
and indoctrinate them. Others suggest it is a bottom up process where individuals 
are often self-radicalized through online activity or exposure to radical ideals 
through literature and the variant forms of social media. Another important 
observation made by a growing number of academics is that radicalism or holding 
radical ideals does not necessitate violent action. Still some question the role of 
ideology as the main reason for violent extremist action (McCauley and Moskalenko 
2016). The assumption of this study is that ideology is an important factor in the 
process of radicalization and violent extremism. This conclusion has been arrived at 
due to the numerous studies showing the success in recruitment efforts of groups 
like al-Qaeda and ISIS and how those influenced by their paradigm seem to be 
more prone and predisposed to violence. “However, a more challenging issue has 
begun to emerge. There is evidence that not all those who engage in violent 
behavior necessarily need to possess radical beliefs… A lingering question in 
terrorism studies is whether violent beliefs precede violent action, and it seems to 
be the case that while they often do, it is not always the case (Horgan 2012:1). 
While Horgan’s observation is useful, his own research suggests that the majority of 
those involved in terrorism had been radicalized at some point prior to violent action. 
In the cases involving jihaadists, they predominately came across radical ideas 
before committing acts of terror or being motivated to act out violence or join 
conflicts. However, there does appear to be those anomalies where there were no 
prior indications of individuals encountering extremists or observable signs of 
embracing radical ideologies, thus further demonstrating the complexity of 
radicalization.84  Aside from trying to determine why people radicalize, the question 
remains why groups like ISIS are so efficient at recruitment and facilitating that 
process. The effectiveness of extremists’ messaging depends upon how they can 																																																								
84 The case of Ali Brown, who killed four people in the US claiming he was frustrated over the conflict 
in Syria and US policy in the Muslim world. He states, “I just wanted to do my part.” The researcher 
knew Ali and had contact with him a few months prior to his rampage, and at the time there were no 
observable traits of radicalization or influence of extremist ideology.  
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play upon the emotions of their target audience and this is especially true if the 
target audience is lacking in Islamic knowledge. Baker in his research sampling 
found that, “(e)vidence emanating from the sample group has pointed to the lack of 
religious knowledge and the effectiveness of extremist protagonists’ ability to tap 
into the emotional psyche of members of Muslim communities, particularly the 
youth due to their relatively new and either ‘founding’ or ‘youthful’ phases of 
development” (2009:320). 
 
The Salafee Response to Radicalism 
 
Most counter-extremism efforts take place at the government level; however, 
Salafees also play an active role in this process mainly through direct engagement 
with extremists. Their efforts include debating extremist ideas by presenting 
counter-narratives and alternative narratives. The more prominent methods 
Salafees employ are debating jihaadists and engaging their ideology. In 
contemporary times al-Albaanee was one of the most renowned Salafee scholars 
who directly engaged and debated jihaadists. In one such gathering a jihaadist 
supporter attempted to dispute al-Albaanee's concept of jihaad claiming that 
although his methodology was consistent with the manhaj of the Salaf, there were 
subtle differences. He said, "We have no doubt that you are one of the first of the 
scholars in the century to call for the return to the understanding of the Salaf. There 
is no doubt that the issue of jihad [sic] is an issue of disagreement among those 
who follow the manhaj as-Salaf al-Saalih" (salafipublications.com).  The jihaadee 
then began to explain his conditions for jihaad and question the origins of al-
Albaanee's claims. In the end, al-Albaanee demonstrated the inadequacies in the 
jihaadists’ reasoning and exposed their mistakes in comprehending of the issue. 
The debate highlighted several important points. First, it must be noted the 
credibility of al-Albaanee: even his adversaries acknowledged this. Second, Al-
Albaanee offered an effective positive alternative narrative to counter the jihaadist 
by emphasizing the priority of da'wa. Third, the counter-narrative of al-Albaanee 
exposed the inherent contradictions in jihaadee ideology and stratagem. Fourth, the 
debate illustrated how direct engagement from a qualified scholar with extremists 
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can be effective in dispelling their narratives. In another incident, Shaikh al-
Albaanee was sought out by a group of takfeerees to debate his theories on jihaad 
and takfeer. Initially, due to the severity of their takfeeree ideology, they would not 
pray behind him. One of the participants who narrated the incident later recanted 
after a series of debates and discussions with al-Albaanee. Shaikh al-Jawaabirah 
relates: 
           
          the discussion continued until the mu’addhin [sic] made the call to prayer  
          for fajr, and we were continually debating mentioning many aayaahs [from  
          the Quraan] [sic] which apparently proved [our stance of] declaring  
          Muslims to be disbelievers [takfeer], and likewise we would mention  
          hadiths which [again], apparently, proved [the stance we had taken of]  
          declaring those people who had committed major sins to be disbelievers.  
          And Shaikh Naasir was like a towering mountain answering this proof, and  
          explaining the objective of other proofs, and reconciling between those  
          which on the surface seemed to be contradictory, quoting the sayings of  
          the Salaf and Imaams who are relied upon from Ahlus-Sunnah wal- 
          Jamaa’ah [sic] (albaniblog.com). 
 
Although it is rare, some Salafee scholars, if they determine it is beneficial for the 
da’wa, do directly debate jihaadees. The purpose, they claim, is to manifest the 
truth, discredit extremists, and expose the flaws inherent in their logic by debunking 
their narrative. Al-Albaanee’s counter-narratives proved to be very effective in the 
incident mentioned above. Shaikh al-Jawaabirah states that “after Shaikh Naasir 
had convinced us of the error and deviation from the [correct] methodology that we 
had been upon, we turned back from our takfeeri [sic] thinking, and all praise is due 
to Allaah [sic]. Except for a small group [of us]- who ended up apostatizing from 
Islaam [sic]” (albaniblog.com). This anecdote affirms the Salafee maxim that 
extremism leads to disbelief eventually and further highlights Salafees’ role in 
producing effective counter-narratives to violent extremism and their ability to assist 
in the disengagement process. 
 
Most documented Salafee efforts take place in writings, books, and conferences 
instead of direct engagement with takfeerees. For example, al-Hameed in his 
monumental work, compiled from a master’s thesis, details many of the foundation 
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principles of ISIS and al-Qaeda. Then he highlights the relationship between the 
original Khawaarij sect and many of the contemporary takfeeree groups and 
ideologues. In his treatise he analyzes the developmental stages of many of the 
groups highlighting their participation in modern-day conflicts involving Muslims. 
The author further introduces some of the leading contemporary jihaadee figures, 
critiques their ideology, offers counter arguments, and extensively documents their 
methodological contraventions (2015).  By analyzing al-Hameed’s discussion of 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdasee, a leading takfeeree ideologue, the following points 
can be observed: 
 
• he refutes al-Maqdasee’s ideology with statements of classical scholars to 
debunk his paradigm, 
• he refutes several of his edicts of takfeer by using sharee’a based evidences 
and statements of classical and contemporary scholars, 
• and he uses anecdotes and testimonials of a former colleague of al-
Maqdasee to question his credibility. 
Overall, al-Hameed’s refutation provided a well-constructed convincing argument; 
however, it is difficult to determine how well received it is by the target audience, 
which is the only way to determine its effectiveness. Historically, Salafees have 
been pro-active in confronting extremists and engaging their ideals compared to 
their sectarian counterparts. As was illustrated elsewhere in this research, Salafees 
devote a significant portion of their lectures, lessons, and debates to presenting 
counter-narratives and alternative narratives to extremist ideology. For example, 
sahab.net a well-known Salafee Arabic website had over 845 postings with articles 
and audio lectures arguing against terrorism and extremist ideology. Many of the 
articles contained refutations of specific takfeeree ideologues and groups by 
rebutting their various religious edicts supporting violence. An analysis of some of 
the postings on the forum is forthcoming.  
 
There is an ongoing discussion in the academic community over whether Salafees 
are better suited to refute takfeeree extremists or not. This is probably because 
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many of the severely polemic debates used to counter extremist rhetoric come from 
Salafees. While surveying Salafee texts two main reasons become apparent for 
their extensive counter-narrative campaign and messaging. First, since a 
fundamental tenet of Salafism is to discern and refute heretical groups and 
ideologies, then it seems within reason that Salafees would devote extensive time 
and effort in distinguishing their da’wa and discrediting takfeeree extremists. 
Second, there are practical reasons for rebuking extremism since Salafism is often 
cited as the core ideology behind violent Islamic extremism. Also, as was shown 
earlier in the study, some of the primary sources of Salafism are often 
misinterpreted to espouse and justify violence. Many takfeeree ideologues tend to 
reference classical sources to bolster their manhaj and credentials as being Salafee. 
However, even with this being the case many of their contemporary references, like 
Syed Qutb, who Salafees vehemently oppose, differ dramatically with the manhaj of 
contemporary Salafee scholars (Green 2009). Although Salafees and some of the 
extremist groups discussed in this research may share some overlapping 
theological points of reference that does not necessitate Salafees being extremist 
or advocating violence.  
 
There is both a positive and negative to having some shared tenets between 
takfeerees and Salafees. As several researchers observe, Salafees appear to be 
better positioned to offer a credible counter-narrative to extremist arguments. 
However, a negative aspect of those alleged similarities is that it allows for easy 
transition for weak Salafees to extremism. For example, a Salafee that engages in 
debates and discussions, but is ill prepared to defend his or her manhaj can be 
swayed by jihaadist arguments. Olidort claims Salafees and jihaadists “are all 
composed of the same theological DNA. They base themselves on texts and 
concepts developed over centuries by communities of established Muslim 
scholars… It is therefore not a big conceptual leap to go from quietism to jihadism 
[sic]” (McCants and Olidort 2015:1).  However, contrary to McCants and Olidort’s 
assessment there are several case studies which illustrate the contrary:  there is 
substantially more movement towards Salafism by Jihaadists. Baker observes, 
	 218	
“Indeed, such data is supported by Sean O’Reilly’s case study account of the 
stagnation in learning he initially experienced followed by his gravitation from the 
violent extremist narrative towards Salafism. It is therefore prudent to assume that 
the respondents from the sample group … are progressing in a similar manner to 
the rest of their cohort” (2009:320). Baker’s research results indicate that 
transitioning to radicalism is multi-facetted.  In his conclusion he drew correlations 
between religious maturity and ideological orientation, to the process of 
radicalization. Also, Baker found that the radicalization of Salafees in mature stages 
of religious development did not pose an impending threat, but rather some 
extremists were more inclined to embrace Salafism. Again, Baker asserts, “The 
question of susceptibility to extremist propaganda, judging by what has transpired 
during the case studies and interviews depends on a multiplicity of factors related to 
socio-economic, socio-political, socio-religious and psychological drivers which 
serve to affect or influence the psyche of Muslim converts at both pre and post 
conversion stages of their lives” (2009: 321). Radicalization is a complex process, 
and as Baker’s research suggests ideology, socio-economic factors, and one’s 
religious maturity all play a role in determining whether one is susceptible to violent 
extremist propaganda or not. Still, even though radicalization is a complicated 
undertaking Salafees appear to be the most suited to attend to the phenomena and 
the less likely to transition from Salafism to violent jihaadism. 
 
Academic Cynics  
 
For some, the premise of Salafism as an antidote requires further scrutiny because 
some takfeerees reference Salafee scholars and selectively choose religious edicts 
that appear to validate their discourse. Since some academics claim that Salafees 
share a common theology as takfeeree groups, the implication of that supposition is 
that it is not a large step for a Salafee to become radicalized. However, according to 
this research premise and the evidence cited, this does not seem to be the case, 
but instead Salafees appear to offer constructive arguments to counter-
radicalization due to some of their commonly shared beliefs. Qadhi claims, “Pacifist 
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Salafism” is one of the best tools to counter radicalism. He also asserts that true 
analysis of the problem of radicalism must be addressed by responding to alleged 
grievances of the Muslim world in general, and radicals more specifically, to find 
solutions to the formidable challenge of radicalism (Qadhi and McCants 2015). 
Although Qadhi admits Salafees offer the most daunting defiance to jihaadists he is 
still cynical of Salafee government partnerships. 
 
Western governments and the intelligence community are mostly skeptical, with few 
exceptions, of partnering with Salafees or any Islamic groups that promote political 
activism or have beliefs, which appear leery of core democratic values. They view 
Salafees and Islamists with suspicion and see them as problematic. They further 
argue, “governments should not legitimize and empower them with any form of 
partnership. The long-term repercussions on social cohesion and integration of 
such engagement, they add, would be much greater than the yet-to-be-proven 
short-term gains than can be achieved in preventing acts of terrorism” (Vindino 
2009:63). Vindino goes on to advocate that the greater the terror threat to a country 
has a causal relationship with its willingness to cooperate with actors that it 
normally views as disagreeable, in other words, “the higher the terrorist threat, the 
lower the bar of partner acceptability is set” (2009:65). The skepticism of Western 
secular states is understandable; however, evidence does not support the 
transitioning of non-violent Salafees to becoming violent extremists. However, the 
prevailing consensus and main argument of skeptics is that there is real tension 
and conflict of interests in partnering with undemocratic groups. Vindino claims, “If 
success in counter radicalization is deemed to be the marginalization of extremist 
and anti-integration ideas among young European Muslims, then many believe that 
partnering with nonviolent Islamists is counterproductive” (2009:71). 
 
There are a variety of criticisms of Salafism and moreover partnering with Salafees 
when it comes to counter-extremism policy. Some pundits suggest that Salafee 
thought is not politically mature and the behavior of the Saudi regime has 
contributed to the evolution of jihaadists. “Jihadi-salafism [sic] was thus a rejection 
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of the original quietist version, which was seen by jihadis [sic] as inadequate to 
rectify the “un-Islamic” state of affairs of the Saudi kingdom and the wider Arab and 
Muslim world. To a great extent, jihadi-Salafis [sic] chose armed struggle as the 
approach to political change because the quietists offered no political program” 
(Bokhari and McCants 2015:3).  Bokhari also observes that this absence of a 
political strategy serves to hamper Salafees’ efforts to disengage radicals, who view 
the Salafee manhaj as impractical for rectifying society or the ails of the umma. 
Other critics argue that Salafees are not truly static regarding political activism, and 
that conflicts, politics, and civil strife can all effect their stance towards political 
involvement, so that inevitably Salafees are unpredictable as pacifists.  Factors 
such as a change in domestic politics, tyranny, religious suppression, and war, all 
influence political activism and a movement’s stance towards violence. Case 
studies in various conflict zones such as Bosnia, Iraq, Syria, Burma, Kashmir and 
Afghanistan have all challenged the Salafee clerics’ position regarding violence. For 
some pundits this only underscores the fact that Salafees are selectively quietists 
and they share many jihaadist causes. However, this researcher suggests that what 
defines Salafees is their adherence to Salafist principles and that the sharee’a 
permits varied stances to varying realities without diminishing or subverting core 
religious principles like the response to tyrannous rulers or principles governing 
when jihaad is legislated as an institution. Therefore, the fact that a Salafee cleric or 
body of scholars issues a decree of defensive jihaad for instance, does not equate 
to the wanton use of force and violent edicts issued by jihaadee clerics. However, 
Wagemakers observes, “If one adopts the concepts, methods and basic 
assumptions of Salafism as a framework of reasoning, the radicals’ theological 
arguments may not come across as being quite as preposterous as some quietist 
Salafis [sic] would have us believe” (Wagemakers and McCants 2015:3). Another 
common criticism of partnering with Salafees in counter extremism efforts is that 
extremists share their overall paradigm and that an unintended consequence of 
their messaging is that it may push the target audience closer to violent radicalism.  
While this is not entirely untenable, the gravitation towards extremism is usually the 
result of either weak counter-messaging or because the overall worldview of 
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jihaadees and Salafees has similarities, therefore radicals may not be sufficiently 
persuaded to abandon violence especially when they are not adequately grounded 
in Salafist principles or founding youthful phase of development.   
 
Another claim made against Salafees is that their unwillingness to integrate into 
their host societies by rejecting core democratic ideas makes them prime 
candidates for fostering extremism. This is a common criticism expressed in 
Western societies.  Vindino claims, while Salafees may reject radicalism and violent 
ideologies “they simultaneously play the role of arsonists, pushing a message that 
plays on the separate identity of Muslims as well as the alleged persecution to 
which Muslims are subjected in Europe and justifying violence in other 
circumstances” (2009:72). This critique was directed specifically at politically 
engaged groups like the Muslim Brotherhood; however, Salafees were included in 
his criticism. The logic goes that since Salafees and other groups reject democracy 
and some of the widely accepted values and norms of the West that they are 
radical themselves and give credence to the ideology espoused by violent 
extremists withholding the vehemence. In addition, by having dialogue with groups 
considered radical, even if they do not espouse violence, is giving them a pulpit to 
advocate their counter-cultural views. Also, it is giving them legitimacy as actors to 
partner with in counter extremism and subverting more moderate modernist views 
by giving preference to those who, in their view, are untenable. Maher and 
Frampton state in their critique of those who partner with Salafees and Islamists in 
preventing violent extremism (PVE),  
 
          The central theoretical flaw in PVE is that it accepts the premise that non- 
          violent extremists can be made to act as bulwarks against violent  
          extremists. Some within government and the police service believe that  
          only nonviolent radicals – otherwise known as ‘political Islamists’ –  
          possess the necessary ‘street cred’ to control angry young Muslims.  
          Genuine Muslim moderates are regularly dismissed by key authority  
          figures as ‘spoken for’, and thus marginalized [sic]. Non-violent  
          extremists have consequently become well dug in as partners of national  
          and local government and the police. Some of the government’s chosen  
          collaborators in ‘addressing grievances’ of angry young Muslims are  
          themselves at the forefront of stoking those grievances against British  
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          foreign policy; western social values; and alleged state-sanctioned  
          ‘Islamophobia’ [sic] (2009:5). 
 
 
It appears, according to the logic of Maher and Frampton, that partnering with those 
that consistently have shown they are more effective in countering the narratives of 
violent jihaadists is unacceptable, primarily due to political reasons and the 
concerns that Salafees may simply be latent jihaadists, and profoundly extreme. 
However, Lambert castigates those who criticized his work at the MCU and the 
partnerships forged with Salafees by saying, “Muslim partners are being re-cast as 
Muslim suspects and Muslim informants by influential academics and think-tanks” 
(2013:256). While their concerns should be acknowledged and are not entirely 
irrational, academics and think tanks should be at the forefront of research and 
sound academic conclusions based upon analysis of existing trends within Salafism. 
Most of the critics of counter-extremist partnerships attempt to undermine any 
efforts that involve, what they deem, as undesirable partners. Maher and Frampton 
conclude, “PVE is thus underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an 
illiberal, intolerant and anti-western world view. Political and theological extremists, 
acting with the authority conferred by official recognition, are indoctrinating young 
people with an ideology of hostility to western values” (2009:5). According to Maher 
and Frampton the approach of partnering with ‘non-violent radicals’ is both flawed in 
theory and practice, because it courts those who contradict many mainstream 
values and morays, although they may not openly espouse violence in Western 
societies. They further argue that these contradictions should not be tolerated as 
they contrast with the political culture of the host society and accommodate groups 
and individuals that have the latent propensity for violence.   
 
           This strategic error on the part of officialdom is born of a poverty of  
           aspiration: the belief of the authorities that they cannot reasonably ask  
           angry Muslims for much more than a pledge not to use violence in Britain.  
           The effect has been to empower reactionaries within Muslim communities  
           and to marginalise genuine moderates, thus increasing inter-community  
           tensions and envenoming the public space (Maher and Frampton 2009:5). 
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Proponents 
 
In contrast, there are those in academia who allege Salafees speak the same 
theological language as extremists, so they are generally better equipped to be an 
antidote to their narratives. Mubin acknowledges that Salafees vociferously oppose 
violent extremists and Western governments can capitalize on their counter-
narratives. “ISIS and quietist Salafis [sic] do share an intellectual genealogy. But in 
contrast to most quietist Salafis [sic], ISIS’s violent worldview springs from the 
political realities of Iraq and the views of Saddam-era Baathists who make up the 
top echelons of ISIS” (McCants and Mubin 2015:2). This statement supports the 
growing realization of some academics that Salafees can, and do, play a role in 
offering counter-narratives to extremist messaging. Furthermore, Mubin’s 
assessment implicates the role of politics in influencing extremists’ rhetoric and 
violent worldview, while at the same time highlighting Salafees’ general pacifism. 
Baker affirms: 
 
          it is increasing acknowledged among statutory bodies and security  
          services that those most effective in countering violent extremism are             
          grassroot communities that understand the psychology and ideology of  
          extremist groups and have experience/expertise in tackling them.  
          Nevertheless, the question of susceptibility to extremism remains and it is  
          the researcher’s summation that so long as new converts, regardless of  
          their respective ages of conversion, are engaged with from an ideological  
          and methodological standpoint during the ‘founding’ and ‘youthful’ phases  
          of development where they are most susceptible, the risk of and exposure  
          to violent radicalisation/extremism [sic] can be effectively reduced     
          (2009:324). 
 
The radicalization process is an entirely complex and perplexing phenomenon: 
however, Salafees exhibit the most potent counter-narrative and are the most 
effective in countering this process and interrupting its stages. Salafees understand 
the takfeeree creed, methodology, and use some of the same terminology and 
concepts. Again, Mubin concedes “Quietist Salafis [sic] can (and do) openly and 
vociferously oppose ISIS’ interpretation of Islamic texts and dispute its use of 
Islamic scripture and scholarship” (McCants and Mubin 2015:2). In contrast, 
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Moderates have no influence over potential jihaadists nor can they offer credible 
counter arguments to the radical narrative (McCants and Mubin 2015:2). Moderates 
generally do not speak the same language as takfeeree extremists, nor do they 
possess the credibility, as Salafees per se, to confront extremists.85 In fact, many 
Salafee students actively study classical and contemporary texts that refute 
takfeeree ideology.  A former Central Intelligence Agency official Reuel Marc 
Gerecht stated, “Muslim ‘moderates’ can’t defeat bin Ladenism since they don’t 
speak to the same audience with the same language and passions” (Vidino 
2009:62). Although ideology alone does not account for the rise of violent 
extremism, this research asserts that it is a primary cause even though it “should 
not be the sole focus of interventions. Many Muslims hold serious grievances (both 
perceived and real) that also need to be addressed. But Quietist Salafis [sic] can be 
very effective at persuading youth to consider more constructive approaches to 
political change” (McCants and Mubin 2015:3).    
 
 Another important observation made during this research is that Salafees’ 
abstinence from democratic participation does not mean they disrespect its 
institutions, or more importantly, call to violence, even though Salafism, in principle, 
is at odds with liberal democratic ideas. Mubin states, “I’d rather have young Muslim 
Salafi [sic] types who don’t vote or don’t believe in voting than have those who think 
terrorism is in any way legitimate in Islam” (McCants and Mubin 2015:3).86 Most of 
the empirical data and literature presented in this research indicate that Salafee 
mosques, da’wa centers, and organizations are not fertile grounds for terrorist 
recruitment. Instead, Salafees tend to be at the forefront of presenting counter-
narratives and rebuttals to extremist messaging. “With the exception of Finsbury 
Mosque, no empirical evidence exists of any other registered mosques ever being 
taken over or administered by violent extremists” (Baker 2009:326). Salafees, for 																																																								
85The discourse of many academics and scholars of other Islamic traditions is inconsistent with the 
discourse used by many of the extremists and thus they are viewed as lacking credibility and 
therefore respect. In order to effectively engage extremist arguments it is important that those who 
attempt to do so have some sort of credibility to the extremists.  
86 A growing number of non-Salafee, and even non-Muslim academics acknowledge that Salafism 
may not be inclusive as a movement, but it is generally not a threat. Also, there is increasing 
acknowledgement that Salafees tend to offer strong counter extremist messaging.  
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some like McCants, Brachman, and Felter, may not be ideal partners in 
governmental counter-terrorism efforts; however, they acknowledge their counter-
narratives to jihaadee discourse may be the most effective.  
 
          Finally, a word about “moderate” Muslims. The measure of moderation  
          depends on what type of standard you use. If by “moderate” one means  
          the renouncement of violence in the achievement of political goals, then  
          the majority of Salafis [sic] are moderate. But if by “moderate” one means  
          an acceptance of secularism, capitalism, democracy, gender equality, and  
          a commitment to religious pluralism, then Salafis [sic] would be extremists  
          on all counts. Then again, there are not many Muslim religious leaders in  
          the Middle East that would qualify as moderates according to the second  
          definition. Until there are, the international community should focus on  
          alienating Jihadis[sic] from the broader Salafi [sic] Movement. While it  
          may be distasteful to work with non-violent Salafi [sic] leaders, they are  
          best positioned to delegitimize Jihadi [sic] violence (2006:11). 
 
Case Study of Sahab.net 
 
In this section Salafee discourse and counter-narratives will be examined to 
highlight existing Salafee efforts in countering extremists. The case study of 
sahab.net, a renowned online Salafee forum dedicated to propagating the Salafee 
da’wa will be assessed for its role in disseminating counter-narratives. Although the 
website is not wholly dedicated to refuting extremists, it does offer a vast number of 
postings that deal with counter-extremism topics while promoting some of the well-
known Saudi Salafee scholars and their verdicts. Sahab.net has countless posts 
from forum participants and transcriptions of verdicts, and audio lectures of Salafee 
scholars discussing controversial topics such as jihaad, takfeer and terrorism. For 
instance, in a search for the term terrorism, generally used on the site to refer to 
violent jihaadee activities, 386 entries appeared, the term takfeer produced over 
5,535 entries, with jihaadee producing 106 entries, and the word extremist had 114 
entries. Finally, there were 130 entries referencing the term violence. Most of the 
entrees referenced violent extremists, rebuttals of their ideologies, or Salafees’ 
stance regarding the use of violence.   
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Chart One:  
 
 
The pie chart documenting frequently used terms to reference extremism and 
radical activities, shows that Salafees that use the sahib.net forum most are 
concerned with ideological deviance from Salafist principles with the notion of 
takfeer being the most prominent concept being discussed. While terrorism and the 
use of violence were also discoursed along with distorted conceptions of jihaad by 
violent groups, the data overwhelming suggests Salafees are most concerned with 
creed and methodological issues which contravene their beliefs. 
 
Many of the articles and lectures posted on sahab.net offer clarifications of the 
Salafee manhaj, distinguish Salafees from violent extremist ideologies, and 
chronicle the development of contemporary jihaadee movements. What this 
indicates is that Salafees are active in disseminating counter messaging and 
cognizant of the dangers present in jihaadist ideals. The implication for Salafees is 
that if they do not become proactive in denouncing extremism they risk further 
being associated with radicalism. However, it must be noted that these discussions 
only take place between Salafees; there is no cross-spectrum engagement of ideas, 
Terrorism	
Takfeer	
Jihaadee	Extremist	Violence	
Terms	Used	on	sahab.net		
Terrorism	 Takfeer	 Jihaadee	 Extremist	 Violence	
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which results in mainly affirmation of Salafee messaging. Many of the online forums, 
especially Salafee ones, are simply communities consisting of individuals of the 
same manhaj.  
 
As was detailed earlier in this study, Salafees devote a considerable amount of their 
writings to denouncing those whom they deem to be deviant in manhaj, with 
refutations against jihaadee-takfeeree ideologues taking precedence. By taking a 
random sampling of three separate posts from sahab.net it was hoped that this 
might offer insight into how Salafee forums address the issue of extremist thought 
and if counter-radicalism strategies were involved.  During the sample of three 
posts several observations were made. In the first post entitled: The Dangers of 
Pronouncing Takfeer Prematurely, the forum participant posted a fatwa of the 
Committee of Major Scholars that included: 
 
• a clarification of takfeer as a sharee’a based principle, 
• the exemplification of the dangers associated with adopting takfeer as an 
ideology and its heretical nature, 
• emphasis on the preservation of lives and property, with discussions about 
the consequences of extremism, both material and ideological, 
• and the sinfulness and injustice inherent to takfeeree ideology and its 
violation of integral sharee’a principles (accessed 2/10/2018). 
 
The post mainly consisted of a posting of the fatwa, which was primarily intended to 
offer counter messaging to takfeeree discourse by showing that the actions of 
extremist groups are inconsistent with sharee’a ethics and concepts. Also, it 
emphasized the negative consequences of acting upon heretical ideologies. The 
fatwa could be characterized as offering a counter-narrative to extremist thought 
with a focus on correcting the distortion of Islamic principles, and providing an 
alternative message used to undermine their narrative. In the second post: Al-
Qaeda the Khawaarij, the author highlighted: 
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• the link between the early sect and the contemporary group 
• the difference between the creed of Ahl al-Sunna, the Khawaarij, and al-
Qaeda, 
• the role of classical scholarship and texts rebuking the various Khawaarij 
sects, 
• and contemporary Salafee scholars’ position about the development of the 
takfeeree ideology (accessed 2/10/2018). 
 
The author of this post mainly dealt with the historical development of the takfeeree 
ideology by distinguishing between the Salafee position and the takfeeree paradigm 
throughout history. This post seemed to be more directed at debunking extremist 
ideology by introducing both historic and contemporary scholarship. In the third post, 
Salafees are Free from Terrorist Actions, the writer: 
 
• characterizes the actions of suicide bombings and car bombings as un-
Islamic, terror inspired actions, 
• describes violent extremists as ignorant, young, and heretical by seeking to 
undermine their credibility, 
• also he clarifies the takfeeree creed while mentioning contemporary 
figureheads of the ideology from Syed Qutb to bin Laden to discredit their 
ideology. 
 
Like the other posts sampled in this research it sought to undermine the credibility 
of jihaadee and takfeeree figureheads by emphasizing the loss of life and dire 
consequences of acting upon jihaadee messaging. Also, the analysis sought to 
undermine the integrity of highly influential jihaadee figureheads. This post seemed 
to be the most comprehensive in both offering counter-narratives and an alternative 
narrative by focusing on da’wa as the means for rectifying Muslim grievances rather 
than violence. Finally, most of the postings surveyed on sahab.net are replete with 
calls questioning and diminishing the credibility of takfeerees by refuting their 
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ideology and offering alternative narratives on how to rectify creed through sound 
Islamic knowledge and da’wa, which implies that Salafees do have a strong role in 
producing counter-narratives to extremist rhetoric. 
 
Miraath.net:  Audio Lectures 
 
 
Another popular Salafee website that contains a multitude of lectures from Salafee 
scholars is miraath.net. Roughly 27% of site’s audio lectures are dedicated to 
issues of takfeer, jihaad, and extremism. Most of the lectures devoted to these 
topics are repudiations of violent extremist ideology and clarifications of the Salafee 
approach to jihaad and takfeer, similar to their English Salafee counterparts. This 
shows that refuting extremists is a fairly consistent pillar of the Salafee manhaj and 
both the English and Arabic language websites confront these issues. A significant 
amount of the material uploaded to the website, twenty seven percent, offered 
rebuttals to takfeeree extremists, which is fairly significant for a website that has 
only been in existence for less than five years. This is in contrast to the many non-
Salafee websites that do not engage in discussions of similar themes. This is 
perhaps due to Salafees’ concerns with, as they view it, preserving orthodoxy and 
proactively repudiating heterodoxy. 
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Drosq8.com: Number of Audio/Video Lectures 
 
 
 
Drosq8.com is a Kuwaiti based Salafee website with over four thousand audio and 
video lectures dedicated to a wide range of Islamic topics and research primarily 
from Kuwaiti scholars. About twenty nine percent of the audio video content is 
devoted to refuting Khawaarij, issues related to takfeer and correcting 
misconceptions about jihaad, as well as denouncing extremism.  
 
The dedication to controversial topics such as jihaad and takfeer appears to be a 
consistent trend amongst Salafee websites, which highlights the fact that they are 
persistent in addressing extremism. It may be possible to conclude that Salafees’ 
efforts have an effect on potential extremist actors; however, it is difficult to 
measure quantitatively as was discussed previously. Salafees take a concerted 
approach to repudiating extremists, because for them it is a religious obligation to 
refute what they deem are aberrations that threaten orthodoxy and the da’wa efforts. 
To Salafees, these are methodological differences between them and jihaadist 
groups that must be addressed, highlighted, and disproved. These refutations are 
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not a part of a government sponsored program or at the behest of policy think tanks, 
rather they are intrinsic to the Salafee manhaj and that is why there is a large 
amount of consistency in lectures, research, books, and websites devoted to these 
topics. Even the data collected from the small sampling of Salafee websites, three 
English websites and three in Arabic, were consistent in showing that approximately 
one fourth to one third of Salafee material analyzed details and repudiates extremist 
ideology.    
 
 Aside form websites numerous books have been authored to counter extremist 
messaging. In a monumental work entitled, Taleeya al-Hiwaar al Daarij beina 
Sunna wa al-Khawaarij, by Shaikh ‘Abdul Maalik Ramadaanee, the author set out 
to debunk 75 documented claims of the takfeeree groups around the subject of the 
caliphate, jihaad, and takfeer. The author meticulously details the most common 
claims of the takfeerees, their logic and conventions for determining an edict, and 
their comprehension of textual evidences. Then he proceeds to discredit and 
repudiate their arguments. The book itself was written as a dialogue between 
Salafees and takfeerees and was compiled over several years of research adapted 
from a prior lecture delivered by the Shaikh. A distinguishable trait of the work was 
that a large “group of those who listened to the lecture claimed that it was the 
reason for their guidance to the mathab of Ahl Sunna [sic] regarding dealing with 
the leader and leaving the mathab [sic] of the fickle minded, irrational, and blood 
thirsty” (2017:8). According to the author’s account, many youths in Algeria who 
were previously aligned with jihaadee groups were affected by his lecture. The 
lecture challenged their prior premise regarding the government and the ideology of 
takfeer.  In one example, Shaikh Ramadaanee mentions the premise of many 
contemporary takfeerees, who claim to follow the Salaf, which is that the modern-
day leaders are oppressive and differ with the righteous leadership of the 
Companions. Therefore, according to their claim, governments lack religiosity and 
violate the sharee’a, which in turn nullifies their right to be obeyed and invalidates 
their social contract. The Shaikh then confers how their logic contradicts the 
sharee’a, by stating, “they judge in accordance with their (limited) intellectual 
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capacity and emotionalism in contradiction to the authenticated divine texts” 
(2017:16). This statement of the Shaikh, although simplistic, resonates with the 
target audience who pride themselves as being adherent to the dictates of sharee’a. 
His statement also questions their claim to legitimacy by showing they do not 
adhere to sharee’a commandments, nor do they refer to clearly expounded upon 
tenets of Islamic law, but instead rely upon logic. The Shaikh’s assertion discredits 
their flawed logic by illustrating the contradiction of the takfeeree premise: the 
leaders are apostate and must be fought. His account illustrates the effectiveness 
of his preaching and counter-narrative in disrupting the radicalization process. 
Through providing counter-narratives to the doubts of the youths by using sharee’a-
based arguments the Shaikh’s credibility was solidified as a proficient Islamic 
scholar. The veracity of the takfeeree claims was tried by first establishing the 
Shaikh’s integrity and then through the legitimacy of his argumentation. The Shaikh 
provides a strong, effective counter-narrative, thus disrupting the radicalization 
process as attested by those who abandoned their former ideology. Debunking their 
edicts of takfeer and undermining their claims of the legality of rebellion were 
important in establishing the Shaikh’s credibility. What makes Shaikh 
Ramadaanee’s book so effective is that he disputes the takfeeree claims point by 
point offering solid textual evidences while highlighting the inherent politicization of 
their arguments. In addition, he was able to show that their arguments consisted 
mainly of conjecture lacking the necessary sharee’a based evidences and 
messaging that resonates with the target audience.  
 
Jihaadists are effective in packaging their message, so it is crucial that Salafees 
can counter their stratagem. Some of the known recruitment tactics of jihaadists, as 
identified by Briggs and Fever, are that they create a sense of duty by extolling the 
rewards of jihaad and promoting a sense of victimhood (2014). Shaikh 
Ramadaanee, in his book, addresses those methods by emphasizing that the 
greatest sense of duty is reformation to reconcile the challenges faced by the umma, 
which is brought about by returning to the core principles of the faith. Shaikh 
Ramadaanee’s lecture engages the target audience primarily through introducing 
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facts and critiquing takfeeree ideology. Many youths that are targeted by extremist 
groups tend to incline to a more literal understanding of Islam, which also makes 
them susceptible to the Salafee da’wa. Shaikh Ramadaanee’s message was 
effective at moving those inclined towards violence to a more pacifist Salafee 
perspective. This illustrates both the effectiveness of a strong counter-narrative and 
a stratagem that assists in disengaging extremists.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Consistent with the findings of this study, Salafees seem to have the most clear-cut 
and operative strategy for addressing extremism. This chapter began by introducing 
some of the main theorems of how extremists recruit by analyzing the radicalization 
process. The results of that analysis reveal that radicalization is a perplexing 
process attributable to a multitude of factors such as psychological development 
and socio-political factors, which all make the target audience more susceptible to 
jihaadist recruitment and violent extremism. As the evidence confirms groups like 
ISIS are extremely effective at producing cogent narratives as shown by their ability 
to persuade and recruit foreign fighters from around the world to support their cause.   
 
Also, during this chapter the question of what comprises an effective counter-
narrative was explored. It was determined that the credibility of the messenger, 
quality of counter messaging and audience retention were all key factors in 
determining a message’s effectiveness as in the case of Shaikh al-Albaanee’s 
engagement with extremists and Shaikh Ramadaanee’s lecture. In addition, one of 
the desired effects of counter-narratives and positive messaging is to encourage 
violent radicals and those inclined towards violence to disengage. The Salafee 
method uses powerful counter messaging as an antidote to radicalization and 
extremism; in addition, Salafees tend to be more ideologically sophisticated and 
capable of understanding contemporary jihaadee paradigms. The observations 
made over the course of this chapter show that Salafees tend to be more proactive 
in their counter extremist messaging, also they are considered to be the most 
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credible amongst target audiences to address radicalization and are closer in 
ideological proximity than many other groups. Baker observes, “it is increasingly 
acknowledged among statutory bodies and security services that those most 
effective in countering violent extremism are grassroot communities that understand 
the psychology and ideology of extremist groups and have experience/expertise in 
tackling them” (2009:323).  Baker’s research also illustrates the process of 
radicalization from a convert’s perspective by detailing specifically the stages many 
converts to Islam traverse while being radicalized.   
 
In addition, this chapter also included critics of Salafism and cynics of their efforts to 
produce effective counter-narratives.  Cynics mostly questioned Salafees’ role as 
potential partners in countering violent extremism. On the other hand, critics were 
largely skeptical of Salafism as a methodology for understanding Islam and 
generally regard it as a radical ideology. 
 
Finally, this chapter concluded by assessing some of the proponents of Salafees’ 
role in counter radicalization by analyzing some of their arguments and by 
supplementing case studies taken from well-known Salafee websites. This was 
done in order to illustrate the importance of Salafees’ online presence in confuting 
radical discourse and ideology. 
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Chapter Six: Research Conclusions 
 
Ideology is fundamental to any movement; however, Salafism claims to be distinct 
from any secular ideology, with a literalist methodology based upon the orthodox 
Islamic tradition. This research has shown that the roots of Salafism are derived 
from the original textual sources of Islam: the Qur’an and Sunna, and the concepts 
espoused by the Companions. This more literalist approach is primarily associated 
with that of Ahl al-Hadeeth. This research set out to investigate Salafism as an 
antidote to extremism by exploring the contemporary rise of extremist movements 
such as al-Qaeda and ISIS and how they compare to the Salafist tradition. This 
comparison was made for three primary reasons. First, because Salafism is usually 
attributed as the underlying ideology of contemporary extremist Muslim groups by 
academics and policy pundits. Secondly, the comparison between the various 
trends warranted attention and analysis because of the researcher’s pre-existing 
knowledge of Salafees’ orientation and approach towards countering extremists 
within the broad spectrum of Islamic movements. Also, there is a necessity to 
highlight Salafee efforts and measure their effectiveness in producing counter-
narratives to extremist discourse. Salafees, regardless of their location, are 
connected by a consistent set of principles and methodology, best illustrated by the 
various locations surveyed during the course of this study. Even in case studies 
carried out in Nigeria, the data seems fairly consistent, showing that Salafees are 
consistent in their creed and methodological approach to extremism. “Given the 
widespread association of Salafism with radicalism and violent extremism, many 
will be surprised to learn that Nigerian Salafis [sic] have vigorously opposed violent 
extremism” (Umar 2018:1). Third, an important part of this study was to elucidate 
the Salafee manhaj from an insider’s perspective and explore the possibility that 
some of the claimants to Salafism and trends associated with it are in fact alien to 
the Salafee manhaj. It seems appropriate to reiterate, as cited in chapter one, a 
well-known axiom of fiqh: the reality lies in substance not in a name when 
considering the diverse trends associated with Salafism. 
 
	 236	
In chapter one of this thesis the origins of Salafism were traced, and its core tenets 
defined as characterized by Salafee scholars. Key components of the Salafee 
creed were explored such as tawheed, faith, and methodological considerations. 
The Salafee da’wa is based largely upon the efforts of the movement to restore and 
defend the original creed, fiqh, and general sciences of Islam as articulated by the 
Companions. This rigid methodology based upon a more literal approach to 
interpreting the Qur’an and Sunna traces much of its tradition to Ahl al-Hadeeth. 
The evidence presented in chapter one clearly suggests that Salafee scholars view 
their creed and methods as being orthodox and they reference core Islamic texts 
and classical scholarship to substantiate their claim. The Salafee approach bases 
much of its credence upon making direct use of the Qur’an and Sunna as the 
primary sources and references for Islam.  Therefore, in the Salafee creed 
emphasis is placed upon judgments being firmly rooted in the primary sources 
rather than speculative, secular or unorthodox methods. The Salafee view is that 
the religion is complete and requires no additional sources, which might lead to 
aberrations in Islam. This also highlights why Salafees appear obsessed with bid’a 
and refuting the sectarian traditions of Ahl al-Kalaam and other sects that differ with 
their methodology of textual interpretation. 
 
An important fact that was learned while analyzing data for this chapter was that 
although Salafees, and in fact the Salaf, have uniform stances rebuking bid’a in 
general and Ahl al-Kalaam specifically, some well-known scholars of Ahl al-Sunna 
engaged rather actively with Ahl al-Kalaam while fiercely debating their arguments 
by using their terminologies and language. Ibn Rajab (died 795 Hijra) states:  
 
          Groups among the Imaams of the Hadith [sic] scholars, those of them who  
          had memorized (the Qur’an), and their jurists used to love the Shaykh (ibn  
          Taymiyya) [sic] and deem him great. However, they did not love his deep  
          involvement with the Kalam [sic] theologians and the philosophers. In this,  
          they followed the way of the Imaams of the early Hadith [sic] scholars,  
          such as al-Shafii, Ahmad, Ishaq, Abu ‘Ubayd (al-Qasim ibn Sallam) and  
          those like them (Hoover and Mahajne 2018:45). 
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Ibn Taimeeya's unique method of engagement seemed like an anomaly that 
challenged the Salafee premise that Ahl al-Sunna or the Salaf had a single 
methodological approach to all affairs of the religion. However, after further analysis 
it became noteworthy that Salafee scholars would potentially address this claim in 
one of two ways. First, that the methods used by Ibn Taimeeya to address the 
problem of religious aberrations and those considered heretics by Salafees, does 
not actually conflict with the overall methods of the Salaf and that he was critical in 
rebuking those sects; nonetheless he chose to engage more proactively through 
strong scholarship and analysis of their methods illustrating the strength of his 
ijtihaad. This appears to differ from many of the recorded narrations of the Salaf 
and treatises they authored openly rebuking Ahl al-Kalaam without deeply engaging 
in their ideological premises. Second, as was discussed early in the research that if 
there was a question of a mistake in Ibn Taimeeya’s approach that would not expel 
him from the manhaj but would be attributable to his slight alternative approach and 
interpretation to the codified methods of the Salaf in dealing with Ahl al-Bid’a.  Still, 
nonetheless, some of the latter-day scholars of Ahl al-Hadeeth were critical of Ibn 
Taimeeya’s tactic of engaging Ahl al-Kalaam. 
 
Another observation made during this chapter after investigating the literature was 
that the findings demonstrate the failure of many policy analysts and writers to 
distinguish between the tenets of Salafism and jihaadism and why it is necessary to 
do so. In addition, this chapter also highlighted some of the core doctrine of 
takfeeree-jihaadee groups by contrasting their views with that of Salafees. This was 
done to demonstrate the different approaches of Salafees and the contemporary 
groups associated with Salafism that espouse violence. For example, Salafee 
da'wa efforts are concentrated on propagating the faith and rebuking what they 
perceive as unorthodox beliefs. Jihaadees, on the other hand, concentrate their 
efforts on regime change, political conflict, and violence, as the survey of ISIS’s 
literature suggests.  
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Chapter two further documented the differences in methodology between groups 
like ISIS and al-Qaeda, groups that both define themselves as being Salafist. The 
evidence showed that the extremist rhetoric and violence of those groups was in 
stark contrast with the pacifist apolitical nature of Salafism. Concepts like jihaad, 
takfeer, and methodological approaches to da’wa were heterogeneous. Jihaadists 
aim to spread an ideology based upon violence to wreak havoc on existing order, 
whereas Salafees seek to morally transform it. The blurring of the Salafee manhaj 
with violent takfeeree ideology constitutes an example of a key dilemma in this 
research. These inherent tensions were explored in this chapter and the finer 
details that distinguish Salafism from takfeerism, were addressed. The association 
of Salafism with takfeerism and jihaadism affects the way policy makers and 
academics approach counter extremism policy, and whom they designate as violent 
religious extremists. This is both counter productive and harmful to counter-
radicalization efforts, in fact it can lead to further alienation of Salafees with the 
potential to radicalize religiously immature youth.  
 
Chapter three sought to explore the role of modernism as an antithesis to Salafist 
interpretation and how modernist appraisals of Salafism are some of the most 
severe due to divergent interpretative discourse. Most modernists view Salafees 
and their methodology as being at the core of extremism. One of the central claims 
of critics of Salafism is that it does not accomadate pluralism and ijtihaad, and that it 
is too rigid, thus inept to deal with contemporary issues. For modernists, Islam is 
broad-based allowing for diverse interpretations of the religion. Also, there is an 
inherent tension in the two approaches: Salafees analyze the past for contemporary 
solutions whereas modernists seek to reform the religion to adapt to contemporary 
realities. Moreover, the chapter concluded that most contemporary Western 
research of Salafism is heavily dependent upon Wiktorowicz’s model, which 
classifies Salafees into three overlapping categories: pacifists, politicos, and violent 
jihaadees. This research analyzed this classification and its core premises, 
highlighting the inherent flaws of lumping together divergent movements, which do 
not share a common manhaj nor aim; although many of the basic tenets of creed 
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and methodology of textual interpretation do overlap. The implication of lumping 
together such diverse trends is that policy makers and academics can 
overgeneralize, thus inaccurately fail to target potential violent extremists while 
alienating Salafees who have shown to be antithetical to extremists. 
 
By exploring the main tenets of the Salafee creed, manhaj, and da’wa this research 
has highlighted the differences between jihaadee-takfeeree groups, and the Salafee 
da’wa. It was essential to explore those differences to show that they were indeed 
substantial and meaningful distinctions warranting reanalysis of Wiktorowicz’s 
classification. Another reason for questioning his analysis and categorization of the 
data was to show Salafees should not be a primary focus of policy makers as 
proponents of violence. 
 
The chapter highlighted the inadequacies of Wiktorowicz’s categorization and why it 
is time for a new model, which does not obscure Salafism with violent jihaadists. 
The association of Salafees with the other two trends Wiktorowicz mentioned 
presupposes that Salafees are one in the same as the jihaadists, but just in a latent 
state of violence. Finally, the chapter ended with a discussion of Wiktorowicz’s 
classification of Salafism and why that classification contrasts with how Salafees 
view themselves. An additional reason for reassessing Wiktorowicz’s categorization 
is because so many contemporary studies fail to differentiate Salafees from 
jihaadees and depend upon his taxonomy.   
 
In chapter four, Salafees’ behavior in a liberal democracy was analyzed to illustrate 
the flexibility of the Salafee da’wa, and to show that even under secular and 
pluralistic societies Salafees are not advocates of violence nor do they espouse 
violent extremist rhetoric. After purveying the data, the findings reveal that Salafees 
do not have a record for violence or espousing violent rhetoric. To the dismay of 
various critics of Salafism there is very little empirical data that shows any definitive 
link between Salafees and violent extremism. On the contrary, there are a growing 
number of works illustrating that Salafees have had a role to play in debunking 
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extremist ideology and propaganda (Umar 2018). In addition, from the exclusionary 
nature of their da’wa and their inherent hostility towards sectarianism and 
aberrations in the religion, there are no indications that they will not continue to play 
a leading role in confronting violent extremists and countering their ideology. 
 
Policy makers, counter terrorism practitioners, and academics are all perplexed by 
the rise in violent extremism. How to mitigate the process of radicalization has 
become a top policy priority in many Western democracies. Chapter five, sought to 
analyze the process of contemporary trends in extremist recruitment. It also 
questioned and analyzed what makes an efficient and effective counter-narrative to 
extremism and the role of Salafees in that process. One unexpected result of the 
literature review was the potential problem of weak Salafees transitioning to 
radicalism. In the case of Baker’s study new converts in the immature phase of 
spiritual development were evaluated and their experiences moving away from or 
transitioning towards radicalism was chronicled. Baker’s analysis illustrated that 
some converts who had not learned and become sufficiently grounded in the 
manhaj had shown the propensity to transition to violent extremism; however, this 
was in very few isolated cases. Majority of Baker’s case studies showed extremists 
transitioning to Salafism (2009). Overall, these anomalies did not significantly 
impact the hypothesis that Salafees are an antidote to extremism rather than its 
cause. This chapter also sought to outline some of the criteria of an effective 
counter-narrative. Issues like credibility of the messenger, ability to engage the 
target audience, and strength of the counter-narrative were all used as criterion. 
Some academics like Jacobson suggest an effective counter extremist message 
should seek to undermine extremist leadership, highlight civilian casualties, point to 
the difficulties of the lifestyle of a terrorist, and their tendency to engage in criminal 
activities. Chapter five also put forth the core arguments of the cynics of Salafism 
and their skepticism of partnering with Salafees in counter extremism. The primary 
argument of critics is that Salafees themselves are extreme and should not be 
abetted in anyway even if there appears to be a common good. Still others query: 
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          How effective are the Salafi [sic] arguments against violent extremism?  
          There is no easy answer to this critical question. For example, all the  
          various Salafi [sic] arguments did not convince Muhammad Yusuf to  
          abandon his ideas, nor have his followers stopped their indiscriminate   
          violence. However, the failure to convince Boko Haram combatants should  
          not be the only indication of the effectiveness of Salafi [sic] counter-violent  
          extremism. Equally relevant is the contribution of the discourses of  
          counter-violent extremism in strengthening the resilience of the vast  
          majority who are not violent extremists (Umar 2018:13). 
 
Umar’s observation encapsulates the dilemma of counter extremism efforts and a 
valid critique of Salafee efforts in Nigeria. However, this research does not 
hypothesize that Salafees offer the only method for countering extremists, nor does 
it argue that they are one hundred percent effective. Rather that Salafees do offer 
important counter-narratives, which at times influence potential radicals and help to 
exploit the weakness of violent narratives using sacred texts to debunk extremist 
ideology in the eyes of the masses. “Muslims need to hear these rebuttals against 
arguments quoting the Qur’an and Hadith [sic] to support violent extremism. Thus, 
one clear policy recommendation should be the mass popularization of these 
counter-radical narratives through the mass media…”  (Umar 2018:13). Although 
Umar is critical of Salafees’ role he also acknowledges the importance of their 
counter-narratives as antidotes to extremism and that they should be endorsed.  
 
Furthermore, many proponents of Salafees’ efficiency in confronting radicalism 
claim that Salafees are generally the most effective in confronting extremists, 
understanding their ideology, and debunking their narratives. One of the challenges 
discovered during the literature review was measuring how effective Salafee 
narratives are in debunking extremist messaging and engaging the target audience.   
 
The data accumulated during the course of this study shows that a part of fostering 
academic integrity is gaining accurate information. “A key principle in policy 
formulation is to strip away impediments to honest discourse” (Wimhurst 2016:14). 
To accurately gage Salafees' role as an antidote to extremism precise data of 
Salafism was needed, thus the necessity for this research. This research helped to 
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fill the gap in literature by providing essential knowledge about Salafism from an 
inside perspective. 
This research was undertaken to determine if Salafism is an antidote to extremism, 
and how Salafees address radicalism. This study’s findings can serve as a resource 
for both academics and policy makers and as an educational tool about Salafism 
and its relationship to violent extremism. In addition, the study provides useful data 
for counter extremism practitioners and offers tools to help problem solve.  
 
This study distinguishes itself from other studies of contemporary Salafism in that it 
offers an insider perspective, makes use of a plethora of contemporary Salafee 
texts, as well as the numerous sources of their critics. This research analyzes 
Salafism with the aim of clarifying their da’wa by discerning its fundamental 
doctrines from those of other contemporary groups. While many academics still 
maintain that Salafism is a source of violent extremism and inseparable from 
contemporary jihaadee movements, it is hoped that this research has helped to 
disprove some of these underlying assumptions. However still, critics like Wimhurst 
maintain, “Attempts to uncouple Salafi-jihadism [sic] from Islam are not only 
intellectually dishonest, they have consequences strategically. The more obvious 
issue is a failure to identify the problem” (2016:14). Increasingly accurate data will 
hopefully help to dispel the association of violent jihaadism with Salafism that 
Wimhurst suggests in order to precisely frame the problem and target practical 
solutions, so while Wimhurst argues that it is more academically honest to make the 
association of Salafism and jihaadism this research contends the opposite. There is 
clearly a need for more accurate data about Salafism and the radicalization process. 
In this light, Mckenzie claims, “The lack of empirical knowledge about the root 
causes and drivers of violent extremism (means)… CVE efforts are mostly 
designed and funded on the basis of anecdotal evidence, with unknown results” 
(McKenzie 2016:2). This is especially the case in Western democracies where 
Muslims are often viewed as a potential security threat and Salafism is thought to 
be the underlying ideology.  
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          It goes without saying that alienating an entire religious community  
          undermines American principles and values. Worse yet, this alienation  
          itself could very well spur radicalization, thereby undermining not only our  
          principles and values but also our security. Therefore, it is not  
          inconceivable that an alienating CVE agenda could in fact create the very  
          problem it sets out to solve (McKenzie 2016:13).  
 
Many of those who are radicalized, especially in the case of ISIS recruits, have 
been radicalized online by encountering extremist literature and propaganda. 
Therefore, attributing extremism to Salafism, and worse yet, to Islam as a faith, only 
further muddles policy objectives and isolates the Muslim community. “In other 
words, there is no clear nexus between a particular city, neighborhood, mosque, or 
community center and violent extremism in America. Yet, the current CVE agenda 
suggests otherwise” ((McKenzie 2016:4). This highlights the need for more 
accurate data about violent extremism and where to target resources and efforts to 
combat radicalization. More recent studies indicate that in the case of many EU 
nations, where most Western ISIS recruits come from, a failure to integrate second 
generational Muslims is a large factor resulting in the success of Jihaadist 
recruitment. Reinares asserts, “A generalized identity crisis among young, second-
generation descendants of immigrant Muslims in Western Europe’s wealthiest 
countries appears then to lie behind the most recent unprecedented jihadist [sic] 
mobilisation.” (2017:72).  Reinares goes on to claim that Salafism, and policy failure 
of Western democracies have further isolated many of these youths and prevented 
them from integrating. “Salafism as a rigorist understanding of the Qur’an and the 
Hadith [sic] leads its followers to believe that liberal democracy is haram [sic] or 
prohibited from an Islamic perspective, that there is an intrinsic incompatibility 
between Islam and democracy, and that Muslims living in majority non-Muslim 
countries should actually resist social integration…” (2017:73). This researcher has 
acknowledged that Salafees, in principle, reject democratic values; however, as the 
data suggests, they are not advocates of violence.  
A main premise of this research was to show that jihaadism and takfeerism should 
be divorced from Salafism and that those trends are present in a wide array of sects 
and groups, which at times espouse violence as a solution to current political unrest. 
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In this regard Wimhurst states: 
          It is self-evident that understanding the legitimate jurisprudential sources  
          of Salafi-jihadism [sic] is central to the shaping of counter-ideological  
          strategies both politically, and in policing and counter-terrorism.  
          Additionally, a failure to acknowledge the Islamic legitimacy of this ideology  
          has the potential to further frustrate Muslims seeking to give expression to  
          their political concerns (Wimhurst 2016:14).  
 
It appears Wimhurst is speaking to the danger of alienating Muslims by categorizing 
them all as security threats, although he maintains an association between Salafism 
and jihaadism, which according to this research, is equally misleading with serious 
consequences. 
           
          This does not mean that politicians should not champion progressive,  
          Western liberal interpretations of Islam. Rather, they should do so in a  
          manner that is fully informed. They should do so knowing that they are  
          advocating reform, not orthodoxy. Policies that advocate for a revisionist,   
          subjective view of history will always lack credibility—especially regarding  
          the history of a religion of which the authors have no membership or  
          apparent knowledge. (Wimhurst 2016:14). 
 
The inherent tension for policy makers is how to promote one sect that is more 
aligned with the state’s values over another. Many pundits suggest that those 
groups that uphold progressive liberal values should become partners in counter 
terrorism; however, as this study has shown, they also acknowledge those secular 
ideologues often lack credibility.  
Still some academics believe that to confront domestic terrorism and extremism 
governments will need to focus on individual approaches to extremism instead of 
faith-based approaches, which continue to isolate Muslims (McKenzie 2016). The 
dilemma Salafees face is that they often find themselves targeted or scrutinized by 
Western intelligence agencies, which often operate according to Wiktorowicz’s 
categorization of Salafism. This bias then serves to muddy sound data analysis that 
only makes it more difficult to disrupt the radicalization process. It is hoped that the 
results of this research will help to prevent blaming Salafees for violent extremism, 
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thus hindering further alienation of Salafees. Moreover, this research has 
highlighted that isolationism tends to be a factor in encouraging individuals to 
radicalize by alienating them and causing them to be increasingly insular, thus 
accelerating the radicalization process.  
 
Key Findings of Research 
 
This thesis set out to analyze whether Salafee discourse is an antidote to 
extremism. The central premise is that Salafees offer one of the most effective 
voices, not the only voice, in countering extremist ideology. The key findings of this 
research can be summed up as follows: 
 
• Salafees have a long tradition in offering rebuttals and refuting takfeeree 
thought stemming from the Companions rebuking of the Khawaarij. 
• The arguments put forth by Salafees to counter extremism are generally 
acknowledged to be more credible, according to experts, in engaging the 
extremists’ core constituency. 
• Salafees, although exclusionary, are not proponenets of violence and they 
view their movment as reformist with a consistent methodology to reform 
Muslim societies. 
• The Salafee manhaj starkly contrasts with jihaadists' concepts and worldview.  
• Salafees devote a lot of material, speeches, and literature to refuting 
extremists and their ideology. 
• Salafees present consistent and, notably, some of the most effective 
counter-narratives to extremists' narratives. However, they require additional 
promotion of those narratives to enhance effectiveness. 
• Some Salafee scholars directly confront and engage in debating extremists 
debunking and disrupting their ideology and, in some cases, disrupting their 
radicalization efforts. 
• Salafees are a factor in the counter-radicalization process in the Muslim 
community and should remain a part of that process. 
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• Groups like ISIS are not easily defeated because they set out to inspire and 
leave a legacy of terror and supplant their ideology. Salafees also realize the 
importance of legacy; however, their legacy is predicated upon creed and 
social reform of Muslim societies through education and da’wa. 
• Recent events like the downfall of ISIS's so-called caliphate show how strong 
ideology is in inspiring and indoctrinating future terrorists (Clarke and Ingram 
2018:1-2).  
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
During this study many equally important areas of research were discovered. The 
following suggestions are areas of study for important future inquiry. 
 
1. There could have been wider sampling of known Salafee websites, mosques, 
and institutions. 
 
2. There should be further research into looking at concrete solutions to 
radicalization. Some have suggested that in France for example the prison 
system actually promoted Salafism and that this did not reduce the 
propensity of inmate radicalization. McKenzie advocates: 
 
Rehabilitation and reintegration programs should also include a structured 
and systematic mechanism for input and participation from former terrorists. 
These individuals are important for at least two reasons: first, they can help 
provide a nuanced, empathetic understanding of the radicalization and de-
radicalization process, and second, their firsthand accounts provide powerful 
narratives in prison programs (2016:9).  
 
3. Additional research should be focused on additional ways Salafees can work 
with counter extremism practitioners especially NGOs, so as not to convolute 
the relationship between church and state in Western democracies.  
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4. Also, there is a need for more research into how governments can 
encourage Salafees in their role of producing counter-narratives? Moreover, 
academics can do more research on Salafism based upon the criterion of 
leading scholars of Salafism instead of using antiquated categorizations. It 
must be acknowledged that there is more and more research and data being 
collected upon contemporary Salafism, which is fundamentally important to 
understanding the movement and its relation to jihaadism; however even 
these contemporary research papers, conferences, and compilations mostly 
fail to distinguish between Salafism as its own unique trend separate from 
jihaadism and takfeerism. While the movement advocating a greater role for 
Salafees in counter extremism is growing, major splits remain between policy 
pundits of how to address this problem. If Salafees begin to play a stronger 
role and are encouraged to do so by Islamic governments, by allowing them 
political space, this can be a means for tackling the problem, while all parties 
maintain legitimacy and integrity.  
 
5. Lastly, there is a need to explore ways Salafees can deal with the potential 
resurgence of ISIS and their propaganda. New evidence suggests that ISIS 
is preparing for a nostalgic resurgent narrative as a recent RAND report 
suggests (2018). What are the implications for policy makers? What counter-
narratives might Salafees produce to help disrupt extremist recruitment? 
“Counter-narratives seem to address the religious ideas explored in Salafi-
jihadi [sic] literature more successfully, but still do not prominently tackle 
about 40 percent of the key ideological concepts of Salafi-jihadism [sic]” 
(Comerford and Bryson 2018:2). More recent evidence suggests that 
Salafees and their counter-narratives do have a role to play in disrupting 
radicalism. 
 
In conclusion, Salafees play a critical role in producing effective counter-narratives 
to violent extremist thought. The question remains as to how academics, policy 
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pundits, and counter-terrorism experts can capitalize on those narratives. One of 
the first priorities of academics and policy makers should be to reassess Salafism 
and existing classifications in order to build a wider consensus on how to approach 
the problem of extremism in the Muslim community. The data in this research can 
be a first step in gathering accurate information towards that end. There are also 
additional steps that Salafees can take to counter radicalization since they have a 
vested interest to do so. 
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